FAR EASTERN POLltfC?
G. F. HUDSON and MARTHE RAJCHMAN
With a Supplement for the Years 1938 to 1942 by
GEORGE E. TAYLOR
and additional maps by
Issued under the auspices of the
Institute of Pacific Relations, by
THE JOHN DAY COMPANY
FIRST PUBLISHED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY FABER & FABER LTD. 1938
ENLARGED EDITION WITH SUPPLEMENT FOR THE YEARS 1938 TO 1942
FIRST PUBLISHED IN THE UNITED STATES 1942
Copyright, 1942, by the
Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. THIS BOOK, OR PARTS THEREOF, MUST
NOT BE REPRODUCED IN ANY FORM WITHOUT PERMISSION
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BY THE HADDON CRAFTSMEN, INC., CAMDEN, N. J.
In sponsoring the publication in the United States of this en-
larged edition of An Atlas of Far Eastern Politics the Secretariat
o the Institute of Pacific Relations has been mainly concerned
to make available to North American readers a book which has
never had the distribution it deserved in the United States and
one which recent dramatic developments in the Far East have
made even more important than when it was first published in
Though surprisingly little of the earlier edition has been ren-
dered out of date by the march of events, it has seemed desirable
to add a supplement dealing particularly with the course of the
Sino-Japanese war since 1938 and with the impact which the
European war has had upon the whole Far Eastern scene. This
supplement, written by Professor George E. Taylor, head of the
Far Eastern Department at the University of Washington and
author of The Struggle for North China, has been prepared
quite independently and without consultation with Mr. Hudson.
Considerations of time and space have made it impossible to
model the supplement exactly upon the earlier chapters of the
Atlas but it is hoped that the principal broad tendencies of the
past three and a half years have been reasonably well covered.
It has not been possible to include an account of the reactions in
sbt ; tb ; the current struggle between Nazi Germany and
TTie siicfden attack by Japan against Hawaii, the Philippines
anti^^laya on December 7 followed by the German and Italian
declarations of war against the United States finally brought
the Far East and America into another world war. That war will
change many of the facts and problems discussed herein, but
for the present the need for such a book is immensely increased
and it has therefore been decided to issue it without attempting
revisions to meet the current war developments.
Though the present edition is issued under the auspices of the
Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, neither the Sec-
retariat nor any of the Institute's national councils accepts re-
sponsibility for statements of fact or opinion in the book or for
its maps. The authors alone are responsible for both text and
W. L, HOLLAND
March x, 1942,
PREFACE page 7
I. THE APPROACHES TO THE FAR EAST 15
II. LANDS AND PEOPLES 26
III. THE WESTERNERS 40
IV. MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC 52
V. THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN 62
VI. SOVIET SIBERIA 76
VII. MANCHUKUO 87
VIII. MONGOLIA AND SINKIANG IO2
IX. SOUTH OF THE WALL 114
X. THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS 157
XI. THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC 159
XII. THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT, I937-IQ4O 174
XIII. FAR EAST IN WORLD POLITICS 189
1 . Ways of access to China (modern) page 25
2. Climatic regions of the Far East 27
3. Ethnography of the Far East 33
4. Populations of Far Eastern countries 39
5. Cities of the Far East 43
6. Ports of the Far East 47
7. China under the Ming and Manchu dynasties 53
8. Provinces of China in the last ten years 59
9. The territorial expansion of Japan 65
10. Minerals in Japan and Korea 69
n. Japanese trade 1936 71
12. Japanese trade expansion 73
13. East Siberia: resources and industries 79
14. East Siberia: communications 81
15. Manchurian railways 1931 89
1 6. Manchurian railways 1938 95
17. Vladivostok and Rashin 97
1 8. Manchukuo: coal, iron and density of population idi
19. The Mongols 105
20. Mongolia and Sinkiang: communications in
2 1 . China : railways 115
22. China: roads 117
23. China: airways 119
24. China: density of population by provinces 121
25. China: agriculture 123
26* China: coal resources 125
27. China: coal and iron production 1936 127
28. China: mineral production 1936 129
29. China: tea, silk, cotton and vegetable oil production 131
30. China: the Japanese invasion 1937-8 133
31. Naval and air bases of the Pacific 141
32. Oil, iron and tin of the East Indies 153
33. The South China Sea 155
34. The Southwest Pacific 166
35. Strategic raw materials of the Southwest Pacific 169
36. Free China and occupied China, 1941 173
37. Land communications in China and East Asia 177
38. The Western Pacific 184
39. Southeast Asia 188
40. Northeast Asia and Northern Pacific 197
AN ATLAS OF FAR EASTERN POLITICS
THE APPROACHES TO THE FAR EAST
There have been in history three ways of approach to the region
of the world known as the Far East: the first, by sea from the
Indian Ocean; the second, overland from the countries of the
Middle East; and the third, across the Pacific from North or
The trans-Pacific approach belongs to modern times; it dates
only from the voyage of Magellan in 1519. The Polynesians
navigated vast expanses of the Pacific in outrigger canoes, but
there is no evidence that they ever jumped the gaps that separate
Hawaii and Easter Island from the Americas. Disabled Japanese
junks have occasionally been carried by wind and current to the
coast of California, but no definite knowledge of America seems
to have come to Asia by such accidents. The pre-Columbian
natives of the New World were not seafarers, and the close
proximity of North America and Asia at the Bering Strait, how-
ever important for the peopling of the Americas with human
stock, belongs to a zone too remote from the areas of old civiliza-
tion to have significance in history. It may be said without con-
siderable qualification that up to the sixteenth century of our era
the Pacific Ocean imposed an absolute limit to human inter-
course east of Asia.
THE APPROACHES TO THE FAR EAST
The approaches by sea and land from the Middle East, on
the other hand, have been in use from remote antiquity, and an
account of them must reveal the natural boundaries of the Far
Eastern region, for it is just the main obstacles to communication
with the farther parts of Asia which determine the most suitable
limits for the three conventional divisions of the continent into
Near, Middle and Far East. It is always possible, of course, to
divide an area of the earth's surface merely according to a scale of
remoteness, but such a regional partition should have more of
geographical significance than this, and the three degrees of re-
moval which we recognize in viewing Asia from Europe actually
do correspond to definable natural areas.
Leaving out of account the Arctic littoral, Asia has three
coastlines: to the west, the Mediterranean and Black Sea, to the
south, the Indian Ocean, and to the east, the Pacific. Before the
making of the canal, the isthmus of Suez barred any access for
shipping from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, and even
now it remains a very definite dividing line. From the Indian
Ocean to the Pacific there is a continuous natural seaway, but
the Malay Peninsula, reaching south to within two degrees of the
Equator, makes a very sharp corner at the southeastern ex-
tremity of Asia, and Singapore is no less of a boundary than
Suez. The three Asiatic coastlines are thus clearly separated, and
their hinterlands may be identified with the three regions of the
East; by this criterion the Near East includes Turkey and Syria
(with Egypt), the Middle East, Arabia, Iraq, Iran and India,
and the Far East, Indo-China and China.
These divisions by relation to coastline would not, however,
have so much significance if they did not correspond to two well-
marked insulating barriers inland. The Ararat highlands and
THE APPROACHES TO THE FAR EAST
the Hamad (Syrian desert) intervene between the Mediter-
ranean and Persian Gulf lands, and formerly set an eastward
limit to that Mediterranean-centered political creation, the
Roman empire. Similarly, a vast mountain system comprising
the Pamirs-Tibet and Yunnan-Burma highlands shuts off China
from India and Iran, the mountains being reinforced to the
north of Tibet by the deserts of Sinkiang. These two great ram-
parts of natural obstruction may be regarded as fixing the con-
fines of the Near, Middle and Far Eastern regions.
The Pamirs-Burma mountain system affords by far the more
impervious barrier of the two, and accounts for the high degree
of isolation which was the condition of Far Eastern history until
quite recently. Though the isolation of the Far East has often
been exaggerated, it remains true that China has been in the
past more secluded from cultural contact and interaction with
an outer world than any section of the region extending from
Spain to Bengal; the history of China is more self-contained than
that of India, Persia, Greece or Western Europe. The Achaeme-
nid kings of ancient Persia, Alexander the Great and the Arab
Caliphs all bridged the gap between Near and Middle East and
ruled from the shores of the Mediterranean to the Pamirs, but
none of them passed the Pamirs and penetrated to China; nor
did any Indian kingdom extend its sway beyond the Himalayas
or east of the Salween. Buddhism was propagated from India
throughout the Far East, but it never displaced the traditional
native religion of China; Islam also reached China, but it never
created there a new epoch of history as it did in India. The snows
of Sarikol and the Kum Tagh sands repelled the temporal power
of Persepolis or Baghdad and weakened the impact of those
spiritual forces which they could not forbid.
THE APPROACHES TO THE FAR EAST
By longitude Tibet and Sinkiang, lying north of the Ganges
plain, should be comprised within the Middle East, but the
course of history which has made them to this day at least
nominally parts of China, corresponds to a strong geographical
, predisposition; they are more accessible from the east than from
the south or west, though just lately, since the construction of
the Turksib railway, the gravitational pull of the Soviet Union
has been very strong in Sinkiang. From the great peak of Khan
Tengri (23,620 feet) in the T'ien-shan southwest of Kulja round
to the great gorge by which the Dihong cuts its way down from
Tibet to become the Brahmaputra in the plains of Assam, the
formal frontier of China follows the line of the most tremendous
mountain rampart in the world. The T'ien-shan, the Pamirs,
the Karakorum and the Himalayas are all mountain ranges on a
grand scale, and the last-named is backed by the vast plateau of
Tibet, a country where many tens of thousands of square miles
lie higher than the summit of Mont Blanc. On these upper
levels the way for caravans has always been arduous in the ex-
treme; Marco Polo tells of the forty days' journey on the high
Pamirs, where "in all this way you shall come to no town, nor
habitation, nor grass, and therefore it is needful for those that
do travel that way to carry with them provision and victuals for
themselves and their horses."
It is possible to avoid the high mountains by going to the
north of the T'ien-shan and then southeast to China via Hami.
There is a clear way from west to east across Asia through the
gap between the T'ien-shan and the mountains of the Altai
system. This way went the caravan route from the Sea of Azov
to Peiping described by Pegolotti in the fourteenth century, and
this way runs the road from the Turksib railway to Lanchow by
THE APPROACHES TO THE FAR EAST
which Russian munitions are supplied to China in the present
war. But for access to China from India or Persia such a route
has always meant a long detour added onto a distance already
excessive for commerce before the age of mechanical transport.
For an approach from the direction of the lower Volga it was
more convenient, but, whatever its natural advantages, it has
been at most times in history rendered extremely difficult for
trade or travel by the nomadic barbarism of the steppes through
which it passes. The same applies in an even greater degree to
the open country to the north of the Altai; here there could be
no question of a route from Indian or Mediterranean countries
to the Far East, and the opening of trans-Asian communications
in such high latitudes depended on the development of Russia
and her expansion eastward through Siberia it dates, there-
fore, only from the seventeenth century.
Turning from the north to the south of the great central
mountain block of Asia, we find obstruction of a somewhat dif-
ferent kind, but no less formidable. From the southeastern
corner of the Tibetan plateau mountain ranges splay out to-
ward the south, reaching the sea in Tenasserim, where the
Malay Peninsula juts out from the land-mass of Indo-China.
These mountains diminish rapidly in height from north to
south though there are large areas over 10,000 feet as far south
as lat. 25 and on this border there are no perils from blizzard
and avalanche or complications of desert and nomadic ma-
rauders. But an exceptionally high annual rainfall the world's
record of 424 inches average is held by Cherrapunji in the
Khasi hills in Assam clothes the hill tracts facing the Bay of
Bengal with dense tropical vegetation, which makes them hardly
less difficult to traverse than the loftier heights of the Pamirs or
THE APPROACHES TO THE FAR EAST
Himalayas. Nor has the human population been more favor-
able to economic and cultural contacts of a high order than it
has in the steppe and alpine grasslands of Central Asia. An
environment of mountain forests has kept a wide region in the
interior of Indo-China in various stages of primitive culture
more or less impervious to influences from areas of higher civi-
lization to west, east and south; the Naga, Mishmi, Kachin and
Wa tribes were head-hunters until yesterday, and the more
civilized Shans and Karens, forming numerous petty principal-
ities in their hill-girt valleys, have always stoutly resisted incor-
poration in any large, centralized state.
With such obstacles to overland communication between the
Middle and Far East, it might seem, nevertheless, that the con-
tinuous seaway from the Indian Ocean into the Pacific would
afford a sufficiently close contact. Yet the Malay Peninsula has
been up to modern times a strong factor of separation, for not
only did it mean a long, roundabout voyage from the Bay of
Bengal to the South China Sea, but it diverted maritime traffic
into waters where piracy used to flourish with peculiar vigor.
Malaya, Sumatra and Borneo, with their numerous adjacent
small islands, lying within the zone of equatorial rain forest,
always remained a region of backward culture, the inhabitants
of which preferred freebooting to regular trade, so that shipping
on the way between India and China was at all times in hazard.
With the arrival of gun-armed European ships in the seas round
Malaya the pirate proa met more than its match, but in earlier
centuries the development of commerce in these waters was
seriously impeded by a piracy too ubiquitous and elusive ever to
be suppressed. Even after Malacca had grown into a great em-
porium for trade from Java and the Moluccas, as well as from
THE APPROACHES TO THE FAR EAST
Siam and China, the institutions of orderly economic life were
little in evidence, and the Italian traveler Varthema, who vis-
ited Malacca in 1506, complains that "one cannot walk about
at night here, because people are killed like dogs, and the mer-
chants who come sleep on their ships. . . . The king has a gov-
ernor to administer justice for foreigners, but the people of the
country take the law into their own hands, and they are the
worst race that was ever created on earth."
In view of the length and dangers of the voyage through the
Straits of Malacca and round Malaya, trade tended to make use
of a portage across the isthmus of Kra, renouncing the advan-
tages of continuous voyage, but reducing the risks from piracy.
The isthmus of Kra appears to have been the main center for
the diffusion of Indian influences in Indo-China during the
early centuries of our era, 1 and later a route from Bangkok to
Tenasserim was much in use for the export of Chinese porcelain
to Islamic countries a trade well attested by the quantities of
broken wares recovered from the earth in this area.
With or without the Kra short cut, however, the "southeast
passage" failed throughout ancient and medieval times to attain
primacy as a means of access to the Far East, and the overland
routes through Sinkiang, in spite of their difficulties, retained
most of the traffic there was. The main trans-Asian caravan
route in the second century A.D. ran from Antioch in Syria to
Ctesiphon (on the Tigris below Baghdad) and thence by the
modern Ramadan, Damghan, Merv, Balkh and the Pamir passes
to Tashkurgan in Sarikol, where there was a mart for Chinese
raw silk, which was brought from China Proper through Sin-
1 The Khmer culture of Cambodia, represented by the famous ruins
of Angkor, thus received its initial stimulus.
THE APPROACHES TO THE FAR EAST
kiang either by the route to the north of the Taklamakan desert
(Anhsi-Hami-Turfan-Karashar-Kuchar-Akus-Kashgar) or by^that
to the south of it (Anhsi-Tunhuang-Charkhlik-Charchan-Keriya-
Khotan-Yarkand). No road to the north of the T'ien-shan ap-
pears to have been used in that period, but later on a trade route
from the Black Sea to Samarkand via Astrakhan and Khiva,
which became important from the sixth century onward, was
extended to China by way of Kulja, Urumchi 1 and Hami. In the
time of Marco Polo both the trans-Pamir and Kulja-Urumchi
routes were in use, corresponding to lines of approach to China
from south and north of the Caspian respectively; Marco him-
self, coming through Persia, traveled by Kashgar, Khotan and
Charchan, but the elder Polos came from Sarai on the Volga to
Bokhara, and they probably went on by Kulja.
From India and from the Bay of Bengal there were two direct
overland routes to China: one across the Himalayas and Tibet
via Lhasa, and the other by Burma and Yunnan. So great were
the disadvantages, however, of both these ways that the main
lines of communication between India and China, during the
period when Buddhism was propagated from India all over the
Far East, were through Sinkiang. From Kashmir there was
always the road to Kashgar by Hunza and the Mintaka pass
(15,450 feet), or the Balkh-Kashgar road could be reached fur-
ther west via Chitral or Kabul a roundabout way of getting
from the Ganges to the Yellow River, but the best available in
pre-modern conditions of travel.
After the arrival of European shipping in the Indian Ocean
with the voyage of Vasco da Gama in 1498, the sea route round
Malaya was opened up more than ever before, and became by
1 Now officially Tihwa, but better known by its old name.
THE APPROACHES TO THE FAR EAST
far the most important approach to the Far East. The traditional
overland routes fell into decline, and, in particular, the old
Khotan-Charchan route was almost completely abandoned. On
the other hand, the last four centuries have seen the develop-
ment by Western powers of two new lines of approach: the
trans-Siberian and trans-Pacific.
The Russians, pressing eastward to the north of the Altai,
reached Lake Baikal early in the seventeenth century and
opened trade with China across Mongolia along the route
Irkutsk-Kiakhta-Urga-Peiping. But when in the last decade of
the nineteenth century the building of a transcontinental rail-
way was undertaken by Russia, it was decided to carry it, not
across the Gobi to Peiping and Tientsin, but to the most south-
erly Russian port on the Pacific. The political situation in 1896
having enabled the Russians to get permission from China to
build the line through Manchuria, it became possible to ap-
proach China overland from Russia without having to cross
either high mountains or deserts. The trans-Siberian was even-
tually linked with the Chinese railway system by the connec-
tion Harbin-Mukden-Peiping, entering China not from the
northwest or north, but from the northeast. The Russians have
had plans ever since the 'nineties for a short-cut line from the
Trans-Siberian to China Proper via Urga or Hami, but no such
railway has yet been built, though there is now a line as far as
Urga (Ulan Bator, the capital of Outer Mongolia).
The approach to Asia across the Pacific dates only, as has
been already pointed out, from Magellan's voyage in 1519. Up
to about 1850 ships came from the direction of Cape Horn or
the Magellan Straits, having sailed round South America from
Europe or New England; or they came from the Pacific ports of
THE APPROACHES TO THE FAR EAST
Latin America, Mexico being the most northerly region of
European settlement on the Pacific coast. Then, with the rapid
growth of San Francisco as a port of the U.S.A. from 1848 on-
ward, shipping began to sail thence almost due west actually
with a slant southward through six degrees of latitude to
Shanghai, which had been first opened to foreign trade in 1842.
Japan, which had hitherto held place as the far end of the Far
East, the Cipangu which Marco Polo heard of but never reached,
lay in the path of the new oceanic trade route, and it was the
Americans coming across the Pacific, not the Europeans ap-
proaching from the south, who in 1853 compelled the self-
secluded Japanese to enter into relations with the outer world.
===== Steamship _.
Over 3000 feet 1/771 Over 9000 feet
^ Access barred
._.-.. Boundary of 18 out of
28 Chinese provinces
I. WAYS OF ACCESS TO CHINA (MODERN)
LANDS AND PEOPLES
The region of the Far East may be divided into three zones: a
southern zone extending from lat. 10 south of the Equator to
20 north of it, a middle one from soN. to 40N., and a
northern from 40 N. to the Arctic, The southern includes
Indonesia, Malaya and most of Indo-China, the middle covers
China Proper, Tibet and the main areas of Korea and Japan,
and the northern comprises Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia
a vast continental area which in it relation to China Proper
may conveniently be termed the Northland.
The southern zone of the Far East lies entirely within the
tropics. It includes an equatorial zone, extending to about five
degrees on both sides of the Equator, in which there is hardly
any seasonal variation of temperature or rainfall; this climatic
belt appears to be very unfavorable to human progress, and to
such environmental influence must be attributed the fact that
Indian civilization, diffused over the nearer parts of Indonesia
and Indo-China, never took root in Sumatra, Malaya or Borneo,
but flourished remarkably in Cambodia and Siam to the north
and in Java to the south countries with definite alternations
of wet and dry seasons. The southern zone of the Far East con-
tains no deserts; it has almost everywhere a very high annual
117 - 196
078 - 117
LID 39- 58
15 - 19
It - IS
2. CLIMATIC REGIONS OF THE FAR EAST
LANDS AND PEOPLES
rainfall and is for the most part heavily forested in its natural
state. The rains of Indo-China are provided by the monsoon
wind system of southeastern Asia. In winter the winds blow
outward toward the southwest, south and southeast from an
intense high-pressure belt over Mongolia, Sinkiang and southern
Siberia; in summer the direction is reversed and they blow in-
ward from the Indian Ocean and China Seas as bearers of rain.
Java and the Lesser Sunda Islands, which are affected climati-
cally by the arid land surface of Australia, have a monsoon
system of their own with wet west and dry east winds.
The middle zone of the Far East may be reckoned as sub-
tropical; it lies within the sphere of the monsoons, and has wet
summers and dry winters like the lands to the south, but it is
distinguished by a considerable annual range of temperature
and by a marked shrinking of rainfall toward the northwest,
leading to sub-arid conditions on the borders of Mongolia.
China has everywhere a hot summer, but it has the coldest
winter south to the Nanling mountains for any part of the
world in parallel latitudes; bitterly cold northwest winds sweep
from Mongolia over the North China Plain, and the Poyang
lake to the south of the Yangtse is sometimes frozen over below
the latitude of Cairo. The South China littoral, the more shel-
tered valleys of western China, and Japan, except for its north-
western coasts, escape these severe winters, and the contrast of
these areas with North China is emphasized by the still more
important differences in the matter of rainfall. Mean annual
rainfalls are 85 inches at Hongkong, 58 at Tokyo, 45 at Shang-
hai, 25 at Peiping and 14 at Taiyuan (Shansi). Most of China
south of the Yangtse has over 50 inches of rain in a year and is
naturally a green and well-forested land; the same holds good of
LANDS AND PEOPLES
Japan, where luxuriant timber covers nearly all the ground that
is not under cultivation. North China, on the other hand, is a
region o comparatively low rainfall, declining below 10 inches
in parts of Kansu; in good years the rains are sufficient for agri-
culture, but they often fail to reach the necessary minimum and
the resulting crop failures produce famine. Much of North
China is now practically treeless; this is partly due to artificial
deforestation always terribly effective in such marginal lands
but the country, even in early times, can only have been
lightly timbered as compared with South China, Indo-China or
Japan. Its character predestined it to be the original seat of the
great independent civilization of the Far East, for under neo-
lithic cultural conditions the zone of decisive initial progress
was the sub-tropical, sub-arid, the grade between the well-
watered forest land and the steppe or desert. Indian civilization
arose in the dry lands of Sind and the Punjab, and only later
spread over the rain-favored plains of the Ganges; similarly,
Chinese civilization arose in the basin of the Yellow River and
had attained there a high level more than a thousand years be-
fore we find evidence of any such development in the valleys
of the Yangtse, the Si-kiang or the Mekong.
The contrast between the Yellow River and Yangtse lands in
the time of the Han dynasty (206 B.C. A.D. 221) was noted by
the Chinese historian Ssu-ma Ch'ien, who describes the latter as
a "large territory sparsely populated, where people eat rice and
drink fish soup; where land is tilled with fire and hoed with
water; where people collect fruits and shellfish for food and
enjoy self-sufficiency without commerce. The region is fertile
and suffers no famine. Hence the people are lazy and poor and
do not bother to accumulate wealth; south of the Yangtse and
LANDS AND PEOPLES
the Hwai there are neither hungry nor frozen people, nor a
family which owns a thousand gold." 1 Yet the Yangtse valley came
in course of time to be no less intensively cultivated and densely
peopled than the old China of the Yellow River, and this result
was brought about by colonization from the north; the natural
fertility of the south country was made to yield its wealth
to a technique of agriculture developed under more arduous
The land areas of the southern and middle zones of the Far
East are everywhere capable of cultivation except for moun-
tainous tracts and the higher plateaux of Tibet. In the third
zone, however, we come to an immense region over by far the
greater part of which agriculture is forbidden either by aridity
or frigidity of climate. The Northland, extending from the
Great Wall of China to the Arctic Ocean, is divisible into three
sub-zones: one of steppe and desert in the forties of latitude, a
second, of forest (generally sparse east of the Yenisei), and a
third, of treeless "tundra" above the Arctic Circle. Of the steppe
region only the fringes can be cultivated, but the whole pro-
vides pasture for animals and has thus been traditionally the
domain of horse-riding, tent-dwelling, milk-sustained herdsmen,
who represent a culture diametrically opposed to that of the
sedentary, agricultural Chinese. These nomads have always been
the neighbors of China to the north, and until recently were
one of the main factors in Chinese history.
Before the coming of the Russians regular agriculture in the
Northland was confined to the piedmont oases of Sinkiang and
the pale of Chinese settlement in southern Manchuria. The belt
1 Ssu-ma Ch'ien, chiian 102. Quoted by Ch'ao-ting Chi, Key Economic
Areas in Chinese History, p. 98. *
LANDS AND PEOPLES
of arable land along the present Trans-Siberian railway to the
north of Mongolia and in northern Manchuria remained wilder-
ness, being cut off from Chinese colonization or influence by
nomad-infested steppe and lacking river communication with
the south the fact that all the great rivers of northern Asia
flow either to the Arctic Ocean (the Ob, Yenisei and Lena) or
to the northerly Okhotsk Sea (the Amur) has contributed much
to the historic isolation of Siberia. Up to the middle* of the seven-
teenth century there was nothing in northeastern Asia above
the forty-fifth parallel of latitude except a barbarism with grada-
tions from the hunting-and-fishing economy of the Chukchis
and Ghilaks through the reindeer-keeping of the Yakuts and
Tungus to the horse-and-cattle nomadism of the Mongols.
The Northland Pacific littoral has a character of its own which
is extremely adverse to human habitation. This region com-
bines the intense cold of the Siberian winter with a chilly, wet
summer unfavorable either for agriculture or stock-raising.
East of the Stanovoi mountains the northern limit of cereals
descends to about the latitude of Paris, and at Vladivostok in
the parallel of Marseilles the sea freezes for four months in the
year. The climatic conditions closely resemble those of Labra-
dor in similar latitudes on the east coast of North America, and
even Soviet planning has not so far made much out of this
territory. In former times Possiet Bay was the northern limit for
shipping, Chinese, Japanese or Korean, and no attempt was ever
made to colonize the coasts beyond.
Turning from environment and basic economic types to eth-
nography, we find that the whole of the southern and middle
zones of the Far East, with the exception of Korea and Japan, is
occupied by peoples belonging to three great linguistic families:
NOTE ON MAP 3
This map is intended to indicate the distribution of the prin-
cipal ethnic types without reference to density of population.
For the relative density of population in the provinces of China
Proper and Manchuria, see maps 18 and 24.
The Tibetans, Turks, Mongols and Tungus occupy large
areas on the map, but with very low density; the Chinese and
Russian areas, on the other hand, are generally of high density,
and the Chinese and Russians often form the urban population
in regions where the native peoples still predominate in the
open country. Thus all the towns of Siberia may be counted as
Russian and those of the Miao, Shan and Lolo districts of the
west and southwest of China as Chinese.
3. ETHNOGRAPHY. OF THE FAR EAST
LANDS AND PEOPLES
the Austronesian, the Austroasiatic and the Sinitic. It is worthy
of note, as indicating the separateness of the Far Eastern region
from very remote times, that neither the Indo-European,
Hamito-Semitic nor Dravidian families are represented in the
Far East, and that the three Far Eastern families are not repre-
sented in Asia farther west than Tibet and central India.
The Austronesian language family comprises three sub-fam-
ilies: Indonesian, Melanesian and Polynesian. Its range extends
over Malaya and all the archipelagoes from Sumatra to Easter
Island and from Timor to Formosa; it also has a trans-oceanic
branch in Madagascar. It covers a large number of distinct
spoken languages, of which the most important at the present
day are Malay, Javanese, Sundanese and Tagalog all of the
The Austroasiatic group includes several languages of back-
ward tribal areas scattered from the South China Sea to central
India and two important living tongues Khmer (Cambodian)
and Annamese. 1 Over a wide area between the Bay of Bengal and
the Pacific older stocks of Austroasiatic speech have been sub-
merged by later Sinitic-speaking invaders from the north, such
as the Burmese' and Siamese. The Sinitic family has three
branches: Chinese, Tibeto-Burman and Tai (including Siamese,
Shan and the Miao dialects of South China); it belongs entirely
to the Far East, and has not spread north of the Kunlun moun-
tains and the Great Wall of China except with Chinese coloniza-
tion in historic times.
The greater part of the Northland was held before the arrival
1 Annamese is classified by some with the Tai group of the Sinitic
family. See, however, J. Przyluski, Langues austroasiatiques in Les
Langues du monde, ed. A. Meillet and M. Cohen, pp. 395-8.
LANDS AND PEOPLES
of the Russians by tongues of the Altaian family, classifiable into
Turkish, Mongol and Tungusic branches. This language group,
owing to its association with nomadism, is very widely spread;
its range extends to the Mediterranean (Turkey), to the Arctic
Ocean (the Yakuts) and to the Pacific (the Tungus), but the
total of its speakers is small outside the settled communities of
Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkestan.
Beyond the foregoing threefold classification of Far Eastern
languages fall Korean, Japanese and certain tribal languages of
the extreme northeast of Siberia and the Primorsk, the affini-
ties of which have not yet been discovered. 1 The geographical
distribution of these forms of speech on the farthest rim of
Asia suggests that they are survivals comparable to Basque in
On such ethnic foundations cultural tradition and political
state-making have in course of time created unities and differ-
ences from which nationalities in the modern sense of the word
have been, or are being, formed. Besides the two big indigenous
nations of the Far East, the Chinese and the Japanese, there are
today about a dozen lesser nationalities which have to be taken
into account, and in addition, a large number of human beings
living in tribal or petty local units and eluding any "national"
By cultural tradition older than the arrival of Europeans the
peoples of the Far East leaving out of account the more primi-
tive tribal elements belong to three different domains of civili-
zation: the Chinese, the Indian and the Islamic. The first of
1 It is held by some that Japanese is related to the Indonesian group
and therefore to the Austronesian family of languages, but there is so
far no consensus of opinion on the matter among philologists.
LANDS AND PEOPLES
these is native to the Far East, whereas the other two are in-
trusive from the west.
Chinese civilization, having grown up in the basin of the Yellow
River, extended its domain in two ways: through colonization by
the Chinese themselves and through the reception of Chinese
culture by non-Chinese peoples. The former type of expansion
prevailed as far south as Hainan and formed the modern China
Proper, including the Yangtse and Si-kiang basins; the latter
kind brought Annam, Korea and Japan within the Chinese
cultural sphere, all these three countries adopting classical
literary Chinese as the language of education and learning.
Indian culture from about the beginning of our era penetrated
by colonization and influenced Indo-China (except Annam) and
the nearer parts of Indonesia. The traditional culture of Siam
and Cambodia is thus affiliated, but in Malaya and Indonesia
the Hindu-Buddhist influence was superseded by Islam in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and now survives only in Bali.
In another direction Indian cultural expansion was even more
far-reaching; from the first century A.D. Buddhism was trans-
mitted to China along the silk-trading caravan routes through
Sinkiang, and through China it reached also Korea and Japan.
Within the sphere of the Chinese literary tradition, however, the
Indian religion was always a subsidiary element except for a
while in Japan. More profound was the effect of Buddhism in
Tibet, where it assumed the special form known as lamaism and
dominated the whole life of the country. From Tibet Lama-
Buddhism spread northeastward to Mongolia, and both in
Tibet and Mongolia modern nationalist feeling has its roots in
a national "church," even though it is anti-clerical in tendency.
Following in the wake of India's spiritual expansion, Islam,
LANDS AND PEOPLES
spreading from Arabia and Iran, likewise reached the Far East
on two courses, one to the south and the other to the north.
Across the Indian Ocean Arab traders and adventurers prop-
agated their faith among the Malays of Sumatra, who carried
it to other parts of Indonesia. The Hindu power in Java was
destroyed by the capture of Madjopait in 1478 and Java became
entirely Mohammedan. Islam was spread eastward as far as
Mindanao, Ceram and Timor, but everywhere except in Java
prevailed only in coastal districts, the inland tribes retaining
their primitive paganism.
In Central Asia the Turki-speaking people of Sinkiang- were
converted to Islam "as were their kinsmen to the west of the
Pamirs. The line between Moslem and Buddhist now corre-
sponds almost exactly to the linguistic division of Turk and
Mongol. Further, Islam, cutting across the line of Buddhist
expansion from Tibet to Mongolia, established itself in north-
west China and created the numerous Chinese-speaking Moslem
community known as Tungans, who can hardly be counted as
a separate nationality, but form a very distinct and centrifugal
section of the Chinese people.
To these formative factors of cultural inheritance must be
added, as constituents of nationality, historical traditions of
political sovereignty and state-making. In China there is the
great tradition of the "Middle Kingdom" and of the Son of
Heaven, who before 1860 could not recognize any other earthly
monarch as his equal. In Japan there is the national sovereign of
divine descent, who, whatever the chaos of Japanese internal
politics, was always the mystical talisman of the "Yamato race."
Korea, Annam, Cambodia and Siam have their traditions of
strong, organized national kingdoms. The Mongols derive an
LANDS AND PEOPLES
intense racial pride from the memory of the empire of Genghiz
Khan, and the Tibetans have their long-established sovereignty
of the holy Dalai Lama. In Indonesia there is still the memory of
the old Javanese empire of Mataram. These historical conti-
nuities serve as nuclei for modern national feeling, even when the
nationalism is anti-monarchical and destructive of traditional
culture; though popular nationalism and its jargon are recent
innovations, the main lines of nationality which now exist were
already drawn before Europeans ever reached the Far East. To
the old ethno-political units, however, the age of European
ascendency has added two more: the Russian, which is the prod-
uct of immigration from Europe, and the Filipino, which is a
creation of Spanish colonialism.
4. POPULATIONS OF FAR EASTERN COUNTRIES
There are today, excluding Manchukuo, nine recognized
sovereignties within the confines of the Far East. Of these only
three China, Japan and Siam belong to indigenous nations;
the rest are held by "Western" nations with their homelands in
Europe or North America Britain, France, Holland, Portugal,
the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. All these six powers have acquired
their territories in the Far East by some kind of expansion, more
or less violent, since a Portuguese squadron first arrived at
Malacca in 1509. In the sequel, however, a distinction must be
drawn between the Far Eastern lands of the Soviet Union and
the "possessions" of the other Western powers. The latter are in
every case imperial ascendencies over areas already well popu-
lated, and the ruling nations are represented by mere handfuls
of administrators, soldiers, capitalist entrepreneurs and techni-
cians, who form insignificant minorities among the native in-
habitants; in Siberia, on the other hand, the Russians have settled
on land previously uncultivated, as the English have in Canada or
Australia, and form the great majority of the total population, so
that Russian nationality, as well as Russian (or Soviet Union)
state power, has been established there. The Russians are today
a Far Eastern nation in a way the British, French and Americans
are not, though their actual numbers are small to the east of the
Yenisei, and their position as a Great Power is based on their
wealth of population and resources in Europe and West Siberia.
The history of European commercial and imperial expansion
in the Far East begins in 1509, when a Portuguese squadron
under Sequiera arrived at Malacca to open trade eleven years
after Vasco da Gama had first reached India round the Cape of
Good Hope. The usual disputes having arisen, Albuquerque, the
Portuguese Captain-General of the Indies, attacked and cap-
tured Malacca in 1511. The Portuguese thus acquired a monop-
oly of the lucrative trade in spices from the Moluccas; to com-
plete their control they annexed the Moluccas in 1522 and held
them until 1583, when they were driven out by a rebellion of the
natives. Their principal rivals in these waters in the early days
were the Spanish, who crossed the Pacific from Mexico and tried
to break the Portuguese hold on the Moluccas; failing in this,
the Spanish went farther north and conquered the group of
islands which they named the Philippines in honor of King
Philip IL From Malacca the Portuguese had meanwhile opened
up trade with China and Japan, and in China they were granted,
in return for services in the suppression of piracy, a lease for a
settlement at Macao in 1557. Macao became a Portuguese
stronghold and was never lost, though it always remained
nominally Chinese territory until it was formally annexed by
Portugal in 1845.
With the beginning of the seventeenth century the Dutch and
the English began to make their presence felt in Indonesia. The
Dutch in 1619 captured Jacatra in Java and made it their Far
Eastern base under the name of Batavia; in 1642 they also took
Malacca from the Portuguese, and the latter were finally elimi-
nated from the Archipelago except for a foothold on the island of
Timor, the eastern half of which still belongs to them. The Eng-
lish, who tended more and more to concentrate their attention
on India, likewise gave way to the Dutch after a period of rivalry.
The Spanish, however, continued to hold the Philippines.
Dutch rule was strongly established in Java and the Moluccas;
elsewhere in the islands their control was slight, and numerous
petty rajas and sultans retained a somewhat diminished in-
dependence. The Dutch secured the monopoly of cloves by ex-
terminating the tree in every island but Amboyna, and when the
spice trade ceased to be important, they turned their attention
to coffee, which they produced in Java under a system of forced
labor. To the north of Indonesia they obtained a monopoly of
European trade with Japan from 1639 and retained it until
1854 and made a settlement on the island of Formosa, which
they held until they were driven out by exiles from China,
partisans of the fallen Ming dynasty, in 1662.
Both China and Japan during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries adopted a policy of restricting foreign trade and resi-
dence to particular ports, partly because of their fear of the
Catholic Christian missions, which had arrived with the traders
and had had a very disturbing effect, especially in Japan;
partly because of the desire of the governments to control the
trade to their own fiscal advantage; and partly because Far
Eastern countries had no system of international diplomatic
intercourse and commercial law such as had been evolved in
Europe. In China foreign trade was restricted by law to Canton
after 1757; in Japan it was confined to Nagasaki, and there
allowed only to the Chinese and the Dutch, from 1639. The
European nations had to put up with this state of affairs, for up
5. CITIES OF THE FAR EAST
to the second quarter of the nineteenth century they were not in
a position to apply coercion to China or Japan as they applied it
to the petty principalities of Indonesia.
The Anglo-French wars from 1792 to 1815 brought English
armed forces again into the Far East after Holland had fallen
under the control of France. The English captured Malacca in
1795 and occupied Java in 1811; these and other Dutch posses-
sions were restored to Holland in 1814, but in 1819 England
acquired Singapore by cession from the Sultan of Johore and
made it into a great commercial and strategic center.
In the final partition of Malaya and Indonesia among the
Western powers, none of the native potentates was recognized
as sovereign, and dominion was distributed in international law,
that is, by treaties between Western powers, often in advance of
conquest, or even of exploration. Large areas of Indonesia were
not brought under any European authority until the present
century; the conquest of Atjeh in northern Sumatra took some
thirty years of campaigning. Today, however, it can be said
that control by the recognized sovereign powers has been made
effective throughout the whole region. The British hold all the
Malay Peninsula south of Siam either by direct (Straits Settle-
ments) or indirect (Protected Malay States) rule. The Dutch
retain Java and the Lesser Sunda Islands, Sumatra, Borneo,
Celebes and the Moluccas, with the exception of eastern Timor,
which belongs to Portugal, and the northern part of Borneo,
comprising British North Borneo and the British-protected
states of Brunei and Sarawak. 1 The dominion of the Philippines
1 Brunei was declared under British protection in 1888, Sarawak in
1890. The British protectorate over Atjeh in Sumatra was relinquished
to the Dutch in 1872.
passed from Spain to the United States of America by the
Spanish-American war of 1898, and at the same time the residue
of the Spanish empire in the Pacific, consisting of the Pelew,
Marianne and Caroline island groups in the ocean to the east of
the Philippines, was ceded by Spain to Germany, to be taken
from Germany by Japan in the war of 1914-18.
To the north of Malaya and Indonesia there were up to 1841
no European possessions except for the Portuguese leasehold of
Macao and the Russian territory in the extreme north of the
continent. The extent of the latter was defined by the Treaty of
Nerchinsk, the first treaty ever signed by China with a European
power, which was concluded in 1689. The Russians, whose
empire in Asia had been founded by Yermak's capture of Sibir
in 1581, had reached the Pacific coast at Okhotsk in 1647 and
Lake Baikal in 1651; then they came into conflict with the
Manchu-Chinese empire which controlled the basin of the
Amur, and received a severe check. The Treaty of Nerchinsk
fixed the Russo-Chinese border along the Stanovoi moun-
tain range and the Uda river, leaving both banks of the
Amur to China; this territorial settlement was not altered until
The Russian west-to-east advance through the far north of
Asia did little to disturb the established order of things in the
Far East during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for
it went on in a back-world of primitive tribes Buryats, Yakuts
and Tungus beyond the ken of high politics. It meant, how-
ever, that for the first time in history there was a power in the
Northland which was not founded on nomadism, and with the
first settlements of Russian peasants east of the Yenisei a new
nation came into being there.
The great European drive against China began with the
Anglo-Chinese war of 1839 and it led to acquisitions in two
categories: colonial and semi-colonial. The former kind, terri-
torial gains in full sovereignty, included
(1) Hongkong: the island ceded to Britain by China in 1841,
Kowloon on the mainland added in 1860.
(2) French Indo-China: first annexations in 1862 in Cochin-
China, protectorate over Cambodia in 1863, protectorate over
Annam and Tongking (previously under Chinese suzerainty)
recognized by China after Franco-Chinese war in 1885, Lao
territory taken from Siam in 1893.
(3) Russian Far Eastern provinces: all country north of the
Amur ceded by China to Russia in 1858, territory east of Usuri
down to Korean border (including site of the future Vladi-
vostok) ceded in 1860.
Besides these territories passing under European rule in full
sovereignty, China was forced in 1898 to cede the following five
districts under leasehold tenure, the occupying powers having
complete rights of jurisdiction and military or naval use
(1) Kiaochow: leased to Germany for 99 years, captured by
Japanese 1914, restored to China 1922.
(2) Kwantung (Port Arthur and Dalny, now Ryojun and
Dairen): renewable 25 years' lease to Russia, transferred to
Japan by Treaty of Portsmouth 1905, lease prolonged to 99 years
after ultimatum to China 1915.
(3) Weihaiwei: leased to Britain for "as long as Russia shall
remain in occupation of Port Arthur," restored to China 1930.
(4) Hongkong New Territory, consisting of "all the land re-
1 Kobe i 12
2 Yokohama 13
Sfngfpore } British Colonies
3 Osaka [ Japan 14
Haiphong \ p hC I *
4 Moji 15
Saigon / rrencn colonies
5 Dairen J 16
Semarang > Dutch Colonies
Minimum shown: 1,000.000 tons of overseas traffic. Vladivostok (V), Sovetskaya (S).
Nlkotaevsk (N) and FUshin (R) foil shore of this minimum, but are shown as a matter
6. PORTS OF THE FAR EAST
quired for the military defense of Hongkong": leased to Britain
for 99 years.
(5) Kwangchow: leased to France for 99 years.
The leased territories were, and are, to all intents and pur-
poses the colonial possessions of the states holding them. There
is, however, another category of foreign treaty or customary
rights in China which are definitely encroachments on Chinese
sovereignty without conferring a generalized territorial control;
these include the autonomous foreign "concessions" and settle-
ments, the foreign gunboats on inland waters, the Legation
guards at Peiping and garrisons in the Peiping-Tientsin area,
and the old railway zone system in Manchuria.
The foreign settlement system is closely bound up with the
extra-territorial rights which the Western powers, beginning with
Britain, acquired for their nationals by treaty. The Westerners
in the ports were under the jurisdiction of their own consuls,
lived in quarters of their own near their consulates and had
their own police. In the long period of disorder and anti-foreign
outbreaks in China they successfully asserted their claim to ex-
clude Chinese police and soldiers from the settlements and to
have their own armed forces local volunteers or marines from
their countries' warships. Originally suburban quarters, the
settlements became in some cases in particular at Shanghai
and Tientsin the principal business areas of their towns and
drew in a Chinese population outnumbering the foreign resi-
dents. The growth of these autonomous un-national units
states within a state provided a grave problem for the time
when China should begin to organize a modern-style state
administration, claiming in full the normal rights of sovereignty
within her borders.
The patrolling of the Yangtse by foreign gunboats was insti-
tuted in connection with the foreign settlements up the river
and the foreign-owned river shipping. The practice was a fertile
source of incidents, the most notable of which was the battle
fought by H.M.S. Cockchafer in 1926 with forces of the provin-
cial army of Szechwan at Wanhsien more than a thousand miles
from the sea.
The stationing of foreign detachments for the protection of
the Legations in Peiping and the guarding of the railway to
Tientsin was authorized by the treaty of 1901, which settled
accounts for the "Boxer" anti-foreign outbreak of the previous
year. The garrisons were meant to provide against renewed
surprise attacks by anti-foreign bands, but, having once been
established, they became a permanent institution, and the
relevant clauses of the treaty have never yet been abrogated.
The railway zone system in Manchuria was introduced by
the Russians, whose contract for the building of the Chinese
Eastern Railway in 1896 gave the company (actually controlled
by the Russian government) "absolute and exclusive right of
administration of its lands" with its own police force. Owing
to the prevalence of brigandage in Manchuria soldiers were
brought in to serve as police, so that the railway became in
effect a ribbon of Russian territory across Manchuria. The same
rights were obtained by Russia in 1898 for the branch from
Harbin to Port Arthur, a section of which was transferred to
Japan in 1905 after the Russo-Japanese war and became the
South Manchuria Railway; by the Treaty of Portsmouth the
railway guards were limited to 15 per kilometer, but this was
quite sufficient for a considerable force to be assembled any-
where along the line.
The semi-colonial servitudes on Chinese sovereignty were
the result of China's failure to modernize her administrative
and fiscal system during the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. China retained enough strength and unity to survive as an
independent state, but remained too weak and loosely organized
either to give due protection to foreigners and their enterprises
(which the official class in any case detested and had accepted
only under force majeure) or to resist demands which were put to
it on pretext of the disorderly conditions. The outcome of the
long series of conflicts between the Western powers and the de-
caying Manchu-Chinese imperial regime was a compromise
which made China a unique anomaly in international law, for,
while continuing to hold rank as a sovereign state, she was de-
prived of the essential attributes of sovereignty inside her recog-
nized frontiers. With foreign garrisons quartered in her territory
and two alien-ruled municipalities in the heart of her biggest
city, China was not, even after the Washington Conference of
19^2, in possession of full sovereign rights. Chinese nationalism
was inevitably imbued with a resolve to get rid of the "unequal
treaties," but strong vested interests had come to be bound up
with them, and the position was all the more difficult because
certain of the privileges claimed by foreigners had long been
conceded in practice without any real treaty basis.
Japan escaped from the servitudes imposed upon China by
her rapid self-modernization after 1868. She was in the begin-
ning subjected, like China, to a system of extra-territoriality,
and in the period of her internal troubles in the sixties was
widely expected to fall to pieces and be eaten up by Western
imperialism much more easily than China. But, having equipped
herself with an effectively centralized administration, a Western-
model legal code and a competent army and navy, Japan avoided
the regime of foreign garrisons and independent settlements, and
secured the final abolition of extra-territoriality in 1901. Nor
did she stop at her own emancipation; even before it was com-
plete, she had joined the Western powers as a holder of extra-
territorial rights on the mainland of Asia. The possession of
such rights came to appear to the Japanese, from their own
experience on the wrong side of it, to be the distinctive
attribute of civilized states in relation to backward peoples, and
its economic value was also appreciated. In Korea Japan was
actually first in the field and secured a trade treaty with extra-
territorial rights for her nationals in advance of any other
nation. She obtained the same privileges in China by the Treaty
of Shimonoseki after the Sino- Japanese war in 1895, and thus
entered the ranks of the Western powers who already held them.
Under the Boxer Protocol of 1901 she shared with the Western
powers the right of keeping garrisons in the Peiping-Tientsin
area. By the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 she took over part of
the system of rights previously extorted by the Russians in
Manchuria, including the Kwantung Leased Territory and the
railway as far as Changchun with its privileges of administration
and railway guards. In this way Japan gained a foothold inside
China, and in the end the Western powers discovered that she
was the principal beneficiary of a system they had originally
elaborated for their own advantage.
MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE
The Chinese empire, as constituted in the first decade of the
present century, consisted of the eighteen provinces of China
Proper and the four outer dependencies, Manchuria, Mongolia,
Sinkiang or East Turkestan, and Tibet. China Proper comprised
only 1,533,000 out of a total area of 4,278,000 square miles, but
was estimated to contain well over 95 per cent of the total
This great empire was the creation of the* Manchus, who cap-
tured Peking 1 in 1644 and set up the Ch'ing dynasty in China.
The purely Chinese Ming dynasty, which had reigned from 1368
to 1644, had not held sway over northwest Manchuria, Mongolia,
western Sinkiang or Tibet, though its territory in the time of its
full vigor had extended northwestward by the Kansu corridor
to Kami and northeastward to the lower Amur and the Japan
Sea north of Korea. Toward the end of the Ming period the
Chinese were confined within the Great Wall, while the North-
land passed under the domination of two barbaric powers: the
Kalmuks and the Manchus. The former, whose homeland was
1 Now Peiping. Peking means "Northern Capital," and when it ceased
to be the capital in 1928, its early name of Peiping was officially restored.
A Boundaries of
7. CHINA UNDER THE MING AND MANCHU DYNASTIES
MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC
in western Mongolia, were essentially nomadic; the latter,
whose ascendancy was based on east-central Manchuria, com-
bined shifting cultivation and horse-breeding with hunting in
their economy, and were better able to amalgamate with the
Chinese than the pure nomads. They conquered Liaoning prov-
ince (Mukden and Dairen) before they penetrated into China
Proper, and were affected culturally by the long-established
Chinese population in southern Manchuria; at the same time
they drew into their confederacy a number of Mongol tribes who
aided them in their wars against China. 1 The Manchus entered
China in 1644 to ta ^ e P^t * n a Chinese civil war and at once
took possession of the capital (Peking), though the south was
not fully subdued for a generation. Then, toward the end of
the seventeenth century the Manchus, strengthened by the re-
sources of China, where their power was now centered, turned
their arms against the Kalmuks and in a series of campaigns
incorporated the whole of Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang in
Outside the limits of Manchu-Chinese rule there were several
states which could not be regarded as forming part of the
empire, but were attached to it by formal acknowledgment of
suzerainty and the payment of tribute. This category of countries
included Korea, Luchu (Ryukyu in Japanese, the string of
Japanese-inhabited small islands between Kyushu and Formosa),
Annam, Burma and Nepal. Such relations of states were not
recognized in Western international law based on the theory of
sovereignty, and in the nineteenth century China was required
either to accept responsibility for the acts of her "vassals"
1 Each of the Eight Banners (pa ch't) of the Manchu army contained
three sections Manchu, Mongol and Chinese.
MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC
which she generally declined to do or to disinterest herself in
their fate. In the end Korea and Luchu were annexed by Japan,
Annam by France, Burma by Britain, and Nepal, which re-
tained a semi-independence inside the framework of British
Indian paramountcy, ceased to pay tribute after the Chinese
Revolution of 1911.
Within the internationally recognized borders of the Manchu
empire the Manchu element gradually declined in importance
and was swallowed up by the Chinese population. The state was
always known to Europeans as "China" or the "Chinese empire,"
and Chinese was its official language. 1 The process of assimila-
tion, moreover, was not limited to China Proper, but extended
also, and in an even greater degree, to the Manchu homeland.
The Manchu tribesmen, a warlike but never numerous com-
munity, were distributed in garrisons over the empire, and Man-
churia itself was left almost empty; the Manchu emperors, wish-
ing to preserve it as an exclusive domain of their race, at first
prohibited the immigration of Chinese, but the prohibition was
later on relaxed, and in the late nineteenth century Chinese
settlement was positively encouraged in order to create a human
barrier against the flow of Russian colonization east of Lake
Baikal. Manchuria thus became almost purely Chinese, except
for the arid western tracts which were left to Mongol nomads,
and the Manchus virtually disappeared as a distinct nationality
with a territory of their own; formally, however, the administra-
tion of Manchuria, "the three eastern provinces" (tung san
sheng), was kept separate from that of China Proper, "the eight-
een provinces" (shih pa sheng), until 1907.
1 In the eighteenth century, however, official business between China
and Russia was transacted in Manchu, and Manchu grammars and dic-
tionaries were compiled by Russians.
MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC
The order established by the Manchu empire also led to an
extension of Chinese settlement in two other regions beyond the
Great Wall: Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang. In the former
Chinese peasants encroached on cultivable steppe land at the
expense of the Mongols' pastures, the government officials and
Mongol princes finding profit for themselves in the process. In
Sinkiang the settlement was more a matter of policy; colonies of
Chinese and Manchus were planted, especially in the Kulja and
Urumchi districts, to protect the western march of the empire,
at first against the still unsubdued Kalmuks and later against
Russia. In Tibet and Outer Mongolia, on the other hand, there
was no Chinese colonization, and Chinese nationality was repre-
sented only by a handful of officials and traders.
Within China Proper there was evident throughout the period
of the Manchu dynasty a deep cleavage between north and
south in relation to the central government at Peking. In the
words of a writer on Chinese history: 1 "The Manchus occupied
northern China by consent, unopposed; they conquered the
south by force after a long and bitter struggle. This fact domi-
nated the later history of the dynasty, and still today explains the
differing attitude of the northern and southern Chinese toward
the Manchu dynasty and the imperial system."
The hostility of the south toward the Manchu regime was
further accentuated by the penetration of Western cultural
influences into the south in advance of their extension to the
north, contacts with foreigners being made not only through the
ports open to foreign trade of which Shanghai was the most
northerly from 1842 to 1858 but also through Chinese emigra-
tion, which came mainly from Kwantung to Malaya, the Dutch
1 C. P. Fitzgerald, China: a Short Cultural History, p. 535.
MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC
East Indies and America. The great T'ai P'ing rebellion, which
broke out in 1851, was not only anti-Manchu, but also Christian;
it began in Kwangsi, and its advance, first to Hankow and then
down the Yangtse to Nanking, foreshadowed the later progress
of the Kuomintang forces from Canton to the North China
Plain. The T'ai P'ing rebellion was finally suppressed in 1864,
but the cleavage between north and south was not overcome,
and Canton subsequently became the focus of the revolutionary,
modernizing, nationalist movement in China. 1
The T'ai P'ing rebels sought to supplant the Manchu dynasty,
not to break up the unity of the empire; the Moslem rebellions
which occurred during the same period threatened, however,
the disruption of Chinese sovereignty. Independent kingdoms,
which made appeals for British protection, were set up in
Sinkiang and Yunnan, and the Russians took the opportunity to
occupy Kulja and the Hi basin in 1871. But the Chinese in the
end crushed the Moslem revolts and recovered Kulja by nego-
tiation. The empire within the frontiers of 1860 was thus pre-
served intact until the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 brought
Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria into peril.
The war was fought on the issue of Chinese suzerainty over
Korea, but military operations were also carried into southern
Manchuria, and by the Treaty of Shimonoseki the Liaotung
peninsula, including Port Arthur, was ceded to Japan. Russia,
however, persuaded France and Germany to join her in com-
pelling Japan by an ultimatum to restore this territory to China,
and then took advantage of her position as China's protector to
penetrate Manchuria herself. In 1898 she compelled China to
x The Cantonese did not support the T'ai P'ing movement, whose
leader belonged to the distinct Hakka community of Kwangtung Chinese.
MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC
grant her a lease of Port Arthur, which she proceeded to turn
into a fortress and naval base; this stronghold together with the
Russian-controlled railways gave the Russians paramount in-
fluence in Manchuria, and when in 1900 the Boxer anti-foreign
outbreak was made the excuse for a general military occupation,
the country passed completely under Russian dominion. The
Russian rule was not destined to last long, for in 1904 Japan,
covered against French or German intervention by the Anglo-
Japanese alliance, made war on Russia and expelled her forces
from Port Arthur and Mukden. This did not, however, result in
a full restoration of Chinese sovereign control in Manchuria, for,
though the Treaty of Portsmouth required a withdrawal of all
troops, Russian or Japanese, outside the Kwantung Leased
Territory (Port Arthur) and the railway zones, these corridors
of foreign power remained, only they were now shared between
Russia and Japan. Nor could China count after 1907 on the
mutual hostility of Russia and Japan, for, having fought each
other, they soon entered into close political collaboration, and
by private arrangement between themselves partitioned all
Chinese territory north of the Great Wall into "spheres of in-
fluence' ' Russia to have North Manchuria, Outer Mongolia
and Sinkiang, while Japan reserved to herself South Manchuria
and Inner Mongolia.
The Russian empire-building in Manchuria from 1896 to
1904 was supplemented by Russian intrigues in Tibet, which
brought about British intervention and a military expedition to
Lhasa in 1904, Chinese control of Tibet being at that time very
slight. To reassert the authority of Peking a Chinese army was
sent to Tibet in 1908 and had just succeeded in its task when the
Chinese Revolution broke out in 1911.
;<.> -v. --
Jt 1 * &i< j^=^5sSSS:S3g";LL' iV" "' f ii^^ '-'^ ftffiQCIUAiJ
8. PROVINCES OF CHINA IN THE LAST TEN YEARS
MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC
After the fall of the Manchu dynasty the Chinese Republic
was recognized internationally as inheriting all the territories of
the old empire, but both the Tibetans and the Mongols of Outer
Mongolia repudiated the Republic and took advantage of the
confusion to gain de facto independence. The Republic adopted
a flag with five bars to represent the five nationalities which
were to form the new state Chinese, Manchus, Mongols,
Moslems and Tibetans, but the driving force in the new move-
ment was pure Chinese nationalism, and it evoked strong re-
sistance from the two most coherent of the non-Chinese nation-
alities of the empire the Tibetans and the Mongols. Of the
other two the Manchus, as already stated, had ceased to form a
real nationality, while among the Moslems the great majority
were Chinese-speaking (Tungans) and, with the modern
nationalist stress on language rather than religion as the cri-
terion of allegiance, tended to regard themselves primarily as
Chinese in the new era; the Turki Moslems of Sinkiang were not
strong enough by themselves to form an independent state.
A feature of the Republican regime has been the creation of
new provinces assimilated to the administrative system of China
Proper in those nearer parts of Tibet and Mongolia which re-
mained under Chinese control. Sikang and Tsinghai were
carved out of eastern Tibet, while Inner Mongolia was split up
into the four provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyiian and Ninghsia.
Apart from the Tibetan and Mongol secessions, however,
there was a great disintegration of the Chinese state after 1915.
The military governors of provinces engrossed the provincial
revenues and made war on one another with private armies in
the manner of feudal barons. Their insubordination was sup-
ported to some extent by the traditional particularism of
MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC
Chinese provinces and their reluctance to submit to a central-
ized fiscal system, but in no case was there a real separatist
movement aimed at setting up a new sovereign state. Among
educated Chinese the consciousness of nationality was continu-
ally growing stronger, and the Kuomintang party with its head-
quarters at Canton was building up a powerful nationalist
movement with a program of "rights recovery," "abolition of
unequal treaties," state unification and economic self-develop-
ment. Nevertheless, as long as the regional tuchun despotisms
and civil wars continued, China was even weaker in relation to
foreign powers than she had been under the Manchus, and her
economic evolution was held up; the country's substance was
devoured by unproductive spoliation and brigandage, and
foreign capital did not dare to venture in under conditions of
such disorder except where it was assured of political control.
At the Washington Conference in 1922 eight nations agreed
with China in the so-called Nine-Power Treaty to "provide the
fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop
and maintain for herself an effective and stable government."
Such a prospect corresponded on the whole to the policies of
Britain and the U.S.A., who took the lead at the Conference;
a third signatory, however, was by no means of one mind with
regard to the desirability of assisting the growth of a strong,
united China. Influential official and business circles in Japan
believed that their country had a vested interest in Chinese dis-
union, and that the unification and industrialization of China
would spell Japan's political and economic decline. In particular
they feared that a nationalist Chinese central government con-
trolling Manchuria would soon make an end of the existing
monopoly position of the South Manchuria Railway.
THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN
In 1853, when Commodore Perry demanded the opening of
Japan to foreign trade, Japan was almost completely secluded
from the outer world and her dominion was confined to the four
large islands from Kyushu to Yezo (Hokkaido). 1 She had no
foothold on the mainland of Asia. To the southwest of Kyushu,
the Ryukyu islands, which are now an integral part of Japan,
then formed a separate kingdom which paid tribute to China,
though also recognizing a certain suzerainty of the Japanese
lords of Satsuma in Kyushu, To the north of Yezo Japanese
fishermen and petty traders frequented the shores of Sakhalin
and the Kurile islands, but there was no Japanese administra-
tion. Yezo itself was scarcely Japanese except in the extreme
south; most of it was wild forest country still left to the primitive
Aino aborigines. Japan in effect consisted of Honshu, Shikoku,
Kyushu and the closely adjacent small islands.
Under the seclusionist system established early in the seven-
teenth century Japanese subjects were not allowed to go abroad,
for trade or any other purpose, on pain of death if they returned;
foreigners were not allowed in Japan except for a very limited
1 Hokkaido is really the name for an administrative division including
Yezo and the Kuriles, but it has come to be used as a synonym for Yezo
THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN
trade, open only to the Chinese and Dutch, in the port of Naga-
saki. From 1615 to 1853 J a P an had no foreign war and no
serious internal revolt; this period affords the most striking con-
trast to the stormy history of modern Japan.
Since prehistoric times (before A.D. 200) Japan has never been
successfully invaded. The attempts made by Kublai Khan, the
Mongol emperor of China, in the thirteenth century resulted in
complete disaster, and the failure of what was then the strongest
power in Asia to subdue the islands of the "Yamato race" gave
the Japanese a traditional confidence in the divinely assured
inviolability of their country. The Kublai Khan invasion has
the same place in Japanese, as the Spanish Armada in English,
memory; the inscription "He blew with His winds and they were
scattered" on the pedestal of Drake's monument at Plymouth
affords an exact counterpart to "the divine wind of Ise," the
typhoon which wrecked the fleet of China's overlord. This
tradition of security goes far to explain the remarkable vigor
of the national awakening when the Japanese in the eighteen-
fifties suddenly found their coasts and ports at the mercy of
Prior to the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 the Japanese had twice
in their history made temporary conquests on the Asiatic main-
land. At an uncertain date some time before A.D. 400 they pene-
trated into Korea, that country being at the time divided into
several small kingdoms; in 663 they were finally expelled by an
alliance of the Korean kingdom of Shinra with China, and Korea
was united by Shinra under Chinese suzerainty. From 663 to
1592 there was no Japanese intervention in continental affairs,
though the coasts of Kyushu were a base for corsairs who sorely
harried the peoples of the mainland; then the great soldier
THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN
Hideyoshi, having united Japan under his own rule (formally
subject to the authority of the Mikado) after a long period of
civil wars, designed the conquest of China and invaded Korea
as a preliminary. After a campaign of varying fortunes the troops
were withdrawn on the death of Hideyoshi in 1598, and the war
came to be known as the Ryo-to Fa-bi or "Dragon's head and
snake's tail" because of its glorious beginning and inglorious
ending. From 1598 no further attempt at continental expansion
was made until after the "westernization" of Japan.
With the entry of Japan into a world of international relations
and modern navies the possession of outlying islands came to be
of great importance, and it was to these that Japan's attention
was first directed after the "Restoration" of 1868. In 1875 a
treaty was made with Russia whereby Russia acquired sover-
eignty over Sakhalin and Japan over the Kuriles (Chishima).
The Bonin islands (Ogasawarajima) to the southeast of Japan
were formally annexed in 1876, and the Ryukyu islands (with a
Japanese-speaking population) in 1879, China's claim to
suzerainty over the latter being ignored. 1 The Kuriles, the
Bonins and Ryukyu were incorporated in the administrative
system of Japan Proper and are not today counted as colonial
The acquisition of a definitely colonial domain began with
the annexation of Taiwan (Formosa), which was ceded by
China after the war of 1894-5, The Liaotung peninsula of south-
ern Manchuria, which had been occupied by the Japanese army
during the war, was also ceded by the same peace treaty, but
was restored to China after the ultimatum known as the Triple
Intervention, in which Russia, France* and Germany partici-
1 The former king of Ryukyu was given a title in the Japanese peerage.
( MARIANAS &
9. THE TERRITORIAL EXPANSION OF JAPAN
THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN
pated. During the next few years it seemed likely that Russia
would swallow up both Manchuria and Korea and exclude
Japan from any possibility of expansion on the mainland, but the
Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 turned the tables and left Japanese
forces in control of Korea, southern Manchuria and most of
the island of Sakhalin. By the Treaty of Portsmouth, which con-
cluded the war, Russia ceded to Japan half of Sakhalin and the
leasehold of Port Arthur and Dalny (Kwantung), which she
had acquired from China; Korea, nominally a sovereign state
since 1895, was placed under a thinly disguised Japanese pro-
tectorate and was finally annexed in 1910. At the time of the
outbreak of the Great War in 1914 Japan thus held four colonial
territories: Taiwan, Chosen (Korea), Karafuto (southern
Sakhalin) and Kwantung, and as a result of the Great War she
obtained a fifth the island groups in the Pacific north of the
Equator which had belonged to Germany. Of the five, three
Taiwan, Chosen and Karafuto were under Japan's full
sovereignty; in the other two her sovereignty was qualified,
Kwantung being held on lease from China, and the ex-German
islands under a mandate of the League of Nations.
The conquests made by Japanese armies in Manchuria,
Mongolia and China since 1931 have effected no formal addi-
tion to the Japanese empire, for a method of "indirect rule" has
been applied without any annexation or even protectorate of
the ordinary kind; Manchukuo is in Japanese theory a sovereign
state, and any nation which so desires can have diplomatic
representation at Hsinking at the price of recognizing Man-
chukuo's sovereignty and detachment from China. The world
in general does not take this theory very seriously and regards
Manchukuo as merely an alias for Japan. But in keeping up the
THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN
elaborate hocus-pocus of independence for a country she in
reality controls Japan is simply following an example set by
Britain with the concurrence of the League of Nations, for the
admission of India in 1919 to a society whose membership is by
its constitution restricted to independent states and "fully self-
governing" colonies or dominions introduced into international
relations an element of sheer humbug; which the world will yet
have cause to regret. If a state can be recognized as "fully self-
governing" when it lacks every attribute of real independence,
the way is open for an unlimited faking of sovereignty. By virtue
of the Geneva conception of national independence Japan can
at least claim that the people of Manchuria have not enjoyed less
freedom in setting up the government of Manchukuo than
has the "fully self-governing" Indian nation in choosing Lord
Linlithgow as its ruler.
In effect the Japanese empire at the time of writing extends
to Paotou on the Yellow River and Kiukiang on the Yangtse,
and its limits are the fronts of the Japanese armies in the field.
The populations under Japanese rule outside Japan already
outnumber the conquering nation, whereas up to 1931 the
inhabitants of the colonies were in a ratio of only about 3:7 to
those of the homeland.
Japan Proper has an area of 147,611 square miles (slightly
larger than Great Britain, but smaller than any one of thirteen
out of the eighteen provinces of China Proper) and a population
of over 70 million. The Japanese in their islands form a very well-
defined and compact nationality, and except for the negligible
remnant of the Aino aborigines in Hokkaido (now only 20,000
strong) Japan has no domestic nationality problem. It should
be remembered, however, in relation to internal politics that,
THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN
although Japan is a small country inhabited by a single na-
tionality, its surface is so much intersected by mountains as
well as by the insular divisions that a very strong local particu-
larism prevails, and ' 'county town" influences are an effective
counterweight to the political activity of the big cities. London
is not Britain and Paris is not France; it is even more true that
Tokyo is not Japan, in spite of a centralized unitary system of
administration. Up to seventy years ago Japan was divided into
small feudal units, many of which were very loosely attached to
the central power, and the old loyalties persist, so that Japanese
opinion is formed no less in such places as Kagoshima, Saga and
Kanazawa than in the capital, and the cliques in national
politics often have narrowly local roots. The strong district
attachments provide a framework for the separate life of rural
Japan, industry being concentrated in a few restricted areas in
the southeast of Honshu and the extreme north of Kyushu.
The army in Japan specially represents the countryside, for
most of the officers come from the small landowning gentry
and the conscripts are selected as far as possible from peasant
stock rather than from the town population.
The directly ruled colonies have a total population of about
30 million, of which less than 2 million are Japanese, the
remainder being made up of about 22 million Koreans, 6
million Chinese in Formosa and Kwantung, and one to two
hundred thousand Formosa aborigines and natives of the
Mandated Islands. To this total must now be added, as for
the time being subject to Japan, over go millions in Manchu-
kuo and approximately 100 millions (minus refugees) in the
areas occupied by Japan in China Proper since the outbreak
of hostilities last year; all these are Chinese except for some
10. MINERALS IN JAPAN AND KOREA
THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN
three million Mongols in the west of Manchukuo and in Inner
The history of Japan's expansion falls into two periods corre-
sponding to the distinction between her formal and her informal
empire. The colonial territories acquired up to 1931 were all of
some value, but they did not give Japan in the long run a strong
economic position either for commercial competition in a
world of increasing economic nationalism or for war-power under
conditions of strategy in which military decision was tending
more and more to depend on capacity for avoiding economic
breakdown in time of war. Japan and Korea were more or less
self-sufficing as regards foodstuffs, and Formosa on the edge of
the tropics supplemented their resources with sugar, citrus
fruits and other special products. In minerals, however, and in
the raw materials of several of her most important industries
Japan remained largely or entirely dependent on imports for
essential supplies. Japan is not rich in any important mineral
except copper; her resources of coal are small, of iron ore
insignificant, and of oil negligible, for a country which aims at
large-scale industrial development. Good coking coal is con-
spicuous by its absence. For textile industries cotton must be
entirely, and wool almost entirely, imported; the rayon industry
is also partly dependent on wood-pulp imports.
To create big industries and support a large population by
the export of manufactured goods with so inadequate a basis of
natural resources would be a formidable task even in a world
of free trade, stable currencies and general political harmony.
Under the conditions prevailing in the world since 1919, and
still more since 1930, industrialization has involved Japan in
very serious difficulties, and the most disconcerting factor in the
THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN
situation has been the prospect of the competitive industrializa-
tion of China. For China not only has five times the population
of Japan, but is far better endowed with natural resources and
capacity for raw-material production, especially as regards coal,
iron and cotton. If China and Japan had begun their self-
modernization simultaneously about 1870 and had continued
at the same rate, there can be no doubt but that China would
now be the Great Power of the Far East, both economically and
politically, and that Japan would still be a mainly agricultural
country and a power of secondary rank, comparing with China
in much the same way as Holland or Sweden with Britain or
Germany. But China's late start gave Japan a long lead both in
economic development and military power, and to retain this
lead has been the main preoccupation of Japanese policy for
the last decade.
If a united and efficiently administered China were to carry
through a program of industrialization with her advantages
of abundant cheap labor equal to Japan's and with superior
natural resources, she would quickly surpass Japan both in
heavy and light industries, competing ruinously with Japanese
trade both in the Chinese home market (covered by tariffs if
necessary) and elsewhere, and also reducing Japan to inferiority
in power by a greater and more self-sufficient capacity for war-
material production. Even if Japan were prepared to con-
template such an economic and political abdication, adjustment
would be extremely difficult with a momentum of population
increase adapted to an expanding economic system, and the
strain on the social structure would probably lead to domestic
revolution. Hence the "positive" policy toward China, which
means, in short, to keep China weak and divided, to prevent a
12. JAPANESE TRADE EXPANSION
THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN
Kuomintang-directed, anti-Japanese industrialization of China,
and to control the raw material resources of the country for
Japan's own use in peace or war.
Japanese liberals during the nineteen-twenties believed that
a satisfactory compromise was possible, and they might have
reached an understanding with the new China but for the funda-
mental conflict over Japan's vested interests in South Manchuria
interests which were based on the political supremacy taken
over from Russia in 1905 and were regarded by Chinese
nationalists as incompatible with China's sovereignty. The
conflict reached a climax in 1931, at a time when Japan was in
the throes of a serious internal crisis due to the effects of a world-
wide economic depression, and the army chiefs took the oppor-
tunity to launch Japan on a new era of imperialist expansion.
The military occupation of Manchuria not only secured the
vested interests of the South Manchuria Railway but delivered
all the resources of four Chinese provinces into the hands of
Japan. Some Japanese leaders hoped to close the account with
the completion of this conquest. There could, however, be no
stopping at the borders of Manchuria. China now became
implacably hostile and acquired a new political unity and
energy from the principle of "anti-Japanism"; her capacity for
economic development was not seriously impaired by the loss
of Manchuria, for her most important economic areas lay
south of the Great Wall. In 1935 China reformed her currency
with British financial support and advice, and at the beginning
of 1937, as a result of the Sian kidnaping incident, the civil
war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists was brought
to an end and replaced by an anti-Japanese People's Front.
Meanwhile the tariff and quota restrictions on Japanese export
THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN
trade and exchange difficulties due to inflationary finance had
combined to convert Japanese business circles to a program
of obtaining economic control over the raw-material resources
of North China; the fighting services favored the same policy
as a means of both forestalling the growth of China's war-power
and strengthening their own. In these circumstances, after four
years of uneasy truce, the war against China was renewed at
the end of July 1937.
The territories of the Soviet Union stretch to the northwest,
north and northeast of both China and Japan Petropavlovsk
in Kamchatka is nearly 20 degrees of longitude east of Tokyo
and in Far Eastern politics the Russian power established be-
tween Lake Baikal and the Pacific stands at the apex of the
triangle of which China and Japan form the base. The obvious
strategic importance of East Siberia, however, and its vast size
on the map do not at all correspond to its significance in the
economy of the Soviet Union. It is by far the poorest both
actually and potentially (on known data) of the main regions
of the Union, and if all territory east of the Yenisei were to be
eliminated tomorrow, the Soviet economic system would hardly
be affected by the loss, except perhaps as regards gold-mining
and the fur trade.
The economic power of the Soviet Union and its future
prospects in world affairs are based on its enormous natural
resources in soil and minerals. The great belt of chernozyom or
"black earth" soil from the 'Dniester to the Yenisei provides the
possibility of an abundant agricultural production, while enor-
mous reserves of coal and iron ore in European Russia and West
Siberia afford an adequate foundation for a heavy industry on
the largest scale. Add to these assets the oil of the Caucasus, the
copper and cotton of Turkestan, the timber of the north, the
broad cattle and sheep pastures of the steppe margins and the
fact that Russia is all plain, except for the Urals, from the Baltic
to the Altai, and the whole of that area is seen to form a grand
economic unit of prodigious natural wealth. But East Siberia
falls outside that area and forms a separate region in no way
comparable in natural resources. It has virtually no black-earth
soil and very little cultivable land; it is in great part as moun-
tainous as it is barren; except for gold, deposits of which are
found mainly in the Lena basin, it has no mineral wealth
remotely comparable to that of European Russia or West
Siberia; communications are inadequate for such resources as
there are and can only be developed at great expense. 1 The
principal maritime outlet, Vladivostok, does not find a place in
the first rank of Far Eastern ports in respect of tonnage cleared.
In a process of normal economic development East Siberia would
remain a region of "bad lands" like northern Canada, productive
of gold and furs with a supplement of lumber and fisheries, but
a mere appendage to the main economy of the Soviet Union.
Its recent development, under the direction of central govern-
ment planning, has been highly artificial and dominated by
strategic-political considerations, which require the existence
of an agricultural and coal-metal base to support Soviet military
power in the Far East.
In 1931 the population of East Siberia, including considerable
territory to the west of the Yenisei, was as follows:
Far Eastern Region (of R.S.F.S.R.) . . . 1,593400
Yakutsk Republic 308,400
1 Gold and furs from Yakutia are at present transported mainly by air.
Buryat-Mongol Republic 575>ooo
East Siberian Region (of R.S.F.S.R.) . . 5,568,400
Total . 5,045,200
A population of rather over 5 millions in this vast area and
it has not greatly increased since 1931 is little enough in com-
parison with over 400 millions in China and nearly 100 millions
in Japan and Korea. Moreover, it has not been attained without
great efforts to promote colonization, begun by the Tsarist
government after the Russo-Japanese war, when the emptiness
of .East Siberia was revealed as a great handicap to the Russian
army operating in Manchuria. Soviet policy has sought to in-
duce settlers to come east of Lake Baikal and stay there by
drastic exemptions from taxation; another device has been the
founding of the autonomous area of Biro-Bijan as a colony for
Jews in the country north of the Amur. Labor for road and
railway construction has been supplied in recent years by con-
victs, who were available in large quantities after the liquidation
of the kulaks under the First Five-Year Plan. By special induce-
ments to some and coercion for others the Soviet government
has during the last decade assembled in East Siberia a greater
number of Russians than would otherwise have gone there, but
the total effect on the wilderness has not been very great, and
the Soviet Far Eastern army still relies less on local agriculture
and industries than on its magazines and its railway communica-
tions with the west.
The Trans-Siberian railway has lately been double-tracked
and this has vastly increased its efficiency as a route of supply.
Now that the Manchurian section of the direct Chita-Vladi-
vostok line (the old Chinese Eastern Railway) has been sold to
Manchukuo and would be held by Japan in case of war, the
only line to Vladivostok is that by Khabarovsk, going to the
north of the Amur. This railway keeps well behind the frontier,
but it might be cut by a rapid offensive from Manchukuo, or
the Trans-Siberian might be cut to the south of Lake Baikal by
a Japanese advance through Outer Mongolia; in either event,
East Siberia has now a second line of defense based on a railway
to the north of Lake Baikal, which has been under construction
during the last three years. The terminus of this line is the new
town of Sovietskaya on the coast north of Vladivostok.
In spite of the general indigence of East Siberia, it has two
assets which are of considerable significance for Japan's eco-
nomic system. Marine products play an exceptionally large part
in Japanese food consumption and some of the best fishing
grounds within convenient range of Japan are inside, or just
outside, Russian territorial waters in the Gulf of Tartary and
off the west coast of Kamchatka. The Russians make compara-
tively little use of these fisheries and their exploitation by Japa-
nese fishing fleets has long been a source of friction, acrimonious
discussion and hard bargaining between the two governments.
The second bone of contention has been the Sakhalin oilfield,
which lies entirely in the northern, i.e. the Russian, half of the
island. The oilfield was not known to exist in 1905, or the Japa-
nese would not have agreed to the partition of Sakhalin as readily
as they did in the settlement after the Russo-Japanese war. The
oilfield is of little consequence to the country which possesses
the wells of Baku and Grozni; it is, however, of major impor-
tance to the Far East, which is very poor in natural oil outside
Indonesia, and especially to Japan, a country with only trivial
oil resources of its own. Since 1955 a Japanese company has
therefore worked the Sakhalin field with a concession on the
checkerboard system, and the arrangement has been too profit-
able to both countries to be upset by the most violent political
quarrels. If Japan were to be at war with Russia or Russia were
to apply full economic sanctions against Japan, the supply would
of course be cut off, and even if Japanese armed forces could
seize the field, the wells could be put out of action for a long
time by competent wrecking. On the other hand, it would be
extremely difficult for Russia, with her lack of sea-power, to hold
Sakhalin in a war, or to recover it if lost except by a knock-out
victory elsewhere. The situation is therefore such as to deter
both powers from going to extremes in this matter, and the
operations of the Kita Karafuto Petroleum Company have been
notable for their obscurity rather than for their prominence in
world affairs, especially since the outbreak of the present Sino-
It has been well said that the Soviet Far Eastern Region is
worth having, but not worth a major war, and there is good
reason to believe that this is the view of the Japanese army
chiefs. There have been two occasions, however, within the last
twenty years when it appeared for a while that the Russian Far
East might be overrun without a major war. The first was at the
time of the civil wars in Siberia just after the Russian Revolution.
Japan then sent troops to Siberia along with British, French and
American contingents as part of the Allied intervention on be-
half of the Czechoslovak legionaries in 1918. As the intervention
developed into support of the Russian counter-revolution, the
Japanese evolved a policy designed to give them a protectorate
over Transbaikalia and the Maritime Province; they backed,
not the would-be central government of Admiral Kolchak, but
the Cossack adventurers Semenov and Kalmikov who fought,
each for his own hand, in East Siberia. The project failed, partly
because of the solidarity of Russian national feeling against the
Japanese and their proteges, partly because the Japanese military
forces at that time lacked sufficient warm clothing to enable
them to remain in the field during the Siberian winter in more
than fifty degrees of frost. There was a lack of enthusiasm for the
campaign in Japan, and the U.S.A. applied pressure for with-
drawal. Finally, the Japanese evacuated Vladivostok in the
autumn of 1922; they stayed in the Russian half of Sakhalin
until 1925, and secured the oilfield concession already mentioned
in consideration of their departure.
When the Russians started to develop Vladivostok as an air
base, Japanese army leaders began to think the place had been
too lightly given up, and another opportunity to lay hold on the
Maritime Province seemed to offer itself in 1932. When the
Kwantung Army took the offensive in southern Manchuria in
September 1931, the Soviet Union was just entering on the crit-
ical period of the First Five-Year Plan and was incapable of any
vigorous action externally; the Japanese, therefore, in confidence
of immunity from Russian intervention in Manchuria, followed
up their initial drive in their own railway sphere with an ad-
vance across the zone of the Russian-controlled Chinese Eastern
Railway and up to the Amur. They thus placed themselves
astride the principal line of communication with Vladivostok,
and a policy group in the army advocated the seizure of all Soviet
territory south of the Amur by a rapid offensive while the going
was good. However, the fighting which broke out at Shanghai
early in 1932 not only diverted Japan's attention elsewhere, but
brought her into a position of such diplomatic isolation that
a further military adventure was out o the question. The
military party therefore contented itself with the elimination of
Soviet interests and influence from Manchuria, which was a
solid achievement and greatly strengthened Japan's strategic
Since 1933 Russia's defensive strength in the Far East has
been so much increased that an invasion of Siberia or surprise
attack on Vladivostok has not been a practical proposition for
Japan. Nevertheless there has been a state of high tension be-
tween Japan and Russia, and a succession of lively border
incidents has fed the rumor of an impending war. The Com-
munists have made it almost an article of faith that Japanese
penetration of China is merely preparation for an attack on the
Soviet Union. But for an economically motivated imperialism
there is no sense in seeking to acquire a territory that is at once
poverty-stricken and strongly defended when richer and weaker
lands lie close within reach. The anti-Soviet agitation in the
Japanese army appears to be due partly to ideological and partly
to strategic considerations, and it also has a distinct value to the
military party in its psychological effect on the Japanese public.
However far the Soviet state under Stalin may have departed
from the principles of Lenin and the Old Bolsheviks, it continues
to stand for republicanism, anti-feudalism and agrarian revolu-
tion, and is therefore anathema to the social class which the
Japanese officers' corps mainly represents. In China Communism
has compromised with landlords, but only in order to unite
the Chinese nation in the cause of anti-Japanism. On all counts
the Japanese emperor-revering, feudally minded "double pa-
triot" fears and detests communist Russia. But such a sentiment,
though it is an important political factor, is not likely to drive
Japan into war with Russia unless it coincides with the economic
urge of Japanese expansion, and this urge is otherwise directed.
There is even a group of business interests which advocates an
understanding with the Soviet Union in order that Japan may
concentrate on an anti-British policy; this group is not dominant,
but its mere existence is very significant.
Strategically the Japanese military attitude is determined by
fear of Russian intervention on behalf of China. The building of
strategic railways and display of military strength toward the
Soviet border are deterrent by intention; these measures are
essentially defensive as regards Russia, though their purpose is
to cover offensive strategy in China. Since the middle of last
year some 400,000 Japanese troops have been held in Man-
chukuo to guard against any Russian move to render direct
military aid to China, and though actual war has so far been
avoided, the need for such a concentration has made the struggle
with China far more difficult and costly than it would otherwise
have been. Japan has had to fight in China with one arm while
keeping the northern gate firmly shut with the other.
The strength of the Soviet Far Eastern army and the menace
of the bombers at Vladivostok to the cities of Japan are genuine
preoccupations of the Japanese General Staff. But the danger
involves a compensating advantage, which would make a
rapprochement with Russia something of a disaster for the mili-
tary party. It is not possible to obtain strong popular support
for an expansionist policy involving heavy sacrifices unless the
people have a sense of being themselves threatened. The
Vladivostok bombers are a threat to Japan's power, but they are
an asset to Japanese militarism just because they put the coun-
try in danger. By frequent air-raid drills carried out with great
realism in the larger cities the Japanese man-in-the-street is
made conscious of the devastation that may come at any time
from the other side of the Japan Sea and is more reconciled to
the taxation he has to pay for the nation's swollen armaments
and continental wars.
If war were to break out between Japan and Russia, there is
no doubt but that Russian bombers from coastal bases on the
Japan Sea could do serious damage in Japan. The distance from
Vladivostok to Tsuruga is 490 miles (as compared with 386
miles, Hamburg to Hull) and Kyoto and Osaka are only a little
farther on. Tokyo is less exposed, because bombers would have
to fly over the mountains of Shinano or Kotsuke, where anti-
aircraft batteries at high altitudes might be very troublesome.
The vital centers of Japan are certainly vulnerable to air attack,
whereas those of Russia are out of reach for Japan; on the other
hand, it seems unlikely that the war could be decided by air
action alone, and on the ground the remoteness of the real bases
of Russian power would tell in favor of Japan in a struggle in
which the Japanese stood on the defensive, especially if they
were to evacuate the Amur salient and concentrate on holding
Harbin with the Gobi desert covering Jehol and Chahar. Unless
it were quickly decided by some remarkable military victory or
by an internal convulsion in Japan, it appears probable that the
emptiness and vast distances of East Siberia and Mongolia
would make such a war more exhausting for Russia than for
The territory of the state of Manchukuo, created by the agency
of Japanese military power in 1932, comprises the former
Chinese provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol.
The first three of these were known to the Chinese as "the Three
Eastern Provinces" and made up the area known to foreigners
as Manchuria; Jehol was reckoned a part of Inner Mongolia.
All four, however, prior to the Japanese conquest were under
the control of the military despotism established in the years
following the Chinese revolution by the adventurer Chang
Tso-lin and inherited in 1928 by his son Chang Hsiieh-liang.
Manchuria is geographically separated from China Proper by
the inner gulf of the Yellow Sea and by the mountains which
shut in the North China plain and extend to the coast at Shan-
haikwan. The Great Wall follows the line of these mountains
and was designed to keep the passes by which barbarian raiders
from Manchuria and Mongolia broke into the lowlands of
Hopei; it never formed, however, an absolute limit to Chinese
settlement, and for the last two thousand years the northern
shore of the Yellow Sea with the hinterland as far as Mukden
has been inhabited by Chinese. The northern and central parts
of Manchuria, on the other hand, remained up to the nineteenth
century in the hands of primitive tribes of Mongol or Tungusic
speech; sometimes a strong Chinese dynasty would reduce them
to subjection, but more often the tribes would form a conquer-
ing confederacy or kingdom and bring the Chinese pale under
their yoke. Manchuria was thus a country which always con-
tained a strong Chinese element, but still remained a ''frontier"
and never became part of the Chinese homeland until quite re-
To the west Manchuria merges into Mongolia without any
very clear definition. The Great Khingan mountains, forming
the eastern escarpment of the Mongolian plateau, are to some
extent a dividing line, but the Barga district of Heilungkiang
lies to the west of the range, while the arid steppe country
typical of Mongolia is continued in a large tract to the east of
it. Ethnically also the Mongols overflow to the east of the Great
Khingan. Broadly speaking, however, there is a strong contrast
between the two regions, in that most of Manchuria is arable
and well provided with rivers, whereas most of Mongolia is
riverless and too arid for cultivation.
It has already been pointed out (Chap. IV) that, as an ulti-
mate result of the Manchu conquest of China, Manchuria
became more Chinese than ever before; that the country fell
virtually under Russian rule from 1900 to 1904; and that
Chinese sovereignty was only imperfectly restored after the
Russo-Japanese war. The seeds which came to harvest in 1931
were sown by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. Manchuria
was recognized as Chinese territory under Chinese administra-
tion, but the Russian railway system with its military guards
and its "absolute and exclusive administration of its lands" re-
mained, only it was now shared between Russia and Japan.
Chinese Eastern Railway t- Japanese Railways
South Mancburian -* Russian ****
Chinese Railways \^^N Riven
15. MANCHURIAN RAILWAYS 1931
Russia retained the continuation of the Trans-Siberian Railway
across North Manchuria (known as the Chinese Eastern Rail-
wa y C.E.R.) and the branch from Harbin to the Yellow Sea
as far south as Changchun now (Hsinking), while Japan took
over the section from Changchun to the port of Dalny (now
Dairen). The Japanese line was given the name of the South
Manchuria Railway (S.M.R.); it was operated by a company
in which the Japanese government owned half the shares and
appointed to the highest posts, while the other half of the shares
were held mainly by a ring of the biggest family trusts the so-
called Zaibatsu. The C.E.R. was always before 1917 under the
control of the Russian Ministry of Finance, and from 1924 to
1935 it was the Soviet government which inherited in a modi-
fied form the rights of the former Russian company. Both Japan
and Russia were therefore deeply involved as states in the affairs
of the Manchurian railways, and every transaction of the rail-
way companies tended to become a political issue.
By the treaties and notes of 1915, imposed on China in
sequel to the famous "Twenty-one Demands," the terms of
Japanese possession of the Kwantung Leased Territory and of
the S.M.R. and Antung-Mukden Railway 1 were extended from
twenty-five to ninety-nine years from the original dates. Be-
cause of the duress under which the concessions were made, the
Chinese, in the words of the Lytton Report, 2 "continuously
denied that these [the 1915 treaties and notes] were binding
upon them." They demanded the abrogation of the 1915 agree-
ments at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, at the Washington
1 The Antung-Mukden line linked the S.M.R. with the Japanese rail-
way system in Korea.
2 Appeal by the Chinese Government: Report of the Commission of
Enquiry, Geneva, 1933, pp. 49-50.
Conference in 1921-2, and in a note to Japan in 1923; they
maintained, as German nationalists held with regard to the
Versailles "Diktat," that the treaties lacked "fundamental valid-
ity" and so again to quote the Lytton Report "they de-
clined to carry out the provisions relating to Manchuria except
in so far as circumstances made it expedient to do so/' Circum-
stances meant, in the first place, the Japanese military units
stationed in Kwantung and along the S.M.R. as "railway
guards" a force with a separate command known as the Kwan-
The C.E.R. was less obnoxious to Chinese nationalists than
the S.M.R., but it also was a cause of trouble, especially after
the break between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists in
China in 1927. There were no longer any Russian railway
guards on the C.E.R. after 1917, and under the Sino-Soviet
agreement of 1924 the Chinese participated in the operation of
the line. The Russians, however, retained an effective control
and made a political use of it, as in 1925, when they supported
the revolt of General Kuo Sung-lin against the Manchurian
government of Chang Tso-lin.
After Manchuria's acknowledgment of the Nanking govern-
ment (controlled by the Kuomintang or "Nationalist" party) as
the central government of China, the conflicts of Manchurian
railway politics came to a head in the two armed clashes of 1929
and 1931. In the first of these crises the Manchurian Chinese
authorities seized the C.E.R. properties, alleging the use of the
company offices for Communist propaganda; the Soviet Union
responded by concentrating an army on the Manchurian border,
invading Manchuria, and compelling the Chinese to restore the
status quo ante on the railway. The violence in 1931 was wider
in scope because the threat to the S.M.R. came, not from direct
action, as in the case of the C.E.R., but from a system of Chi-
nese-operated lines designed with the aid of through-traffic ar-
rangements and rate-cutting to divert trade from the S.M.R.
and Dairen to a Chinese port Yingkow (Newchwang) or Hu-
lutao on the Gulf of Liaotung. 1 Up to 1929 the S.M.R. had
earned monopoly profits from the economic development of
South Manchuria, but from that year the intensive state-organ-
ized competition of the Chinese lines began to make big in-
roads on the profitability of the Japanese system and produced
a strong demand for a "positive policy" in Japanese financial
circles. The result was the campaign of the Kwantung Army be-
ginning with "the Incident" of 18 September 1931. At the out-
set Japanese official and public opinion was divided as to the
aims of policy to be pursued in Manchuria, and a compromise
settlement with the existing Manchurian authorities, preserving
at least the nominal sovereignty of China, was possible up to
the end of the year. But the exaltation of easy military success,
the growth of a reactionary chauvinist movement inside Japan,
and anger at the Chinese refusal to enter into bilateral negotia-
tions 2 combined to persuade the rulers of Japan to adopt the
policy of setting up a separate sovereign state under Japanese
military protection in Manchuria.
1 Some of the Chinese lines had been financed by the S.M.R. as "feed-
ers," but, having been linked up in the Chinese system, reduced instead
of increasing its traffic. The Ssupingkai-Anganchi and Mukden-Kirin
were tapped by the Peking-Mukden and Tahushan-Tungliao-Liaoyuan
2 The Soviet Union, not being a member of the League of Nations in
1939, insisted on bilateral negotiations and declined to admit any kind
of mediation. In 1931 China appealed to the League, and Japan, as a
member, could not refuse to plead, though she subsequently disregarded
the League's verdict.
A number of more or less eminent Chinese of Manchuria and
certain Mongol princes lent themselves to this scheme, and a
Declaration of Independence was published by them on 18 Feb-
ruary 1932; the new state, having taken over the civil adminis-
tration with the assistance of Japanese advisers, was recognized
de jure by Japan six months later. Recognition was accompa-
nied by a treaty which empowered Japan to station troops
throughout the country for the defense of its newly established
sovereignty; the Kwantung Army, which had brought Man-
chukuo into being, thus obtained the right of permanent occu-
Manchukuo is provided with a monarchy and Chinese min-
isters and officials, the throne being held by the heir of the
Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty overthrown in China by the revolu-
tion of 1911. The substance of power, however, belongs to the
commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, who is also Japa-
nese ambassador to Manchukuo, and thus performs the func-
tion of a resident or high commissioner in a protectorate. He
resides at Hsinking, formerly Changchun, which is now both
the capital of Manchukuo and the headquarters of the Kwan-
tung Army. The central administration of Manchuria was re-
moved from Mukden to Changchun to mark the change of re-
gime, and the latter was almost entirely rebuilt to give it the
aspect and facilities of a capital city; at the same time the four
old provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol were
split up to make new divisions with new names, so that the po-
litical map of the country has been quite transformed since
1931 (see map 18).
By the action of 1931 the Japanese not only averted the dan-
ger to the S.M.R. from politically promoted Chinese competi-
.tiori, but were able themselves to obtain control of the Chinese-
operated railways and unite them with the S.M.R. in a single
system. Nor was the victory of the S.M.R. restricted to its former
domain in South Manchuria. Just two months after the Mukden
incident a Japanese column occupied Tsitsihar in Heilung-
kiang, thus cutting across the Soviet-controlled C.E.R. The
Soviet Union, paralyzed for the time being by the stresses of the
First Five-Year Plan, could not risk military counter-measures,
and remained passive while the Kwantung Army took posses-
sion of North Manchuria up to the Amur. The potential stra-
tegic value of the C.E.R. as a short cut to Vladivostok having
been destroyed by the Japanese advance, the Soviet govern-
ment decided to cut its losses, and finally sold its interest in the
C.E.R. to Manchukuo in 1935.
With the acquisition of the C.E.R. all the railways of Man-
churia came under a unified. Japanese management. There was
in 1931 a total railway mileage of 4,000; over 2,000 miles of new
lines have been constructed since then by the Japanese. Three
of the new railways have special strategic, as well as economic,
significance. One continues the Dairen-Harbin line north to
Heiho on the Amur opposite the Russian town of Blagove-
shchensk; a second supplements the old Peking-Mukden line by
an inland route via Jehol (completed early this year); and a
third runs from Rashin on the Korean coast a little way south
of the Siberian border to Hsinking, with branches north to
Harbin and to Sanchiang province, thus giving Japan railway
access to Manchuria from the Japan Sea as well as from the
Before 1931 Japan had land frontiers with the Soviet Union
only in Karafuto and for a very short stretch in the extreme
16. MANCHURIAN RAILWAYS 1938
NOTE ON MAP 17
Vladivostok was founded on an uninhabited site in 1860;
Rashin has been developed from a fishing village into a major
port within the last five years. Between Yuki and Kunju the
railway from Rashin into Manchukuo runs close to the south-
western extremity of Soviet territory. Serious fighting took place
for ten days from 29 July 1938 over rival claims to the hill of
Changkufeng between the Tumen river and Lake Khasan, The
Russians claim that the map attached to a Russo-Chinese
border-demarcation treaty of 1886 shows that the hill belongs
to them, though it is not apparently marked by name on this
map; the Japanese protest that this map was never communi-
cated to Japan with other Russo-Chinese secret agreements at
the time of the entente of 191 1 and that maps prepared by the
Russian Imperial General Staff leave the hill on the Chinese
side of the frontier. It seems that a serious attempt is now being
made to arrive at a final demarcation of the boundary in this
\7, VLADIVOSTOK AND RASHIN
northeast of Korea. With the conquest o Manchuria she took
over 1,500 miles of China's Siberian boundary, and the fact that
this boundary had never been precisely demarcated gave plenty
of opportunity for border incidents between the armed forces of
two Great Powers on very bad terms with each other. The
greater part of the frontier was formed by the Amur and Ussuri
rivers, but even in the river sections there were islands in dis-
pute, and at each end, near the Japan Sea in the east and to-
ward the edge of Mongolia in the west, there were no rivers to
separate the Japanese and Russian outposts. In these circum-
stances skirmishes have been frequent during the last few years
and they have served as trials of strength, willingness to risk
general hostilities being measured by truculence of attitude in
each case. In June 1937 a fight broke out over possession of an
island in the Amur and the Russians withdrew after losing a
gunboat sunk by shell fire; this was soon after the execution of
Tukhachevsky and other Red Army generals in Moscow, and
the Japanese army leaders were encouraged by the exhibition
of Russian weakness to bring matters to a head in North China.
This year, with the Japanese deeply involved in their war in
China, the tables have been turned on the Siberian border, and
it is now the turn of the Russians to press menacingly on the
Japanese. The aim of Soviet policy is to embarrass the Japanese
campaign in China by immobilizing as many Japanese troops as
possible on the Manchukuo border; strategically the most sensi-
tive spot on the line for Japan (though not for Russia) is
where the tongue of Russian territory along the coast south-
west of Vladivostok approaches Japan's new artery of communi-
cation with Manchukuo, the Rashin-Harbin railway. It is at
this point that fighting has recently been going on. (See map 17
The Kwantung Army has a scheme for settling Japanese
emigrants, mostly ex-service men, in the provinces of Heiho and
Sanchiang near the Amur; there is still much unoccupied land
in the far north of Manchuria, and it is here that there is most
need for a co-national rural population to support the military
garrisons. The scheme provides for the. settlement of a million
families in twenty years from 1936. So far Japanese colonization
in these regions has not prospered, for the conditions of life are
very different from those in Japan, and financial assistance for
the settlers is likely to be exiguous in the near future, whatever
the outcome of the war in China.
As yet only about ten per cent of the population of Manchu-
kuo is to be found in the northern half of the country. Economic
life is still concentrated in the south near the Yellow Sea. Here
is not only the richest and most closely settled agricultural land,
with wheat and soya beans as its main products, but also the
Mukden industrial area based on the coal and iron ore of Feng-
tien province. The center of coal production is at Fushun, a little
way to the east of Mukden; to the south is Anshan, site of the
Showa Steel Works, now Japan's largest heavy industrial plant.
The development of this industrial area under complete Japa-
nese control his undoubtedly strengthened Japan both from an
economic and from a military point of view. Fengtien heavy
industry is, however, subject to certain drawbacks which can-
not be eliminated either by political control or administrative
energy. Manchuria has large coal reserves, but is deficient in
good coking coal for metallurgical purposes, and its abundant
iron ore is almost everywhere of low grade and costly to work.
Good coking coal, on the other hand, is produced in Hopei and
Shantung in North China, and fairly large reserves of high-
grade iron ore exist in Chahar to the west of Jehol. The Japanese
occupation of Manchuria thus left China still with a great
potential advantage in heavy industry and all it implies, if she
were to undertake seriously the exploitation of her coal and iron
resources. Such considerations counted for much in persuading
the Kwantung Army to extend the "manifest destiny" from
Manchuria to Inner Mongolia and North China.
Density of population per sq. mile
280 (HO 75-50
225 3 25-12
15075 Q| Under 12
Coal and Iron
Coal production in
18. MANCHUKUO: COAL, IRON AND DENSITY OF POPULATION
MONGOLIA AND SINKIANG
Mongolia and Sinkiang under the Manchu empire together
comprised an area about eighteen times that of Great Britain
with a total population of perhaps five millions. Since the
Chinese Revolution the landmarks of this vast region have been
considerably altered, for the old Mongolia has been broken up
by the constitution in Outer Mongolia (north of the Gobi desert)
of the two independent republics of Mongolia 1 and Tannu-Tuva,
and in Inner Mongolia (south of the Gobi) of the four Chinese
provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan and Ninghsia. Chinese
colonization in the four Inner Mongolian provinces has greatly
increased their population during the last twenty-five years, so
that it now stands at over seven millions, while Outer Mongolia
and Sinkiang contain together about four million inhabitants.
Chinese form a numerical majority in the Inner Mongolian prov-
inces, but are in a minority in Sinkiang and are a negligible
element in Outer Mongolia.
Politically the Mongolia-Sinkiang region is now divided de
facto between China, Japan and the Soviet Union. China con-
tinues to hold, subject to considerable insubordination of the
/In fall tide the Mongol People's Republic; often, however, men-
tioned simply as Mongolia or as Outer Mongolia.
MONGOLIA AND SINK1ANG
provincial governors, Ninghsia and Sinkiang. Japan incorpo-
rated Jehol in Manchukuo in 1933, and has overrun Chahar
and part of Suiyiian in the campaign of 1937-8, setting up an
"autonomous" Mongol state to the southwest of Manchukuo.
The Soviet Union holds under a kind of protectorate Outer
Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva, which were originally detached
from China in 1912.
The predominant characteristic of both Mongolia and Sin-
kiang is aridity. About ninety-five per cent of the total area is
either desert of sand or gravel, or grassland, good for pasture
but incapable of cultivation. Arable land is found only in the
south near the Great Wall, where the summer monsoons from
the south bring some rain; in the valleys of the Altai and Sayan,
which get their rainfall by westerly winds from the Atlantic;
and at the foot of the T'ien-shan ranges, where streams fed by
the snows of the high peaks can be used for irrigation in places
where there is little or no rainfall. In Sinkiang there is more true
desert than in Mongolia, but irrigated cultivation has been
carried on in the oases from early times, so that the sedentary
element of population has always been stronger relatively than
in Mongolia, where most of the land is of the type intermediate
between desert and arable and is well suited to an economy of
The main desert belt is formed by the Taklamakan, Kum
Tagh and Gobi tracts stretching east-northeast from Yarkand
to the Great Khingan. Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang lie on the
farther side of this belt, and Inner Mongolia on the nearer side,
as approached from China. A "line of enormous sandhills" 1
marks the actual boundary between Inner and Outer Mongolia
1 Sir Eric Teichman, Journey to Turkestan, p. 49.
MONGOLIA AND SINKIANG
to the north of the Suiyiian-Hami motor caravan route, and the
Gobi desert as a whole is a natural frontier of great impenetra-
bility. It cuts off Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang from China
while leaving them in close contact with the territories of the
Soviet Union to the north and west. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that China should have found it difficult to hold under her
authority the conquests of the Manchu empire on the other side
of the "sea of sand," and that Soviet influence should be para-
mount there, though with different effect at Urga and at
Urumchi. Inner Mongolia, on the other hand, is well within
China's reach, and would by now be firmly held by the Nanking
government were it not for the Japanese penetration westward
from South Manchuria.
Apart from the Chinese there are three nationality elements
in the Mongolia-Sinkiang region. The Mongols are scattered all
over Mongolia, except for Tannu-Tuva, and are also represented
in the former "Three Eastern Provinces'' (Manchuria), in cen-
tral Sinkiang (the Kalmuk enclave north of Karashar) and in
Tsinghai to the south of the Kansu Chinese corridor; they
speak various dialects of the Mongol language, and are all
traditionally nomads by culture and Lama-Buddhists by re-
ligion. There are between four and five millions of them in all,
and fully three-quarters of them numerically live in Manchuria
and Inner Mongolia, but their numbers in these areas are in-
ferior to the masses of Chinese in close proximity, so that Outer
Mongolia, which is thoroughly Mongol, has for long been the
To the northwest of Mongolia between the Sayan and Tan-
nuola mountains dwell the Uriankhai, a very primitive people
speaking a Turki language; they only number some 50,000, but
Boundaries of 'Autonomous
Inner Mongolia 1
Boundaries of Leagues
o IQO 200 soo
19. THE MONGOLS
MONGOLIA AND SINK1ANG
have been put on the map through being endowed by the
Russians with a state of their own (Tannu-Tuva) separate from
the Mongol People's Republic.
On the other side of the Altai, in Sinkiang, are other Turki-
speaking peoples, some sedentary and some nomad, Moslems by
religion and thus traditionally akin to the Turki peoples of
Soviet Central Asia the Uzbeks, Turkomans, Khirgiz and
Kazaks. The Turkis of Sinkiang appear to number about two
The Chinese inhabitants of Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang,
numbering some five or six millions, are of two kinds, ordinary
Chinese and Tungans. The latter are Chinese-speaking Moslems,
and have long formed a distinct section of the Chinese people,
sharply divided from their "pagan" compatriots. Language binds
the Tungans to China, but religion links them with the Turkis
in a minority group. In the present generation there is a tend-
ency for language to prevail over religion as the prime factor of
affinity, and the Tungans show no sign at present of breaking
away from China, though they continue to be a somewhat centrif-
ugal .element in the Chinese body politic. 1
The first result of the Chinese Revolution in the Mongolia-
Sinkiang region was the successful revolt of Outer Mongolia.
The rebels declared that they owed allegiance to the Ch'ing
dynasty, but none to China, and the insurrection manifested a
bitter enmity to the Chinese. The improvident Mongol nobles
were everywhere in debt to Chinese moneylenders, and Chinese
peasant settlers were continually encroaching on the pastures of
the Mongol tribes to the north of the Great Wall. The inde-
1 See page 60 on the symbolism of the five-barred Republican flag
which counted the Moslems as a "nation."
MONGOLIA AND SINK1ANG
pendence movement was general in both Inner and Outer
Mongolia; that it failed in the former region, while succeeding
in the latter, was due not only to the advantages the rebels de-
rived from the remoteness of Outer Mongolia and the barrier
of the Gobi desert, but also to other factors. The old tribal
organization of the Mongols had been preserved much better in
Outer, than in Inner, Mongolia. The Mongols were divided
into numerous "banners" (hoshuri) grouped into confederacies
(aimak); of the latter there were only four in Outer, but twenty-
four in Inner, Mongolia. The Inner Mongols were thus more
split up than their kinsmen beyond the Gobi, and Peking govern-
mental control over them was further increased by a system of
artificial combinations called "leagues" (chiguglari). As many of
the banner princes also found profit in selling tribal lands to
Chinese settlers, Chinese domination in Inner Mongolia was
too strong to be broken down before the arrival of the Japanese.
The Mongol revolt in Outer Mongolia in 1912 was supported
by Russia, who extorted from China recognition of Outer Mon-
golian autonomy under nominal Chinese sovereignty. The
Russians at the same time made claims to the Uriankhai terri-
tory, now Tannu-Tuva, and secured its separation from Mon-
golia; after the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 it was brought
under direct Russian administration. Russian power, however,
dwindled after the revolution of 1917, and the Chinese took the
opportunity to send an expedition across the Gobi and capture
Urga, the capital of autonomous Outer Mongolia. The Mongol
princes called to their aid a White Russian force under Baron
Ungern von Steinberg, who drove out the Chinese, but was
himself overthrown by a Red Russian column pursuing him
from Siberia. The new Soviet Russia renewed the independence
MONGOLIA AND SINKIANG
of Outer Mongolia vis-a-vis China, but transformed its institu-
tions with the aid of a revolutionary party among the Mongols.
Power had been in the hands of the banner princes with the
Buddhist metropolitan of Urga, the Khutukhtu or "Living
Buddha," as the head of the state; this regime was replaced in
1954 by the Mongol People's Republic with a popular national
assembly as the legal sovereign. Tannu-Tuva had meanwhile
been proclaimed a separate republic, the Russian colonists there
being locally the most important element.
China has not had any control over the governments of Outer
Mongolia or Tannu-Tuva for the last seventeen years, and these
states have external relations only with the Soviet Union, with
which they have concluded military alliances. Chinese sov-
ereignty ovei all this territory is still, however, juridically recog-
nized by all other states, including the Soviet Union, and the
new republics have not claimed sovereignty as Manchukuo has
done, though they are quite as effectively removed from the
jurisdiction of the central government of China. The principal
reason appears to be that the Mongol and Uriankhai states and
their Soviet Union protectors are content with the fact of separa-
tion and are willing to leave the empty form of sovereignty to
China, whereas the restored Manchu monarchy in Hsinking
cannot acknowledge even nominally the supremacy of the
The Soviet Union does not have to keep an army of occupation
in Outer Mongolia to prevent it from rejoining China of its own
volition, for Mongol nationalism can be relied on to resist
Chinese overtures. The social radicalism of the People's Re-
public has, however, alienated the formerly privileged noble
and priestly classes and thus split the national independence
movement into two factions, both anti-Chinese, but looking to
MONGOLIA AND S1NKIANG
different quarters for support. The "Red" Mongols rely on the
Soviet Union to sustain their cause, but the more conservative
nationalists in Inner Mongolia, anxious to free themselves from
the Chinese yoke, and yet afraid to accept aid from the "City of
the Red Heroes" (Ulan Bator Khoto Urga, as renamed in
1924), turned to Japan when the columns of the Kwantung
Army broke out from the Japanese railway zone of Manchuria
across the Chinese-inhabited corn-lands to the Mongol steppe.
The Japanese were not slow to realize the value of an alliance
with Mongol nationalism. No real separatism could be induced
among the Chinese of Manchuria, but the anti-Chinese senti-
ment of the Mongols made them an ideal instrument for Japa-
nese imperialism. The Mongol-inhabited western parts of Man-
churia, including northern Jehol, were therefore detached and
made into a new province called Hsingan (subsequently divided
into four: North, East, West and South Hsingan), and the
Mongols were given a special status and guarantees against
Chinese officialdom in the new state structure of Manchukuo.
The Japanese have not been entirely successful, however, in
winning the support of the Manchukuo Mongols, for the eco-
nomic urges of their imperialism have prevented them from leav-
ing the Mongols alone to continue in their old ways of life. From
the point of view of Japanese economy Hsingan is of great
potential value as a producer of wool within the Japanese
currency area; in time it might free the Japanese wool industry
from dependence on imports from Australia. But the wool
hitherto produced by the Mongol nomads is too coarse to be
suitable for industrial purposes, and Japanese attempts to im-
prove the breed of sheep have involved a degree of administra-
tive interference and compulsion much resented by the Mongols.
MONGOLIA AND SINKIANG
The condition of the Mongols in Manchukuo was neverthe-
less greatly preferable to that of their kinsmen in Chahar and
Suiyiian who remained under Chinese rule until 1937. The
Chinese officials there continued to enclose Mongol tribal lands
and sell or rent them to Chinese settlers from the south. In 1936
there was a Mongol revolt under the leadership of Prince Teh;
the Kwantung Army supplied the rebels with munitions, but
was restrained by the Tokyo government from serious inter-
vention, and Teh was defeated. In the following year, however,
after the Lukouchiao incident had precipitated general hostilities
against China, the Kwantung Army overran Chahar and Sui-
yiian as far as the terminus of the railway from Peiping at Paotou
on the great northward bend of the Yellow River. An autono-
mous Mongol state covering the two provinces was then pro-
claimed under the name of Meng Chiang.
The great economic importance of Chahar lies in its deposits
of high-grade iron ore, which are located about 1 50 miles north-
west of Peiping. As this area is so closely connected with Hopei,
consideration of it will be deferred to the next chapter; it suffices
to point out here that control of the iron ore of Chahar has
been one of the principal objectives of Japan's North China
policy ever since the completion of the conquest of Manchuria
By her advance westward into Inner Mongolia Japan has
intercepted the old Russia-China trade route via Urga and Kal-
gan and also that via Kami and Suiyiian. But the Soviet Union,
Outer Mongolia, the Chinese Communists in Kansu and Shensi
and the Kuomintang central government of China have now all
been brought into a combination against Japan, and they are in
contact by routes which remain out of reach of the Japanese.
m Routes availiblt for motor traffic M* Railways
The Lanchow-Sinklinj route is now ,
In reconstruction *** " ^r construction
M projected or discussed S, Shan-tan Miao
. Routes now in disuse
- Other routes
Motor route from Kalpn to Ulan Ude
o too go !oo
20, MONGOLIA AND SINKIANG: COMMUNICATIONS
MONGOLIA AND SINKIANG
One is a trail across the desert from Urga to Ninghsia; another,
much more important, is the dirt road by Urumchi (Tihwa) and
Kami to Lanchow in Kansu. It is twelve days' journey by lorry
from the Soviet Union border to Lanchow, and another five on
to Sian at the Lunghai railhead. A considerable quantity of
munitions enters China by this route, though it is quite inade-
quate as a main channel of supply for the requirements of large-
scale modern warfare. 1
Sinkiang is now held by a Chinese army which is implacably
anti- Japanese because it consists mainly of exiles from Man-
churia. A large number of troops of the army of Chang Hsiieh-
liang who fought against the Japanese in 1931-2 finally fled
across the frontier into Siberia; they were conveyed by the Trans-
Siberian and Turksib railways and put back into Chinese terri-
tory over the Sinkiang border. Sinkiang was at the time in the
throes of a Turki rebellion supported by an army of Tungans
from Kansu, and it appeared likely that an independent Mos-
lem state would be set up there, so that China would lose Sin-
kiang no less than Outer Mongolia. But the Turkis and Tungans
took to fighting each other, the arrival of the Manchurians
turned the scale in favor of Chinese authority, and a number of
Soviet bombing airplanes sent to the aid of the provincial
government settled the matter. The great Moslem revolt col-
lapsed in 1934. It may be noted that Soviet policy in Sinkiang
was the opposite to what it was in Outer Mongolia; in the latter
region the Russians sustained Mongol separatism against China,
while in the former they helped the Chinese to crush a separatist
national insurrection. The reason was no doubt fear of the
1 The greater part of the Russian munition supply to China goes from
Odessa to Canton by sea.
MONGOLIA AND S1NK1ANG
attraction which an independent Turki Moslem state in Sin-
kiang might have for the ex-Moslem Soviet citizens of Kazak-
stan, Khirgizia and Uzbekistan. The capitulation of the Turkis
and the retreat of the Tungans left Sinkiang under the rule of an
energetic Chinese general who owed his position to support from
Moscow, who stood for anti-Japanism in an extreme form, and
who could not be a cause of unrest in Soviet Central Asia.
SOUTH OF THE WALL
Of the eighteen provinces of China Proper often known simply
as the Eighteen Provinces (shih pa sheng) five are of primary
importance, holding key positions at the center and at the four
points of the compass respectively. These five contain, or con-
tained two years ago, the seven most populous cities in China, 1
as shown in the following table:
North , . . Hopei Peiping, Tientsin
East . . . Kiangsu Shanghai, Nanking
Center . . , Hupeh Hankow
West . . . Szechwan Chungking
South . . . Kwangtung Canton
The five key provinces are linked together by China's two
1 The figures as given by the Chinese Year Book of 1935-6 (not applica-
ble today in view of mass exodus from places in the war zone) are as
(1) Shanghai - - 3,359,114 (5) Hankow - - 777,993
(2) Peiping - - 1,496,648 (6) Nanking - - 681,855
(3) Tientsin - - 1,387,462 (7) Chungking - - 635,000
(4) Canton - - 1,122,583
The only other towns given as possessing more than 600,000 inhabi-
tants are Changsha in Hunan, and Wenchow in Chekiang.
2U CHINA: RAILWAYS
SOUTH OF THE WALL
most important lines of internal communication, which intersect
at Hankow: the west-to-east Yangtse river and the north-to-south
Peiping-Canton railway. Of the seven cities Chungking, Hankow
and Nanking are on the Yangtse, while Shanghai, though not
actually on the river, acts as the seaport for its whole basin.
Three of the five provinces, Kwangtung, Kiangsu and Hopei,
are coastal, and the whole tendency of economic development
in the last hundred years has been to increase the importance of
the maritime, relative to that of the interior, provinces of China.
Even before the opening of China to extensive foreign trade, the
real economic center of gravity was located on the lower Yangtse
in southern Kiangsu; in those days the most important inter-
section of routes was the crossing of the Tientsin-Hangchow
Grand Canal (linking Hopei with Chekiang) and the Yangtse
at Chinkiang. With the access of foreign shipping to the Yangtse
delta, a vast amount of river, canal, coastwise and oceanic trade
came to be concentrated there, and Shanghai, a medium-sized
town in 1842, grew and grew until it became by far the largest
city of China and the sixth largest in the world.
In 1928 Nanking was declared the capital of China by the
government of the Kuomintang party, whose forces had cap-
tured the former capital, Peking, and were also in possession of
Canton, Hankow and the Chinese-administered section of
Shanghai. Nanking had the advantage of having been a capital
at certain, earlier periods in Chinese history, and it was further
indicated by its proximity to Shanghai; this was specially im-
portant for revenue purposes, as the maritime customs have so
far been the surest fiscal asset of any central government in
China, and Shanghai provided nearly half their total takings
and an even greater proportion after the Manchurian customs
_ tarfyaaMfirto roxfs open b /nffif
ma/a roads ttfter coflj/rvcAiw VKunstrucKon
21 CHINA: ROADS
SOUTH OF THE WALL
had been subtracted in iggs. 1 Shanghai, the commercial and
industrial metropolis, could not itself become the political capi-
tal, because half of it was under foreign administration (the
International Settlement and French Concession).
As already pointed out in Chapter II, the Yellow River valley
was the original seat of Chinese civilization, and the Yangtse
valley long remained a country of forest and swamp with savage
inhabitants. But the basin of the Yangtse not only contains a
larger area of cultivable land than that of the Yellow River; the
Yangtse itself, the fourth river of the world in length, is navi-
gable for 2,000 miles from the sea, whereas the Yellow River is
blocked by rapids in its upper, and by shoals and sandbanks in
its lower course, so as to be of little use for navigation. As the
Yangtse valley was brought under .cultivation and long-distance
trade increased, it was inevitable that the economic center of
gravity in China should tend to shift southward from the Yellow
River; the center of political power, however, remained usually
in the north, mainly because the central government had to
attend to the ever troublesome northern frontier and could not
afford to be too far away from it, while the Mongol and Manchu
conquerors of China naturally sought to exert their dominion
from a point which was convenient for organizing the adminis-
tration of China, but also within easy reach of their own northern
homelands. Such a point was Peiping, the Cambaluc of Kublai
Khan, in the extreme north of China Proper, but about halfway
between Canton and the Amur. Except for a period from 1368
to 1421 when Nanking was the capital, the Yuan (Mongol),
Ming and Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasties ruled from Peiping
latterly called Peking or "Northern Capital" (1280-1911).
1930, St.$ 135 out of 281 millions; in 1934 $*.$ *75 out of 335
The China National The South-western
Aviation Corporation Aviation Corporation
23. CHINA: AIRWAYS
NOTE ON MAP 24
All population statistics for China must be accepted with some
reserve, as no satisfactory census of the country as a whole has
ever been carried out, and estimates vary from a maximum of
nearly 500 millions total down to only 250 millions (Legendre).
It is probably safe to allow just under 400 millions for China
Proper and the outer lands, exclusive of Manchukuo, at the time
of the outbreak of the present war. The figures used for the map
opposite are taken from the Chinese Year Book of 1937, and the
totals by provinces in millions (to the nearest million) are as
Province Pop. in millions Province Pop. in millions
1. Szechwan 1 47 13. Yunnan 12
2. Shantung 35 14. Shansi - u
3. Honan 33 15. Shensi 10
4. Kiangsu 31 16. Fukien 10
5. Kwangtung 31 17. Kweichow 7
6. Hunan 28 18. Kansu 6
7. Hopei 27 19. Sinkiang 2
8. Hupeh 27 20. Suiyuan 2
9. Anhwei 22 21. Chahar 2
10. Chekiang 20 22. Tsinghai i
11. Kiangsi 16 23. Sikang i
12. Kwangsi 13 24. Ninghsia i
1 The 1936 edition of the Chinese Year Book, however, gives the popu-
lation of Szechwan as only 37 millions. It has on the other hand been
estimated at more than 50 millions.
Density of population /oersy. mile
- iz EH
250 - 375
24. CHINA: DENSITY OF POPULATION BY PROVINCES
SOUTH OF THE WALL
After the Republic had replaced the Manchu dynasty Peking
remained the capital, but it was now neither the seat o an im-
pressive imperial court nor the center of the new progressive
nationalism which had created the Republic. The latter had its
headquarters at Canton. Kwangtung, separated from northern
and central China by the Nanling mountain range, has always
had a strong provincial individuality, and throughout the period
of the Manchu dynasty had been the focus of antagonism to the
conquering race; in addition to this it had had long contact with
Europeans through trade and the emigration of Cantonese to
the Dutch Indies, Malaya and California. Thus Canton became
the principal base of the Chinese Revolution, while Peking re-
mained in spirit a stronghold of the ancien regime even after the
collapse of the monarchy.
The spearhead of the revolution was the Kuomintang party
with a nucleus of Cantonese politicians who, finding it impossible
to consolidate the initial success of the revolution in China as
a whole, repudiated Peking and all its works and set up a sepa-
rate government at Canton in 1917. For nine years the Kuo-
mintang ruled in Kwangtung, while various factions of "war
lords" warred on each other in the rest of China; then in .1956
the party's army, led by Chiang Kai-shek, marched north and
won, first Hankow, then Nanking and Shanghai, and finally
Peking, 1 for the new dispensation. China was thus re-unified,
though the new unity was far from complete, by a movement
sweeping the country from south to north. It is to be noted that
1 Peking was not captured by the forces under Chiang Kai-shek, whose
advance from Nanking was interrupted by the dash with the Japanese at
Tsinan, but by the army of Shansi under Yen Hsi-shan, who threw in
his lot with the Kuomintang after their victories on the Yangtse.
2. to 3 crops
200 300 400 M
DENSITY OF POPULATION PER SQ. MILE AND NAME OF REGION
647 North China Plain
581 Red Basin of Szechwan
421 South Yan<tse Hills (a) 417 Southeastern Coast (b)
p / t 290 Central mountain belt (A) 285 Hills of Llankwan (B)
L_y>1 286 Mountains of Shantunc,Jehol,LIao-tung(C)
[fffff] 211 Loess Hijhlxnds
I. -\ 157 South-western tableland
Percentace of cultivated land
(black square) to total area
of the region (white square).
Density of population persq.
mile on cultivated land only.
// Area of cultivated land per person
' (In mow; 100 mow= 16.47 acre).
Figures used to make this map are
from G. F. Cressey (Geographical Foun-
dations of Cnfna). Areas of reg fons cor-
respond to planometer reading and are
adopted from the same work.
25. CHINA: AGRICULTURE
SOUTH OF THE WALL
the effect of the Japanese invasion has been and will be, if suc-
cessful, to reverse this process. The Kuomintang sequence was
Canton-Hankow-Shanghai-Peiping; the order of Japanese ob-
jectives has been Peiping-Shanghai-Hankow, and if these three
focal points are taken and held by the Japanese, the Kuomin-
tang power will be put back into the southern region from which
it emerged in 1926.
In the present war the essentially strategic aims of the Japanese
must be distinguished from their economic purposes. The ad-
vance on Hankow belongs to the former category, whereas the
invasions of the Peiping-Tientsin and Shanghai-Nanking areas
correspond to the economic motives of Japanese policy. The
latter fall under three heads:
(1) To acquire control, within the Japanese currency area, of
essential raw materials in which Japan, even after the conquest of
Manchuria, is deficient, notably coking coal, iron ore and cotton.
(2) To acquire monopoly or preference in Chinese trade.
(3) To prevent the competitive industrialization of China,
both in heavy and light industries.
The first of the above objectives could be sufficiently realized
by the control of the "Five Northern Provinces," that is to say,
Hopei, Shansi and Shantung plus the two Inner Mongolian
provinces of Chahar and Suiyiian, which the Japanese unsuc-
cessfully tried to detach from China by intrigue and menaces in
1935. Aims (2) and (3), on the other hand, required in addition
a campaign for domination of Kiangsu, where half the trade of
China had its outlet and a formidable Chinese textile industry
was growing up in the decade before 1937.
The Five Northern Provinces are economically important,
Source : General statement on the Mining Industry fn China (National Geological Survey)
presented by the Information Bulletin, Council of International Affairs, Nanking.
The circles for ShansI and Shenst are to be enlarged five and three times respectively.
26. CHINA: COAL RESOURCES
SOUTH OF THE WALL
not so much for their actual productiveness as for their potential
wealth as the region of future location for the biggest heavy
industry in the Far East. To quote from a paper read to the
World Engineering Congress in igsg: 1 "Disregarding political
boundaries, perhaps the best potential combination in the Pacific
region [for heavy industry] would be between the iron ores
of India or of the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies on the
one hand, and the coking coal of the northeastern provinces of
China on the other, with smelting centered on the Chinese coast,
possibly on the Bay of Pe-chi-li [Po Hai]." In other words, as
North China has the best supply of coking coal in the Far East,
and as, owing to the relative tonnages involved, iron ore moves
to coal rather than the reverse, the seaboard of Hopei is indi-
cated as the best site in the Far East for the growth of a heavy
industry. Nor would such an industry be entirely dependent on
imports of iron ore from the overseas sources mentioned in the
above quotation; the Five Northern Provinces contain not only
the principal coking coal deposits of the Far East, but also the
"most important single iron ore region in China" 2 the Hsiian
Lung deposits in Chahar estimated at 90 million tons of high
grade, or more than the entire estimated reserves of Japan and
Korea put together. The Hsiian Lung field lies about 150 miles
northwest of Peiping, and its natural outlet is to Hopei, where
the Kaiping coalfield supplies coking coal.
To the west of Hopei lies Shansi with more than half of China's
estimated probable coal reserve, which is about thirty times
Japan's. Because of Shansi's inland seclusion its coal resources
1 C. K. Leith, "The World's Iron Ore Supply." Quoted by H. Foster
Bain, Ores and Industry in the Far East, p. 265.
2 Bain, Ores and Industry in the Far East, p. 96.
',. .*'>/ . ,
CHAH^. ; : :v^
s ' J "' "*"
* * 4
) ^ ANHWEI
"0. CHINA: COAL AND IRON PRODUCTION, 1936
SOUTH OF THE WALL
can only be made available with the aid of railways, and the
Japanese in 1936 formulated a plan for a line from Shihchia-
chwang to Tsangchow to link the Shansi coal mines with the
coast. China's refusal to grant Japan concessions either for the
construction of this railway or for the exploitation of the Chahar
iron ores was one of the principal reasons for the tension which
led to the outbreak of war at the end of July 1937. The Kwan-
tung Army and its powerful financial partner, the Manchukuo
Heavy Industry Company, were determined to obtain control
of the mineral resources of Hopei, Chahar and Shansi, and the
government of Chiang Kai-shek was no less determined to pre-
Besides coal and iron another raw material sought by Japan
was cotton. Cotton cannot be produced successfully in Japan,
Korea or Manchuria, but China Proper is one of the five princi-
pal producing countries of the world (the other four being the
ILSA., India, the Soviet Union and Egypt). The great Japanese
cotton textile industry was built up entirely on imported raw
material, and in the days of relatively free trade and budgets
hot too unbalanced this was quite a practical procedure. But
since 1931 Japan has plunged deep into the mazes of inflationary
finance, and while her export trade has boomed, her exchange
difficulties have become ever more and more embarrassing.
The urge to enclose a cotton-growing area within the currency
domain of the yen had become very strong in the Japanese tex-
tile industry by 1 937. It is an essential part of Japanese expansion
to provide conquered regions with a currency tied to die yen,
so as to reduce the amount of imports which must be paid for in
currencies not under Japanese control. Cotton is produced in
western Shantung, Hopei and southern Shansi, so that en-
MINERAL PRODUCTION l!5t
I OIL in barrels
28. CHINA: MINERAL PRODUQION, 1936
SOUTH OF THE WALL
closure of the Five Northern Provinces could be of great benefit 1
to the Japanese textile industry as well as to heavy industrial
Apart from raw materials, Japan's principal economic aim
has been to reverse the trend of Chinese tariff policy. In the
words of the Japan Year Book for 1Q37: 2 "The Manchurian
Incident, 1931, enabled Japan to get the lion's share in the
foreign trade of Manchukuo . . . but on the other hand, com-
bined with the Shanghai Affair, it intensified the anti-Japanese
movement in China. Increases in China's tariffs on Japanese
goods were also effected in rapid succession, thus dealing a great
blow to Japan's trade with China 3 and at the same time furnish-
ing a chance for the United States, Great Britain and Germany
to recover their commercial influence of former years in that
country." Japan's exports to China declined in value between
1930 and 1936 (even allowing for subtraction of the Man-
churian share from the 1930 figures), while the export total to
Asia as a whole almost doubled. The present war has given
Japan control of the Chinese seaboard from the Great Wall to
Hangchow with ports which normally handle about three-
quarters of China's foreign trade, and through the provisional
governments set up at Peiping and Nanking the Japanese have
had the tariff rates revised in their favor, though the fighting
and devastation have so interrupted trade that there is little
enough for anyone at the present time.
If the Five Northern Provinces are of supreme importance for
1 So far this aim has not been realized, as Chinese guerrillas have pre-
vented the marketing of the crop.
* P. 4*4- .
3 The tariffs did not discriminate against Japan by name, but were
raised against all types and qualities of goods in which Japan specialized.
Main cultivation of tea
Q Rape seeds
~ Ground nuts
| Tung seed
Q Soya bean
^ Sesame seed
Provinces are shown which have an annual production of vegetable oil of
500.000 piculs minimum.
29. CHINA: TEA, SILK, COTTON AND VEGETABLE OIL
SOUTH OF THE WALL
heavy industry raw materials, Shanghai is the key point com-
mercially and has been the special objective of the Japanese
exporting light industries. A similar distinction o group aims
may be discerned as regards the negative purpose of Japanese
policy: the prevention of China's competitive industrialization
and evolution to Great Power rank. By seizing the only region
of China suitable for the development of a large-scale iron and
steel industry, the Japanese have thwarted China's advance to
economic supremacy in the Far East for as long as they can hold
the positions they have gained; by the capture of the Shanghai-
Nanking area they have taken into their own hands the rapidly
growing Chinese cotton industry, which was already a formidable
rival to the mills of Osaka and Kobe.
The economic ends of Japanese policy would be well enough
served by control of the Five Northern Provinces plus Kiangsu
without any further advance. But as the Kuomintang has declared
its resolve to continue the war indefinitely, and as the Chinese
main army escaped destruction in the Shanghai and Lunghai
Railway battles, strategy has required a campaign for the cap-
ture of the third of the five key districts of China Hankow,
at the intersection of the Yangtse and the Peiping-Canton
railway. At the time of writing the Japanese have reached
Kiukiang; it is said that they hope to take Hankow in September,
or alternatively, to cut the railway to the south of it.
If Hankow falls, Chiang Kai-shek will have to make a diffi-
cult choice between a military and a political disadvantage.
If he retires with his main force into Szechwan, he will still be in
a central position as between the southern and northwestern
provinces not yet invaded, but his army will suffer from a shortage
of military supplies, as Szechwan will no longer have rail and
30. CHINA: THE JAPANESE INVASION, 1937-38
SOUTH OF THE WALL
river communication with Canton, but only the unsatisfactory
road connections through Kweichow. If, on the other hand,
Chiang Kai-shek retreats south into Hunan, he will be in a
strong military position with Canton and its munition imports
at his back, but he will be out o touch with Szechwan and still
more with Shensi and Kansu, so that the recently created
national unity, depending so much on a centrally situated capital
and adequate communications, will be gravely impaired.
If the Japanese are not diverted from China by a war with
Russia, and if they can take Hankow, it seems likely that China
will in effect be divided into three parts:
(1) The South, remaining under Kuomintang rule, with
Canton as link with the outer world; primarily the three prov-
inces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Hunan, with Szechwan loosely
(2) The Northwest, under Communist rule, linked with the
Soviet Union by the Lanchow-Urumchi road; Kansu and
Shensi plus Ninghsia and Sinkiang beyond the Great Wall.
(3) The Northeast, including the Peiping-Tientsin, Shanghai-
Nanking and Hankow areas; divided between Japanese-
controlled governments and Communist guerrilla formations;
Japanese occupation of chief towns and along the Yangtse and
The war has already produced a curious reversal of roles be-
tween the North and the South. For several decades up to last
year the South was, on the whole, a revolutionary force in conflict
with the conservative North. Today the North is the strong-
hold of Communism, while the South is by comparison con-
servative. The Communists of Kiangsi, driven out by Chiang
SOUTH OF THE WALL
Kai-shek in 1934, made a long trek through Hunan, Kweichow
and Szechwan to Shensi 1 and there renewed their strength with
a somewhat modified program; then, as a result of the famous
kidnaping of Chiang Kai-shek at Sian at the end of 1936 the
Kuomintang and the Communists came together in a national
united front, the Communists adopting the national flag, but
retaining in fact under their own rule the territory they held.
After the outbreak of the war with Japan the Communist leader
Mao Tse-tung was made governor of Kansu a province vital
for communication with the Soviet Union and the Commu-
nists, alias the Eighth Route Army, took over the conduct of the
war north of the Yellow River. The old Chinese administration
in Shansi and Hopei having been broken up by the Japanese
invasion, the Communist guerrillas have extended control over
all the districts not actually held by Japanese garrisons. Thus,
while the South remains more or less solidly attached to the
Kuomintang, North China has become a battle-ground be-
tween the Japanese and their handful of ultra-reactionary
Chinese followers on the one hand and the Communists with
their mass-mobilization peasant auxiliaries on the other.
If Hankow falls, Canton will again be the main base of the
Kuomintang, as it was before 1926. If Canton is lost, resistance
can be continued in the mountainous Southwest with the rail-
way to Yunnan from French Indo-China and the newly con-
structed road to Yunnan from Burma as routes of supply. But it
is very unlikely that the Japanese will seriously attempt to cap-
ture Canton. Not -only would it require a large expeditionary
force, which Japan cannot afford to send out in addition to all
1 For an account of the "Long March" see Edgar Snow, Red Star over
China, part v.
SOUTH OF THE WALL
her other commitments, and a landing on a wide front on a well
defended coast; it would also almost inevitably involve com-
plications with the British at Hongkong which all but the
wildest of Japanese extremists desire to avoid, at least in the
immediate future. The leased New Territory of Hongkong
would greatly impede any operations against Canton, and
"incidents" would be sure to occur along the border; the British
reaction to these would be much sharper than at Shanghai, for
not only is Hongkong British territory (which the International
Settlement at Shanghai is definitely not), but it now represents
the whole stake of British interest in China. While British trade
in North and Central China has suffered eclipse as a result of
the war, Hongkong has enjoyed a boom. The foreign trade of
independent China is again concentrated at Canton, as it was
before 1845, and Hongkong is Canton's open-sea port. The
Japanese capture of Canton would put an end to this trade, and
Britain has therefore the strongest of reasons for doing everything
possible to keep the open door open here, even though Japanese
sliding screens may impede entry at Shanghai, Tsingtao and
THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
The region of the Far East to the south of China and Formosa,
lying entirely within the tropics, contains a total of 117 million
inhabitants divided between six sovereignties as follows:
State in millions
Netherlands Indies ....... 60.7
French Indo-China ....... 23.2
Siam ............ 14.5
U.S.A.: the Philippines ..... 13,3
Britain: Malaya ........ 4.4 1
Borneo ......... 8 J 5 '*
Portugal: Macao ......... i ^
Timor ......... 5 '
It is not easy to fix a natural boundary for this region toward
the east, but it is convenient to count the Netherlands Indies as
a unit, including Dutch New Guinea, within the Far East, and
to distinguish Australia, Australian New Guinea (Papua and the
former German colony now under an Australian mandate 1 ) and
1 The administration of Papua, formerly under the British Colonial
Office, was transferred to the Commonwealth of Australia in 1906.
THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
all the Pacific islands east of New Guinea and the Philippines as
"Oceania/' The Pacific archipelagoes, however, are of great
strategic importance for Far Eastern affairs in view of their
actual or potential development as naval and air bases, and it
should be noted that four of the states holding sovereignty within
the region of the Far East also possess groups of islands in
Oceania. Thus no study of the Far East can avoid some refer-
ence to the distribution of "territory" if consisting only of
coral atolls in the vast ocean spaces between Asia and the
Japan holds three groups of islands taken from Germany in
the Great War: 1 the Marianne (or Ladrone), the Caroline and
Marshall Islands. The Mariannes continue southward the line
of the Bonin Islands which are reckoned an integral part of
Japan and lie mostly between latitudes 20 and 10; the
Carolines and Marshalls form a belt stretching for some two
thousand miles east and west between 10 N. and the Equator.
There are about three thousand islands in all, the great majority
being uninhabited coral reefs enclosing lagoons, useless for pro-
ductive purposes, but admirable as submarine or seaplane bases.
To the south and southeast of the Carolines and Marshalls is
a belt of British Empire ownership in five sections from west to
east: (i) Australian New Guinea, full sovereignty in the south
(Papua) and League mandate in the north over former German
New Guinea; (2) the Bismarck Archipelago, formerly German,
now under Australian mandate; (3) the Solomon and Santa
Cruz Islands, British; (4) Nauru, formerly German, now under
1 See p. 66. The Pelew Islands were formerly reckoned as a separate
group, but the Japanese have included them for administrative purposes
in the Carolines.
THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
British Empire mandate, exercised jointly by Britain, Australia
and New Zealand; (5) the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, British.
These areas are, as it were, in the front line relative to the
Japanese island groups. Farther back, below lat. 10 S., are
Australia itself, the New Hebrides (Anglo-French condomin-
ium), the Fiji and Tonga Islands (British) and Western Samoa
(New Zealand mandate).
The main area of French possession, including the Tahiti,
Marquesas and Tuamotu island groups, lies far away to the east;
in the westerly Australia-Fiji region, however, France also has
her share in the New Hebrides condominium and full owner-
ship of the large island of New Caledonia, economically im-
portant as one of the world's principal sources of nickel/
The American empire in the Pacific pivots on the Hawaii
group, which lies roughly in the latitude of Hongkong. The
Hawaiian Islands have a total population of 368,000 and con-
tain the large town of Honolulu and the first-class naval base of
Pearl Harbor. To the north, in the latitude of Kamchatka, are
the Aleutian Islands forming a curved chain to the southwest
of Alaska. Far to the south are the islands of Eastern Samoa,
adjoining British Tonga and the New Zealand mandate of
Western Samoa. A distance of more than 2,200 nautical miles
separates Honolulu from Samoa, but in this vast space of ocean
are scattered the Central Polynesian Sporades and the Phoenix
-Islands; among the former the ILS.A. owns the island of Sama-
rang, and among the latter (which, as a group, are British) dis-
putes with Britain the title to the two small islands of Canton
and Enderbury. A curious compromise has just now been
reached, whereby the question of sovereignty is left in abeyance
"for a protracted period of time" and each nation accords the
NOTE ON MAP 31
"First-class" naval bases are those which are capable of docking
and repairing capital ships, Hongkong was a battleship base
before the introduction of "Dreadnoughts/ ' but has not been
rendered first-class for modern conditions; this rank has passed
to Singapore, where the base was completed in 1937. The U.S.A.
has so far no first-class base west of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and
Japan has none south of Sasebo in Kyushu. Cavite (Manila) and
Mako are cruiser bases like Hongkong. The standstill agreement
on fortifications and naval bases in the Washington Naval
Treaty of 1922 was intended to reduce tension by keeping
battle-fleets at safe distances from one another, and the three
great naval Powers of the Pacific are still very widely spaced out
from a strategic point of view.
THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
other equal facilities for civil aviation; according to the Daily
Telegraph Washington correspondent 1 "there is nothing in the
details of the settlement at present known which would prevent
the [American] navy from taking over the islands in the event
Between Hawaii and the Philippines lie three American-
owned islands, not in a straight line, but breaking through what
would otherwise be a three-thousand-mile space of sea contain-
ing only Japanese land. These three stepping stones are Midway,
Wake and Guam. Before 1919 they were already stations for a
trans-Pacific submarine cable, and during the last four years
they have been in use as airports for the trans-Pacific service of
Pan-American Airways. They are under the jurisdiction of the
American Navy Department, and Guam, the only one of any
size (225 square miles), is a regular naval station.
The American chain of islands cuts in between the Marianne
and Caroline groups of the Japanese mandate. Under the
terms of the League of Nations mandate, which Japan still pro-
fesses to regard as binding, though she has withdrawn from the
League, the Japanese islands may not be fortified, and there is
no evidence that any large regular naval base has been con-
structed, but harbor works and an aerodrome at Saipan not
far to the north of Guam could no doubt be militarized very
quickly if war were imminent.
It will be clear from the above survey that in the event of a
naval war in the Pacific,
(i) If the British Empire and the U.S.A. were allied against
Japan, their position would be a strong one, and the U.S.A.
would be able to use Australian New Guinea and neighboring
1 Daily Telegraph, Aug. n.
THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
Australian or British islands for supporting American forces in
Guam and the Philippines.
(2) If the British Empire were at war with Japan, and the
U.S.A. neutral, New Guinea and Nauru (important for its
phosphate deposits) would be exposed to attack from the
Caroline and Marshall Islands.
(3) If the U.S.A. were at war with Japan, and the British
Empire neutral, the Americans would have great difficulty in
coming to grips with the Japanese in the western Pacific from
their bases in Hawaii and Samoa owing to the great distances,
while Guam with Japanese islands to north and south of it
would be very insecure as a link with the Philippines until the
Mariannes and Carolines had been entirely cleared of Japanese
naval and air forces.
Such strategic considerations have a direct bearing on the
political problems of the East Indies and Indo-China, for the
question of the continuance or renunciation of the American
control of the Philippines is crucial for that part of the world,
and the position of America as a Great Power in the Far East
depends on trans-Pacific communications. The European na-
tions holding colonial territories in the Far East naturally main-
tain communication with them via the Indian Ocean and the
Malacca or Sunda Straits; these lines cannot be intercepted by
Japan. The line Hawaii-Manila, on the other hand, runs right
across Japan's line Yokohama-Yap. The situation of the Philip-
pines as a part of the American empire is so exposed that, in
order to make sure of holding them in an era of imperialist
struggle, the U.S.A. must in the long run either equip herself
with armaments far in excess of what would be needed for the
defense of the homeland and possessions as far as Hawaii, or
THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
must enter into defensive arrangements with other powers in
the Far East. From the point of view of the European Powers
with Far Eastern colonies the final departure of the Americans
from the East Indies would be a great misfortune, for it would
uncover the East Indies to Japanese expansion and leave the
European colony-holders who cannot deploy their full strength
in the Far East as long as Europe is in a state of discord to bear
the brunt of it.
The Western Powers owning territory in the Far East have
long since ceased to aim at further expansion or to contend with
one another; they are concerned only to hold what they have,
with the exception of the U.S.A., who is in doubt whether to
retain or to abandon her rule. The Western Powers in the
Southern zone of the Far East are confronted today with politi-
cal problems of two kinds: the first, that of dealing with the
nationalist aspirations of the peoples under their sovereignty,
and the second, that of preserving their territories from the ex-
pansionist aims of indigenous Far Eastern states in which cate-
gory must be included, not only Japan, but also Siam.
Among the hundred million Asiatics under Western rule in
Indo-China and the East Indies three national movements are
of real importance the Javanese, the Annamese and the Fili-
pino. Fully a third of the hundred million are entirely out-
side these three divisions, and they include the Indian and
Chinese emigrant colonies, the Malays, the Khmers, the Bali-
nese, the Bugis and a host of minor peoples and tribes. But
in a brief survey it is possible only to take note of the three
big aggregates numbering some forty, twenty and ten millions
Java and the scarcely detached island of Madura comprise
THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
only a little over one-fifteenth of the area of the Netherlands
Indies, but contain more than two-thirds of their total popula-
tion, or 41.7 millions at 817.5 to the square mile. Java thus
naturally forms the core of the Dutch East Indian empire, the
rest of it being termed the "Outer Islands/' Three languages are
spoken: Sundanese in the west and Javanese in the east of Java,
and Madurese in Madura. A "Javanese 1 ' may accordingly be
either an inhabitant of Java or a speaker of Javanese, and in spite
of the differences of language there appears to be enough com-
mon civilization in the islands for a Javanese nationality in the
former sense to exist in fact. The "Indonesian" nationality, on
the other hand, cannot be said to have any real basis; it exists
only among a handful from various parts of the East Indies who
have received a higher education in Dutch, and does not corre-
spond to any popular consciousness. Outside Java and Madura
insular and tribal particularism are so far too strong for the
formation of any "Indonesian" unity, and the Javanese are as
much foreigners as the Dutch; the Malay language provides a
lingua franca on the coasts, but no adequate foundation for a
coherent nationality, and Malay in any case cannot bind the
Outer Islands to Java. The only vigorous nationalism is that of
Java itself, but this is quite sufficient to confront the Dutch with
a difficult problem of government.
The Netherlands India Constitution of 1925 granted a very
limited measure of self-government in Java following the ex-
ample of British concessions in India, but as the Indian example
also shows, it is not easy to stop at any particular point on the
road to "Dominion Status." The Dutch have no intention, as far
as is known, of yielding up ultimate control over their East
Indian empire, which has in the past been as lucrative as it has
THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
been easy to manage. But there has certainly been unrest in Java
during the last decade, and there is always the possibility that a
discontented element might seek foreign aid for a revolutionary
movement. An independent Java might rapidly become a con-
siderable power; it may be noted incidentally that the popula-
tion of Java and Madura is six times that of Australia, and that
Java, Borneo and Sumatra together form the most important
oil-producing area in the Far East. 1
In French Indo-China the ruling European Power has to deal
with the growing nationalism of the Annamese, who form over
90% of the population of the territory. Unfortunately for France,
the internal problems of French Indo-China are complicated by
the proximity of an increasingly powerful and unfriendly Siam.
The French colony 2 is composed historically of (i) the "empire"
of Annam, including Tongking and Cochin-China, (2) the king-
dom of Cambodia, and (3) territory taken from Siam, including
Luang Prabang province and Battambang. Thus, while Annam
and Cambodia were swallowed whole, Siam was merely muti-
lated, and today France, with a power depending on a small
colonial force halfway across the world from the home country,
is confronted with a modernized state which has a long history
of wars and is now in the grip of an intense nationalism, has a
population equal to that of Yugoslavia, is building up an army
on a basis of universal military service, and has created a not
negligible navy and air force. Siam in the 'eighties and 'nineties
1 The oil production of the Netherlands Indies (of which about 97%
comes from Java, Borneo and Sumatra) was 6,437,910 metric tons in
1936, and the country stands sixth in the world in estimated oil reserves.
* Formally only Cochin-China is a "colony/ 1 while Annam, Tongking,
Cambodia and Laos are protectorates. But the difference is only that
between French administration in Algeria and in Morocco.
THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
of the last century only escaped the fate of her neighbors, Burma
and Annam, because France and Britain could not agree on
a division of the spoil and preferred to leave the country as
an independent buffer state. Both Britain and France, however,
helped themselves to outlying territories of the Siamese kingdom,
and these losses are too recent to have been entirely forgotten in
Another factor important in shaping Siamese policy is sus-
picion and fear of China on account of the large Chinese
minority (si/ millions) in Siam. The Chinese formerly counted
Siam as one of their "vassal states" on the strength of receptions
of seal and calendar from Peking, and since the Revolution such
historic claims have been brought up to date by spokesmen of
the Ruomintang in the form of proposals for a future federal
union of these states with China. Siamese nationalists reject the
idea, and view any increase of China's power with apprehension,
as they consider it is bound to have a disturbing effect on the
overgrown Chinese minority and to compromise Siam's inde-
pendence. They therefore tend to regard Japan's activities in
smashing up the new Chinese state as extremely beneficial to
Siam, and it was not without reason that Siam, alone among the
attending members of the League of Nations, abstained from
voting on the resolution of the League Assembly which con-
demned Japan's action in Manchuria in 1933.
Latent, but unassuaged, grievances against Britain and France
and a strongly anti-Chinese bias have given Siamese policy in
recent years an unmistakable pro-Japanese trend. Though the
1 Britain in 1909 extorted the cession of Siamese suzerainty over the
Malay principalities of Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis in re-
turn for partial revision of an extra-territoriality treaty.
THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
rumors of a Japano-Siamese canal through the isthmus of Kra
to short-circuit Singapore may be discounted for such a canal
would be as vulnerable in time of war as it would be costly to
construct Japanese influence in Bangkok has been strong
enough to cause alarm to Britain and France, who have sought
to deter Siam from such an undesirable friendship by imposing
demonstrations of naval and aerial might. Measures of this kind
may be effective for a while, but the attitude of Siam in the
event of a European war would be determined by circumstances.
In 1917 Siam declared war on Germany and seized German
shipping and property in the country; Englishmen liked to think
this was because the Siamese in the third year of the Great
War had become convinced of the righteousness of the Allied
cause. In another struggle of the European nations, however,
Siam might decide differently on the question of right and
invade French Indo-China with the assistance or collusion of
The position of French Indo-China between the Japanese
navy and the Siamese army has suddenly become very danger-
ous, and the French have shown their awareness of the fact by a
series of vigorous measures increase of the military establish-
ment, a "French Singapore" to be constructed at Kamranh Bay
on the Annam coast north of Saigon, occupation of the strategi-
cally important Paracel Reefs southeast of Hainan, and warn-
ings to Japan not to encroach on French vital interests by the
seizure of Hainan in the war against China. But in the long run
France's ability to hold Indo-China will depend mainly on the
degree of her success in conciliating the Aimamese; the latter
have no desire to exchange one foreign yoke for another, but
if there were enough discontent with French rule (and there
THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
has been a great deal), Annamese rebels might seek Siamese
aid, the Siamese to take Cambodia and parts of Laos, which
historically have a closer connection with Siam than with
British Malaya is in a much less exposed situation than French
Indo-China. It is relatively secure against a possible attack by
land from Siam; by sea it is much more remote from Japan and
is protected by the now completed first-class naval base at
Singapore. Internally the political problems of Malaya are not
too difficult from a British point of view. The Malays of the
hinterland are divided among a number of small protected
states, and in the Straits Settlements they are outnumbered
by the Chinese and Indian immigrants, who have flowed in
with the rapid economic development of the country. In
these circumstances there cannot be any united nationalist
movement and the classic formula of divide et impera is easily
Singapore is continually being developed as a seaport, airport
and fortress on the assumption that Britain will endeavor to
hold Malaya indefinitely, and France and Holland, closely linked
with Britain in the triangle Singapore-Saigon-Batavia, show
an equal resolve to stay where they are. In striking contrast
with this dug-in attitude is the doubt at Manila about the in-
tentions of the U.S.A. By an Act of the American Congress the
Philippines are being governed for ten years from 1935 as a
"Commonwealth" with an elected President and an American
1 The Siamese national hero Phra Naret subdued Laos and Cambodia
in the sixteenth century. The power of Cambodia had already been
broken by Siam two centuries earlier.
2 The government services have hitherto been reserved for English-
men and Malays, but now the Chinese and Indians demand a share.
THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
High Commissioner; in 1945 all American control is theoreti-
cally due to coine to an end and the country is to become a
sovereign "Philippine Republic." The abdication of American
power was brought about in the States by an extraordinary
log-rolling combination of anti-imperialist liberals, isolationists,
sugar interests which wanted the Filipinos put outside the
American tariff wall, and labor unions hostile to Filipino cheap
labor immigration. The abdication appeared to be as definite
as legislation could make it. Yet it may be considered improbable
that the Americans will be out of the Philippines definitely in
Filipino nationality is of a peculiar kind. The group of islands
called the Philippines had no sort of political unity before the
Spanish conquest in the sixteenth century, and takes its name
from a king of Spain. Further, the tribes of the Philippines
(except in the extreme south) were converted en masse to Chris-
tianity a phenomenon without parallel elsewhere in the Far
East. 1 The nationalism of the Philippines has thus more simi-
larity to that of Mexico or Peru than to that of Java, Annam
or Japan, and the revolt against Spain in the 'nineties was
largely inspired by Hispano-American examples. After 1898
U.S. American institutions and culture were superimposed on
Spanish, and today both Spanish and English languages are
current, the latter being the more widely known. But a nation
cannot be quite happy with the language of alien conquerors,
and so this year a law has been promulgated making Tagalog,
the speech of central Luzon, the official language of the Com-
ir The nearest analogy is provided by the Minahassa district in the
northern peninsula of Celebes. But, generally speaking, Christianity has
made little headway in the East Indies outside the Philippines.
THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
monwealth. All this has caused considerable confusion; there
are in fact a dozen vernacular languages of importance, and
there are as many fair-sized island units outside Luzon. There is
a strong Moslem minority known as Moros ("Moors") in Min-
danao, and a Japanese colony, numbering about 14,000, engaged
in the cultivation of hemp in the district of Davao in the south-
east of the same island. On a broad view, the prospects of sta-
bility in an independent Philippine republic do not appear to be
very bright; and when it is remembered that the most northerly
island of the Philippines is visible on a clear day from Japanese
Formosa, it is fairly obvious that the international position of
the new state would be one of acute discomfort.
In Japan the program of overseas expansion toward the
south is called the Nankai ("South Sea") policy. At its minimum
this means nothing more than an intensified commercial drive,
but at its maximum it implies a political ascendancy and the
use of force. In its latter form, the Nankai policy is clearly an
alternative to expansion on the mainland of Asia, and the debate
between the Continental and South Sea schools is bound up
with the professional rivalry between the two fighting services
in Japan. In the opinion of the Japanese Army the Navy's
function is to preserve Japan's communications with the con-
tinent and perhaps to harry enemy powers in war-time with
commerce raiders, but not to set itself up as an independent
force with a strategy of its own; the Navy's idea, on the contrary,
is to restrain the Army from continental adventures, to avoid the
liabilities of long land frontiers and to concentrate Japan's re-
sources on building up sea-power. The bridling of the Army by
the Navy was an evident fact when Admiral Okada was Prime
Minister and Japan denounced the capital ship ratios of the
THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
Washington Treaty. But the military mutiny of February 1936
ended Okada's rule, and the present war in China, even if
it brings victory to Japan, must involve vast new permanent
military commitments and reduce the Navy's share both of the
national budget and of influence on national policy. The Navy's
failure to prevent the new plunge into continental conquest may
be attributed partly to the wider popular hold of the conscript
army as compared with the limited personnel of the naval serv-
ice, and partly to the fact that the Navy no less than the Army
demands a large-scale autarchic heavy industry which can only
be secured by control of North China.
Nevertheless the attractions of the Nankai program remain,
and in certain circumstances it might again become practical
politics. Malaya and Indonesia represent a vast market for cheap
manufactured goods and also produce (or could produce) a
great variety of raw materials, notably rubber, tin, oil and iron
ore. British Malaya comes first, and the Netherlands Indies
second, in the world's production of rubber; British Malaya
stands first, and the Netherlands Indies fourth, in the world's
supply of tin. The Netherlands Indies is the principal oil-pro-
ducing region in the Far East; oil is found in Sumatra, Java,
Borneo and the island of, Ceram in the Moluccas. Finally, Min-
danao in the Philippines and Celebes and southeastern Borneo
in the Dutch domain contain vast deposits of lateritic iron ore,
which are costly to work and have as yet been hardly touched,
but which might in the future be of a great importance for a
'Far Eastern heavy industry. All these things, and especially the
oil of Borneo and Ceram, might be objectives of Japanese
But the crucial question is whether or not the Americans
32. OIL, IRON AND TIN OF THE EAST INDIES
THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
finally abandon the Philippines in 1945. If they go, it should not
be too difficult for the Japanese unless they have suffered some
crushing disaster in the meantime to gain control over the Fili-
pino state and make it into a kind of Manchukuo, and with both
the Philippines and the Carolines in their hands they would
seriously threaten New Guinea, the Moluccas and eastern
Borneo at a safe distance from the Singapore base. If, on the
other hand, the Americans remain in the Philippines and keep,
under whatever juridical formula, a protectorate over the
islands, Japan will not be able to dominate the Philippines or to
invade New Guinea or the Moluccas across the Hawaii-Manila
line without risking war with the United States, and it is incon-
ceivable that she should do this as long as she has both Russia
and China as enemies on the mainland of Asia. The sole con-
dition on which Japan would be likely to provoke the U.S. A. by
a South Sea expansion would be a Russo-Japanese rapprochement
giving rise to relations like those of 1907-17; such an appease-
ment would give Japan security on the mainland, so that she
could concentrate again on sea-power, but it is a possibility very
remote from the facts and policies of today.
If the Americans stay in the Philippines and continue to take
an active interest in Far Eastern affairs, a violent expansion of
Japan to the south or southeast is extremely improbable for a
long time to come. A frontal attack on Malaya across the South
China Sea is equally improbable. Hongkong and French Indo-
China, however, remain in a danger zone, for British and French
interests in access to China via Canton and Yunnan respectively
can at any time involve them in the struggle between Japan and
China which may continue, with intervals of truce, not for years,
but for decades. In this struggle the possession of Hainan is likely
British EZ3 French
Dutch HI US. A.
USA. ^ Japanese
100 200 300 <rOO 500 M.
33. THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
in the long run to be o paramount importance. A Japanese
naval and air base in Hainan, added to the existing base at Mako
in the Pescadores west of Formosa, would give Japan a strangle-
hold both on Hongkong and Tongking and the power finally to
cut off China from the traffic of the South China Sea.
THE RAJ* EvN.ST, 1938
GEORGE E. TAILOR
W/t/i Additional A/\ap>s by
THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC
The United States is not only an imperial power in the Far East
sharing the interests of the western empires but also a Pacific
power in her own right. She has therefore always had two distinct
sets of relations, one with the western empires, sometimes co-
operative and sometimes competitive, among them but not of
them, and the other with the independent countries bordering
the Pacific in particular, China, Japan and the eastern terri-
tories of Russia. The policies of the United States in this area
have done more than is generally realized to determine, for a
hundred and fifty years, the course of events in Eastern Asia.
The United States, from the territorial point of view, is neces-
sarily pulled into Pacific affairs. In the north her Alaskan
boundaries are separated from the mainland of Asia by a nar-
row sea, Japan is within flying distance of the nearest Alaskan
bases. United States possessions in western Pacific waters, the
South Pacific and the South China seas, rival those of any of
the western empires; her naval bases lie much further from the
homeland than do any of the Japanese; important airports extend
from Dutch Harbour in the north to Pago Pago in the south, from
Pearl Harbour in the east itself 2410 miles from San Francisco
to Cavite in the west Pacific. The United States operates the
THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC
only trans-Pacific air lines. The argument that America has been
historically more interested in Europe than in Asia must take into
account the fact that for decades she has held a position in the
Pacific which she is only now, for example by the occupation of
Iceland, beginning to acquire in the Atlantic. Whatever the
apathy toward or ignorance of her role in America itself, there
have been no illusions about her role in the Pacific among the
countries in the Far East.
The policy of the United States has, indeed, been well defined
and consistent. The ends of policy remain the same for all regions
in which she is interested, the means by which policy is achieved
derive from local and historical conditions. The United States
has sought in the Far East, as in other regions, first and foremost
the security of its own territories and the protection of its own
nationals; for this reason it has a regional as well as a general
interest in peace. A further end of policy is the development of
economic interests and this naturally includes an active concern
with the manner in which trade is conducted and with the main-
tenance of the economic principles underlying the American
The main techniques which the United States has employed in
the Far East to secure regional peace and its own interests are
maintenance of a balance of power and freedom of the seas.
Upon these depend the success of keeping an Open Door for
commercial opportunity. These methods of handling Far Eastern
affairs came into prominence at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury when the United States re-emerged in the Orient after
several decades of quiescence due to the Civil War. It was a
different United States and a different Orient. From the end of
the 1 8th to the middle of the igth century the United States
THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC
joined vigorously in the expansion of European trade and meth-
ods of trading to the East, partly as a result of her commercial
rivalry with Great Britain, partly because the merchant capital
of New England found the clipper trade a far more profitable
business than expansion across the American continent. The
British command of the South China seas following the capture
of Singapore in 1819, the development of the American Pacific
coast, the growth of the whaling industry and the improvement
in shipping led to the use of the Pacific route. Rivalry with
Great Britain gave the impetus to the opening up of Japan. It
was necessary, as Commodore Perry put it, to anticipate the
designs "of that unconscionable government, the British Govern-
ment" whose cupidity was limited only by its capacity to satisfy
it. "The honor of the country and the interests of commerce
demand it." This was the language of a trading nation, but the
United States which re-entered the Pacific scene in 1898 was a
continental empire with vast industrial possibilities and growing
accumulations of capital to invest. Revived American energies
took United States commerce and investments into the Carib-
bean and Central America, a development forming the back-
ground of the Spanish-American War which led indirectly to
the seizure of the Philippine Islands.
The age of British sea power in the Far East, or at least of
British monopoly, waned as the igth century came to a close and
a new balance of power came into being. The building of the
Trans-Siberian railway brought the Eurasian land mass of Russia
into the picture and gave a land frontier on China outflanking
British naval power; the defeat of China by Japan in 1895
changed the relation between these two Far Eastern powers.
Completion of German and Italian unification in 1870 hastened
THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC
the tempo of imperialist competition to such an extent that
Africa was divided in twenty short years and pressures upon
China became intense during the last decade of the century.
Under such circumstances the only way in which the United
States could trade in the Far East was by preserving the formal
independence of China, her main arena of business, and this was
possible only on condition that China was not divided. The
revolt of China against imperialism at this time, the Boxer
rebellion, in the suppression of which United States troops par-
ticipated, helped to prevent the partition by compelling the
powers to unite at the very moment when they were in violent
competition. Because there was actually a balance of power it
was possible for the Open Door to be accepted. No one country
was strong enough to shut it.
The Open Door policy, as it is called, happened to be a tech-
nique best suited to the peculiar conditions of the time it has
never been a moral principle universally applied in all regions
where American policy was active, or even in the Far East itself.
But the natural corollary of this was the need to prevent China
collapsing and thus endangering the balance of forces. The gen-
eral purpose of American policy toward China has been to keep
China in that state where she would be weak enough to take
orders but strong enough to obey them; in other words, the
United States was as active as any in maintaining those treaty
rights which she shared with other powers, and which constituted
a violation of Chinese territorial and political integrity, and inter-
vened actively, for example, in the igso's, when these rights
were endangered, but was more willing than some to keep alive
the goose that laid the golden egg.
It is generally true that when Russia became too strong the
THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC
United States supported Japan; when Japan became too strong
support was given to Russia. The Anglo-Japanese alliance, de-
vised mainly to counterbalance Russian imperialism, came in
with an American blessing; it went out, when Russian imperial-
ism was apparently dead, with an American curse. So long as the
Chinese capital remained in Peking the pivot of American
policy, the keystone of the balance of power, was Manchuria, and
various schemes were suggested for making it a more effective
buffer state. Manchuria fell to the Japanese in 1931 partly be-
cause it had already lost much of its meaning; the political center
of China had moved to the Yangtse valley and the character of
the international situation had changed. The theory that Japan
was permitted to set up a bulwark against Communism must not
be exaggerated because in the Siberian campaign of 1919 the
mission of the American forces was concerned far more with the
prevention of Japanese expansion than assisting the Czechoslovak
legionnaires. From 1931 to 1941 the focus of the Far Eastern
balance of forces moved south until finally it centered in the
South China Sea.
The fact that the United States has only rarely used force in
the Far East can be attributed less to unwillingness to use it than
to her success in maintaining the balance of power.
At the same time the ratio of naval forces between Japan,
Great Britain and the United States, together with the non-
aggressive policies of the U.S.S.R., made possible a wide margin
of action on the part of Japan before she endangered her rela-
tions with the Anglo-American empires to the point of war.
This continental expansion and southward drive of Japan have
called forth, on the part of the United States, expressions of
policy which reflect the general purposes and techniques of that
THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC
policy in new forms, but the essence remains the same. The insti-
tutions of the United States as well as her geographical position
combine to support a desire for general peace, essential for the
security of the nation, and to sublimate the balance of power
policy into what Mr. Cordell Hull has called "order under law."
From the American point of view there was a perfect combina-
tion of principle and interest in insisting upon the maintenance
of treaty rights, both by China and Japan, upon the sanctity of
international law, upon the refusal to recognize, at least in the
Far East, changes brought about by force. While Franco's con-
quest of Spain was recognized, the spread of Japanese sponsored
regimes was not, while American treaty rights on the high seas
were abolished by Congress, in the Neutrality Act, the rights to
extraterritoriality, to the stationing of troops and gunboats, and
to administrative privileges, in China, were protected against all
comers. Yet the maintenance of these rights, from the Chinese
point of view, constituted a continuous infringement of the
other American principle of concern for China's integrity. Nor
was the Open Door open for China; none of the powers conceded
to China the rights they demanded from her.
United States policy can be properly stated only if it is under-
stood that most of the things which are usually called principles
are really techniques, applied unilaterally to the Far Eastern situ-
ation. The language of Secretary Lansing in 1914 put the
situation very frankly: "This Government will be glad to exert
any influence, which it possesses, to further, by peaceful methods,
the welfare of the Chinese people, but the Department realizes
that it would be quixotic in the extreme to allow the question
of China's territorial integrity to entangle the United States in
international difficulties." In other words, the United States has
THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC
been far less actively concerned about the integrity of China than
has Britain about the integrity of Belgium and Holland, for the
simple reason that it was of less concern to American interests.
Statements of American as of British policy are more a guide,
when they deal with principles, to the sort of world they would
like to live in than to the motives which inspire action.
It is often overlooked that democracies, as well as dictator-
ships, spread their ideas abroad. The American government has
quite naturally been active in the protection of its missionaries
on the one hand and its own philosophy of economic behavior
on the other. The effect of American ideas upon Japan and
China has been impressive, in the latter case revolutionary. It is
arguable, from the Japanese point of view, that the presence of
American colleges, churches and business houses in China repre-
sents a political force as potent as the most active fifth column
of the totalitarian states. Japan has everything to fear from the
spread of American influence in China, in fact this is one of the
things that she is most concerned to wipe out hence the attacks
upon educational institutions and the curtailment of missionary
activities. American propaganda in the East is none the less potent
for not being organized by government; its impact upon Chinese
society is patent to all, and American consular and diplomatic
agents have always used the missionary and businessman as a
source of information. It is the success of this propaganda in
China, as contrasted with Japan, which accounts for the senti-
mental stake that the United States has in China, and China in
the United States.
United States policies in the Far East cannot be explained in
terms of investments and trade. American investment holdings
in China, before the "incident," amounted to only $240,000,000,
34. THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC
her total trade to $250,000,000. For Japan the amounts ran
about three times as high. As far as China and Japan are con-
cerned the United States is interested in preserving opportunity
for trade and the American way of conducting trade rather than
in fighting for the preservation of investments as such; from the
economic point of view she can afford to lose the battle for
China and let Japan overrun it, as she has, but from the political
point of view the old concern for China's so called "integrity" is
important. The power that can control, if not exploit, China can
challenge the whole balance of power in Eastern Asia and en-
danger the very important strategic and economic interests that
the United States and others have in the South China Sea. It is
the southward drive of Japan which most concerns the United
The change in United States actions in the Far East came after
the fall of Holland and France. Up till then the flow of war
materials to Japan had gone on without serious interruptions,
the argument being that Japan was bound to expand and that as
no one was willing, on general principles, to stop her, it was the
better of two evils if she spent her energies on the continent
rather than in Southeast Asia. So long as the raw materials for
war which came from the trade with America were expended,
and, it was hoped, wasted, in China there was no urgent reason
to stop the flow, for the imposition of an embargo might well
have turned Japanese energies in other directions. The U.S.S.R.,
which sought to prevent a Chinese collapse, and would have pre-
ferred Japanese oceanic expansion, supported China with arms
and munitions and immobilized the best equipped sections of
the Japanese army in Manchuria.
The effect of the policies of the U.S.S.R. and the United
THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC
States was the same, to permit the aggressive power in the East
to weaken itself against the rising tide of Chinese resistance.
Soviet trade continued with Japan although some pressure was
put on Japan with regard to the fishing rights in Russian waters,
and the United States continued to trade with China although
insisting on the cash and carry provisions of the Neutrality Act.
The relations between the United States and Japan changed
when it became clear that Japan had ambitions in Southeast Asia
for here lay important interests. The most optimistic studies of
the degree to which the United States depends upon the Far East
for strategic raw materials admit that such materials as tin, rub-
ber, abaca and quinine, if obtained elsewhere, would be in
quantities sufficient only for immediate American military
needs; even this depends upon the assumption that the sea lanes
to the U.S.S.R., South Africa and South America remain open.
New sources of supply, scrap, synthetic products, and substitutes
can possibly replace these materials from Southeast Asia, but
the replacements would be extremely costly and the changes
involved would be very extensive involving, in some cases, a
period of several years. Only the accumulation of large stocks
could avert disaster while these measures were being taken.
There are no climatic reasons why Far Eastern vegetable prod-
ucts could not be grown in the Western Hemisphere, but the
high cost of labor prevents their production in the Western
Hemisphere in peace time, and new plantations could not be
made productive enough in sufficient time, during a war emer-
gency, to be of practical value. Over 85 per cent of American
rubber imports come now from British Malaya and the Nether-
lands Indies, a fact of enormous importance in war, for it takes
between five and seven years to bring a rubber plantation into
35. STRATEGIC RAW MATERIALS OF THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC
production. Scrap rubber to the amount of one fourth of the
American demand can be reclaimed, but not used for tires;
synthetic rubber can be produced at great cost, but at least a
year would be necessary to expand production.
The United States, therefore, could not willingly permit the
Netherlands Indies and the Malay Peninsula, the Philippines,
south China and the south Pacific to fall into the hands of an
unfriendly power, both because she depended on this area for
vital strategic materials and because control of such materials
would strengthen considerably the power of the enemy. It was a
necessary part of American strategy that the Japanese drive to the
south be stopped, a fact which became clear when Mr. Matsuoka,
while in office as Japanese Foreign Minister, went out of his way
to convince the world that Japan intended to give no more re-
spect to the statics quo in the Pacific.
The naval position of the United States in the Pacific had
changed even before the armament program got under way
after the fall of France. It had for years been assumed that in
time of crisis the British and American fleets might well be act-
ing jointly in the Pacific, for although the Washington confer-
ence gave Japan a favorable position in her own waters, the
cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese pact and the acceptance by
Great Britain of battleship parity with the United States paved
the way for co-operation between these two countries. Britain
and the United States controlled between them the exits to the
Pacific, thus making possible a long range blockade of Japan,
which, if enforced, would compel her to fight far from her own
bases. But it was the ever lengthening radius of air power which
gave the United States a potential advantage over Japan, espe-
cially after the abrogation of naval limitation treaties in 1936.
THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC
Guam, which had not been fortified as a naval base, became very
important as a possible submarine and air base only 1,500 miles
from Japan; the Aleutian Islands reach out to within 2,000
miles of Japan's industrial areas. The cancellation of the non-
fortification agreement by Japan herself worked to the advan-
tage of the United States; Japan had no territories within 1,500
miles of American shores. On the contrary, Japan's easternmost
possessions in the Marshall Islands are still 2,000 nautical miles
even from Hawaii and her nearest naval station is 6,600 miles
distant from the Panama Canal. The United States, therefore,
seemed to have control of the western and considerable power
in the eastern Pacific. That the time was too short to develop
these potentialities is a matter of history.
Full advantage of the treaty situation as regards naval power
in the Pacific was not taken by the United States until the new
armament program began in 1940 but pressure was applied,
though very gently, in the economic sphere. The first step, the
"moral" embargo of June, 1938, on exports to Japan of aircraft
armaments, engine parts, accessories, aerial bombs and torpedoes
practically stopped all trade in these categories. In December,
1939 the embargo list was extended to include molybdenum,
aluminum, and equipment or information required for the pro-
duction of high-quality aviation gasoline. In January, 1940, the
trade treaty of 1911 was abrogated but not until the fall of
France did Congress give the President authority to subject
exports to a licensing system. Actions up to this time on the
part of America can be explained as much by the restriction
which Japan put on trade with the U. S. for example, the
two million dollar tobacco export to Japan fell to two thousand
dollars in 1939 and to nothing in 1940 as by political motives.
THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC
Nor did the U. S. go out of its way to weaken Japan by giving
decisive support to its enemies until the events of 1 940 changed
everything. A loan of $25,000,000, to be repaid in shipments of
wood oil, was granted China in December, 1938, and one of
$20,000,000 in March, 1940 to be repaid in tin; these loans were
of political value to China, but in effect, the United States
merely financed the importation of strategic materials.
The United States was well aware, as was pointed out in the
note to Japan of December, 1938, that the situation had changed.
"This Government is also well aware that many of the changes
have been brought about by the action of Japan. This Govern-
ment does not admit, however, that there is need or warrant for
any one power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be the
terms or conditions of a 'new order' in areas not under its
sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository of authority
and the agent of destiny in regard thereto/' But the United
States did not feel it necessary to act until the whole basis of
the world balance of power was shaken by the German offensive
in the spring of 1940. Then came a crisis in American policy;
for the first time in a century and a half of contact with the Far
East the United States was faced with a situation in which it
would have to defend its interests by the threat of full scale
military and naval operations.
oyfton </ CUe
Man Aeo^es of
odn in 1941
36. FREE CHINA AND OCCUPIED CHINA, 1941
THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT, 1937-1940
The balance of forces in the Far East changed rapidly as a
result of the Sino-Japanese conflict. By the time that the Far
Eastern and the European wars merged together more particu-
larly after the fall of the Netherlands and France in the spring
of 1940 and the military alliance which Japan made with her
Axis partners in September of the same year measurable
changes had taken place in the internal economic and political
structures as well as the external policy and strategic positions
of China and Japan. By the fall of 1940 Japan had already taken
some of the steps mentioned in chapter X, such as the occupa-
tion of Canton and Hainan island and the putting of pressure
on French Indo-China to close effectively all routes from China
to the South China Sea. The course of events after the German
victories in Europe was largely influenced, in the Far East, by
the effect of the Sino-Japanese conflict on the two major powers
The position of China in 1940 was changed indeed from that
in the spring of 1938. Japanese armies had taken Canton in
October, the Munich crisis probably encouraging Japan to pro-
ceed with her plans, and followed this up with the capture of
Hankow. The drive up the Yangtse was stopped, it is true, at
THE SINO JAPANESE CONFLICT, 1937-1940
Ichang, and the push to the south did not reach Changsha, but
the positions held by the Japanese in central China were suffi-
cient to disrupt important Chinese communications and make
the feeding of widely separated armies a major problem. The
real turning point of the war, however, had come when China
survived the loss of Nanking and by refusing to come to terms
forced Japan to embark upon the annihilation of Chinese arms
and government. By the winter of 1938-1939 the Japanese armies
were fought to a standstill and since the spring of 1939 there
have been few changes in the territorial distribution of the two
opposing armies. Japanese strategy ceased, apparently, to con-
sider the cost of further invasion worth the price in men and
materials and the conclusion of the conflict was sought, from
this time on, by other means. On the military side this was
attempted by seeking to close all the gates that China still held
open on the world, particularly those leading through French
Indo-China, British Burma, and the remaining unoccupied
treaty ports, on the political side by attempting to create an
alternative government, in the occupied territory, to the Chung-
king regime, which Tokyo had refused to recognize since Janu-
ary 16, 1938. The stalemate in military affairs contributed,
therefore, to the Japanese drive to the south and the increasing
tension in Japan's relations with the western empires. In China
itself the struggle for territory gave place to a struggle for
The military stalemate came about only in part as a result of
the Chinese strategy of fighting the war in three stages a stage
of withdrawal, a period of stalemate, and finally, after Japanese
exhaustion and Chinese preparations, counterattack. There is
no question but that the Japanese invasion was made costly by
THE SINO JAPANESE CONFLICT, 1937-1940
the stubborn resistance of the Central troops at Shanghai and the
operations of the guerrilla units behind Japanese lines in the
north. China made full use of her territory as well as of her
social and economic organization, which made this type of re-
sistance possible. But the Japanese themselves are responsible for
important contributions to the smooth working of Chinese
strategy by failing to prepare those conditions necessary for
successful blitzkrieg. Instead of dividing China they united its
two most discordant elements, the Kuomintang and the Com-
munists. Far from lulling China into a sense of security and
encouraging lack of preparation they heralded the coming con-
flict by a series of declarations and actions which left no doubt
of their intentions. The victim was not isolated by diplomacy
or by previous encirclement, the way was left open for contact
between China and the western empires and the U.S.S.R., and
even the military advisers of Japan's ally, Germany, remained at
their posts for most of the first year of war. Nor was sufficient
allowance made, in terms of strategy, for the fact that China's
communication system did not accurately reflect the economic
complexity of her economy; strategy was based on the assump-
tion that control of the cities and means of communication
would bring with it control of the hinterland, which it did
not, and time which could have been better spent in imme-
diate occupation of the hinterland was spent in further ad-
vances into the interior. Almost every rule for successful war
was violated, strategy and politics were at variance and diplo-
macy hindered rather than helped the progress of the armed
The achievements of the Japanese army must not be lightly
dismissed, however, by measuring them against perfectionist
Pro/fee f</ roo.<f t now under
Western. Southern limits ; _o
JLoads '<mjajin.) = secondary
Numbers and letters on the map correspond to the following names:
- - Hg Hangchow
K Kwangchowan (Fr.)
M Macao (Port.)
1 1 Ningtsing
1 2 Batang
1 3 Silchar
1 5 Dacca
37. LAND COMMUNICATIONS
IN CHINA AND
THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT, 1937-1940
standards. If Japanese armies were bogged down in China, Chi-
nese armies were unable to drive them out of the country and the
prospects of building up in the west the industry and materials
for counterattack were no brighter than those of importing war
supplies from other countries. Japan's flank, admittedly at great
cost, was protected in case of southward expansion. China had
lost control of most of her railways, important rivers, and high-
ways; she had to watch the destruction of the major part of her
industry, 80 per cent of which had been located in Shanghai;
she was torn from her main sources of raw materials; she had
to cope with the migration of millions of her people. Nor was
the political front, which in many ways showed vast improve-
ment over the conditions of 1937, entirely satisfactory, the cleav-
age between the Kuomintang and the Communists at times went
as far as open conflict and in Nanking Wang Ching-wei had been
drawn into a rival government under Japanese sponsorship. In
those areas in which Japanese troops were stationed, control,
except for occasional assassination of pro- Japanese Chinese pup-
pets, went unchallenged. China's leaders were as determined as
ever to continue the conflict but there were few signs, in the
spring of 1940, to encourage any prospect of an early conclusion
of the war on Chinese terms.
The lowest point in Chinese morale probably coincided with
the closing of the Burma road by the British government in the
summer of 1940. At the same time there was much to the credit
side of the balance as far as China was concerned, for she more
than held her own in the struggle for government. The Japanese
sponsored regimes the Provisional Government of China at
Peking, established December 14, 1938, and the Reformed
Government at Nanking, set up March 28, 1938, both later
THE SINO JAPANESE CONFLICT, 1937-1940
incorporated in the Reorganized National Government of China
at Nanking under Wang Ching-wei, March 30, 1940 did
nothing to aid Japanese arms. Mainly owing to the vigor of
Chinese resistance, from the Border Government in the north,
the Communist regions based on Yenan in Shensi, to the Kuo-
mintang in Chungking, and partly owing to the political stupid-
ity of the Japanese army, the puppet regimes foiled to confuse,
divide or attract the mass of the Chinese people or the leadership
of free China. Free China has made it impossible for Japan to
rule China indirectly through a Chinese regime founded on a
sound social basis of classes favorable to Japan. Japan had to
choose between leaving China to the Chinese or ruling it directly
herself behind the facade of powerless puppets. In this connec-
tion North China was used as a kind of testing ground, for under
the Provisional Government a new political party, the Hsin Min
Hui, and a new political principle, the Hsin Min Chu I, were
introduced to replace the Kuomintang and the San Min Chu I,
and the flag of the Chinese Republic gave place to the five-
barred flag. When Wang Ching-wei was installed in Nanking
all this was dropped and the position assumed that Wang's
government was the legitimate heir to the Chinese revolution,
the orthodox as contrasted with the heretical branch at Chung-
king. The Reorganized Government at Nanking adopted, there-
fore, the San Min Chu I, the Kuomintang and the national flag.
Nothing could illustrate better the political failure of the Japa-
nese army, for this revealed that the only tactic left open to it
was the attempt to divide Chinese leadership in Chungking by
the offer of wealth, power, and personal safety at Nanking.
Against these temptations the Chinese, in spite of bombings and
hardships at Chungking, remained firm.
THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT, 1937-1940
The building up of a new China went forward, during this
period, on several fronts. That apparatus of the modern state
which had been constructed in Nanking between 1928 and 1937,
which constituted the Kuomintang's main 'contribution to
China, survived the transfer from Nanking to Hankow and
Chungking and in certain directions took on new forms and
strength. China in 1940 had a national army, in some places a
peoples' army, and had only the Japanese to thank for the
destruction of provincial forces of the old type; she called the
long postponed Peoples' Congress. Changes were made in the
machinery of central government and in some districts an attack
was made on the problem of modernizing local administration.
Because the government depended, for ultimate victory, not
only on the obedience, but also on the spontaneous co-operation
of the people, the general effect of the war, there is evidence to
indicate, was to encourage a closer relation between government
and people and efficiency in administration. Out of the war came
the impetus which brought forth the Chinese Industrial Co-
operative movement, a form of association which gave promise
of a broad basis for new social and economic patterns, tempering
the necessarily authoritarian regulation of war time. Free China
had to be a military agrarian state, for the army was the chief
political force and agriculture, even more than before the war,
the main part of Chinese economy; the government was the only
body able to direct, control and invest in industry. The issue of
the war revolved in large measure, therefore, around the ques-
tion of political ends, whether they were to be democratic or
fascist the spirit that would inform the economic and social
structure and the outcome in 1940 was far from clear. The
third stage of Chinese strategy, that of counter-attack, waited not
THE SINO JAPANESE CONFLICT, 1937-1940
only on materials of war and industrial growth, but also on the
fusion of strategy with political and social ends.
Japan in the spring of 1940 bore many marks of change as a
consequence of the war. The most obvious developments had
come on the diplomatic front in the formulation of the New
Order in East Asia, which later came to be extended to Greater
East Asia. On November 3, 1938, Premier Konoye described
Japan's ambitions as the establishment of a new order that would
insure the permanent stability of East Asia and indicated that
such purposes constituted the justification for the Sino-Japanese
conflict. Vague as the statement was it came generally to be re-
garded as committing Japan to the destruction of Chiang Kai-
shek's regime and the establishment of another government
more amenable to Japanese desires, the elimination of "Euro-
pean Liberalism/' that is, Anglo-American political, economic
and social ideas, as well as the liquidation of the Western em-
pires. This meant, in effect, the setting up of a Japanese con-
trolled economic and political bloc from the Amur river to
British Malaya and later, as ambition grew, to the Netherlands
Indies and the Philippines. Japan extended its diplomatic front
in a hostile world with friends but not allies, for the Anti-
Comintern pact of 1936 meant nothing to her in terms of mili-
tary assistance, and it was the unfavorable reaction which the
New Order received in those countries which stood to lose most
by it that assisted those Japanese who wanted to turn the Anti-
Comintern pact into a military alliance.
The New Order for East Asia was balanced by a new order for
Japan itself. The Japanese army soon took advantage of the war
in China to pass through the Diet legislation to initiate senji-
keizai, or full wartime economy. There is some debate as to the
THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT, 1937-1940
exact relation between the army and the big capitalists but it is
clear that the very difficulties of the campaign in China did much
to assist the military in securing the support of capitalists and bu-
reaucrats. The General Mobilization Law of 1938 gave the gov-
ernment unprecedented powers over the whole of Japanese econ-
omy. The necessity of stabilizing the situation in China was again
the chief argument used to justify the further movement towards
the forms of totalitarianism of August 1940 in Konoye's an-
nouncement of the New Political Structure and the New Eco-
nomic Structure. Through this the army achieved an old ambi-
tion, the abolition of political parties, for which were substituted
an Imperial Rule Assistance Association. The membership of
the new Association consisted largely of Konoye appointees.
With this went the final step, in the New Economic Structure,
of assuming complete control over industry, commerce, and
agriculture. The nation had to be fully geared to the task of
achieving, now, the creation of a New Order in Greater East
Asia; it had taken the army from September 1931 to August
1940 to put itself in an unchallengeable position in Japanese life
and commit the whole resources of the country to imperialist
The army influence upon Japanese economy was as far-reach-
ing as its interference in diplomacy. The effect of mobilizing the
armed forces in 1937 was to draw men away from production,
and the need for re-armament tranferred men from agriculture
to industry, a serious matter in a country where there is exten-
sive application of human capital to the land. The need for arm-
aments, naval and military, was greatest when the available man
power was weakest. Production in agriculture, forestry and fish-
ing went down; standards of consumption, after three years of
THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT, 1937-1940
war, were well under the already low levels of 1937; labor pro-
ductivity suffered measurably from declining consumption. The
production of producers' goods had gone up, of consumers' had
gone down; Japan sacrificed butter but she had the guns.
Those in charge of Japanese policy were naturally those who
least understood the impasse, diplomatic, economic and mili-
tary, to which she had been brought. In this respect Japan was
in a very different position from that of 1931; to say that her
policies were now entirely subservient to the imperialist ambi-
tion of the military is the same as saying that decisions were not to
be based on as careful an examination of the domestic and inter-
national situation as in earlier years. One of the most important
factors in the whole development of Far Eastern affairs had now
come to be the difficult internal position of the army; in order
to maintain its domestic prestige serious changes had been made
in Japanese politics and economics, changes which made it easier
to form and to control opinion, but which did not make it any
the less necessary to maintain public morale and keep up the
prestige of the forces abroad. Even totalitarian states ultimately
govern through opinion. In order to enslave East Asia the Japa-
nese army first found it necessary to enslave Japan.
China in the spring of 1940 was compelled diplomatically to
concentrate entirely on securing friends against Japan. Her po-
sition had changed, for Japanese occupation of the Chinese mari-
time provinces made the nineteenth century techniques of con-
trol meaningless; China no longer had her industry under foreign
guns, no longer received the Maritime Customs revenues and
had little to fear from extraterritoriality. For the time being the
foreign settlements were China's chief outlets to the world and
important centers of anti- Japanese activities. Japan, indeed, was
First- class naval base
dary naval bases
+ Military reservation
o 3oo soo
/Saipaii^; * Jap.
38. THE WESTERN PACIFIC
THE SING-JAPANESE CONFLICT, 1937-1940
finishing one part of the work o the Chinese revolution by at-
tempting to drive out western imperialism. China had changed,
in other words, from a strong semi-colonial country at the mercy
of foreign sea power to a weak though independent state based
on the inner heart of her land mass. Japan, on the other hand,
had lost much of her diplomatic freedom of action by commit-
ting herself openly to the destruction of the Western empires, by
antagonizing the United States and by formal association with
Italy and Germany. When the fall of France and Holland opened
up new opportunities in Southeast Asia the direction of Japa-
nese policy toward that area had already been prepared not
only by the steps which followed the China war but also by
earlier interests and policies in that part of the world.
Japan's commercial expansion in Southeast Asia and the south
Pacific countries developed during the World War of 1914-18
and grew rapidly in the decade preceding the China war. Japan
competed with advantage in a wide range of cheap goods, the
most important being textiles, as against the more highly priced
European and American products. During the first half of the
thirties, it is asserted, Japan assumed a position of major im-
portance in the commercial life of this area. The expansion of
her export trade led to greatly increased imports of raw materials
from the very countries which bought her goods. With goods
went retail merchants into Thailand, the Netherlands Indies and
the Philippines, where they competed with long established Chi-
nese commercial groups. Nor was Japanese capital inactive in this
region. Japanese rubber plantations, in which some 36 large firms
were interested, produced around 20,000 metric tons of rubber
a year as early as 1934. In Davao, southern Philippines, some
18,000 Japanese worked on Manila hemp plantations in 1939.
THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT, 1937-1940
Japanese agricultural investments in the islands were estimated
at $16,500,000; the big Japanese houses, such as Mitsui, Mitsu-
bishi, Nomura, Okura, had built up interests in almost every
product of the tropics tea, coffee, cinchona; Japanese mines in
British Malaya produced more than a fifth of Japan's total iron
ore imports in 1937; Japanese sources estimate total investments
in the mines, plantations, forestry, fisheries, and commerce of
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific at about 250,000,000 yen.
The growth of this vested interest took place mainly in the
colonies of Europe, of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands
and Portugal, and partly in the American Philippines. It de-
veloped in spite of restrictions imposed by the controlling
powers, which, after the conquest of Manchuria, began to fear
that the Japanese flag would follow Japanese trade. A vicious
circle appeared; increasing fear of Japan led to greater restric-
tions and greater restrictions to increased Japanese irritation,
and in certain quarters, more sabre rattling. More important
than this, however, was the financial strain of the war in China
and the use of foreign exchange resources for munitions of war,
which reduced Japan's capacity to purchase raw materials from
this region for peacetime industries and therefore reduced ex-
ports and foreign exchange.
The effects of the China conflict became more and more far-
reaching. If Japan had not embarked upon that adventure she
would not have required so desperately the raw materials of
war from the south at a time when she had less and less foreign
exchange to purchase them with. The effect of the war was to
make it more and more imperative for Japan to include her
neighbors to the south in a yen bloc and to secure political con-
trol over raw materials which she had helped to develop under
THE SING-JAPANESE CONFLICT, 1937-1940
foreign flags. The southward expansion of Japan, which had
been mainly an economic movement, turned into a political and
military development in 1940 more as a consequence of the
China war than of the developments in Europe which orphaned
the colonies of two western empires; it was the opportunity
which created the means.
39. SOUTHEAST ASIA
FAR EAST IN WORLD POLITICS
The role of Holland in the Pacific has been in some respects
similar to her role in Europe that of a weak power controlling
very important strategic areas. No great power in the Far East
could permit any other great power to dominate the rich raw
materials, the cheap native labor and the strategic position of the
Dutch East Indies, but Holland could be left in this position
because she was not strong enough to oppose the policies of the
powers or to change the general method of doing trade. The
Netherlands Indies were in this sense the pivot of the Far East-
ern balance of power; they were the Lowlands of the Pacific.
When Holland and France fell, therefore, the impact was felt
immediately in the Pacific.
The first world war began in Europe and spread to the rest of
the world; the present conflict began in the rest of the world and
finally reached Europe. In this sense the Far Eastern conflict has
from 1931 been a part of the world struggle, though generally
unrecognized as such indeed the theory that seems to have
been followed was that the European conflict might be avoided
if the smaller fires were isolated and allowed to burn themselves
out. The great system of Anglo-American-French domination of
the world depended, in one aspect, upon maritime control of
FAR EAST IN WORLD POLITICS
the industrial revolution, in the sense that none of the Great
Industry could be permitted to develop too far out of the range
of naval operations. The blockade was the chief weapon against
land powers with the Great Industry. The most important and
the first blow struck at this system, or this relation between land
and sea power, came through the spread of the industrial revolu-
tion in die U.S.S.R., the second blow came through the develop-
ment of air forces, the new power these gave to land armies and
the new possibilities they opened up for the prevention of naval
operations through narrow straits or near unfriendly shores. It
was these things which made possible a battle for the world.
The Sino-Japanese conflict was from its very inception, there-
fore, a part of the larger struggle, the struggle to break down
the domination of the world and its industrial development by
the United States, Great Britain and France. Gaping holes were
punched in the political structure of this world domination by
Japan's invasion of Manchuria, by her withdrawal from the
League of Nations, in company with her friends in Europe, and
by the destruction of the treaty structure of the Pacific. If the fact
of an Axis strategy be admitted, the Sino-Japanese conflict might
well be considered as part of the "softening up" process in the
struggle to destroy the world order. Certainly, when France and
Holland fell, the merging of the Far Eastern conflict into the
general European struggle became clear for all to see. Tokyo
"was not compelled to join the Axis by pressure of the United
States or by a common interest in destroying communism, she
joined the Axis only after the military had taken over full con-
trol of Japanese policies here again the importance of the Sino-
Japanese conflict, which helped to bring this about, is apparent
and after German diplomacy had succeeded in persuading the
FAR EAST IN WORLD POLITICS
military diplomats of the ease with which the Anglo-Saxon
powers could be destroyed and the world divided, to the advan-
tage of Japan in the Pacific, among the conquerors.
The German successes of the spring of 1940 naturally strength-
ened the hands of those Japanese, such as the ambassadors to
Berlin and Rome, who had earlier made an unsuccessful attempt
to bring Japan into close relations with the Axis. The importance
of the political changes in Japan in the summer of 1940 the
establishment of the New Political and Economic Structures,
and the destruction of political parties became apparent in
September, when the new foreign minister, Mr. Matsuoka, signed
the military alliance of Tokyo with the Rome-Berlin axis. This
alliance formally drew together the wars in the East and the
West; it provided, in effect, that if the United States should ex-
tend its participation in either conflict beyond measures "short
of war" then the other members of the Axis would engage in
war with the United States. The intention of the pact, appar-
ently, was to prevent the United States from acting decisively
on the Atlantic front, in behalf of Britain, by threatening it with
war in the Pacific, and to discourage American opposition to a
Japanese attack on the Netherlands Indies by committing Ger-
many, in such an event, to war with the United States in the
Atlantic. Each member of the Axis, however, was left free to
determine what constituted an act of war by the United
The next step in Japanese policy was to exploit the pact in her
relations with the U.S.S.R. and the announced task of the new
Japanese ambassador to Moscow, Mr. Tatekawa, was the con-
clusion of a non-aggression pact. Japan had much to gain if the
U.S.S.R. could be persuaded to guarantee the Manchurian fron-
FAR EAST IN WORLD POLITICS
tier, and reduce its supplies to China, thus permitting not only
a conclusion of the China incident but also expansion to the
south while the U.S.S.R. and the United States were both im-
mobilized by the pact. Germany had made it clear, after the fall
of Holland, that she was not interested in the future of the
Netherlands Indies. German good will in the south was shown,
moreover, by the pressure put on Vichy to accede to Japanese
mediation in the border dispute with Thailand. Acceptance of
Japan's demands on Indo-China in the summer of 1940 gave
Japan supervisory rights sufficient to close Indo-China as a
route through which supplies could go to Chungking, air bases
from which she could reach the Burma road, and an opportunity
for further embarrassing the colony by getting it into conflict
with Thailand, over which issue she not only mediated but se-
cured base facilities at Saigon and other points. If Japan ap-
peared to have profited little as a result of the changes in Europe
it must be remembered that Britain had not yet fallen, the atti-
tude of the U.S.S.R. was uncertain, the Chinese were undefeated,
the United States had gone out of its way in April, 1940, to point
out that its policy in the Pacific was based upon respect for and
maintenance of the status quo. The establishment by Tokyo of
the Wang Ching-wei regime, March 30, had been followed
twenty-four hours later by announcement of American loans to
China and in June by a licensing system on exports to Japan.
Perhaps the most important reason, however, why the Japanese
did not strike immediately after the fall of France was that op-
position in Japan itself had first to be fully overcome and that
this took most of the summer. By the time that Japan had com-
pleted her internal changes the forces opposed against her were
much stronger than those she would have faced in June.
FAR EAST IN WORLD POLITICS
The Japanese ambassador's mission to conclude a non-aggres-
sion pact with the U.S.S.R. was brought to a successful conclu-
sion by Matsuoka in Moscow on April 13, 1941. The Axis mili-
tary alliance of September did not affect the political status of
each of the three parties with the U.S.S.R., it was up to Japan to
get what terms she could. The pact, which runs for five years,
guarantees friendly relations and respect for the territorial in-
tegrity of the two parties, and the one is to be neutral in the
event the other is attacked by a third power.
The promise to respect the territorial integrity of the Mongol
People's Republic and the state of Manchukuo merely regulated
the status quo and was intended to remove boundary disputes
as a source of friction between the two countries. The pact did
not apparently include any agreements on the rest of China, and
Moscow assured Chungking that supplies would continue as
usual. It is difficult to see what Japan got from the pact, except
the regularization of her relations with the presumed friend of
the Axis, and a somewhat more favorable atmosphere for the
settlement of problems such as Japanese fisheries rights, bound-
aries and trade. The U.S.S.R., in spite of respecting the territo-
rial integrity of Manchukuo, did not cease aid to China or re-
move troops from Siberia. It is probable that Moscow knew in
April that Germany was preparing to strike very soon and wished
to prepare for Japanese neutrality as well as to encourage Japan
to strike south and thus bring the United States and Britain into
the war in the Pacific.
The United States, after the Japanese threat to extend its New
Order in East Asia to Greater East Asia was noisily announced
in Tokyo, very rapidly revised its whole strategy in the Pacific.
The aim of her policy, to prevent a Japanese absorption of the
FAR EAST IN WORLD POLITICS
lands to the south, was implemented by a series of moves which
were calculated to more than achieve that purpose. A new atti-
tude toward the U.S.S.R. became apparent in 1940 and early
1941, the United States apparently attempting to be friendly
enough with Moscow to frighten Japan but not so friendly as to
force Japan into the arms of the U.S.S.R. Mr. Oumansky, Soviet
ambassador to Washington, had conversations with Mr. Welles,
the Assistant Secretary of State, gestures were made such as per-
mitting $7,000,000 of machine tools which had been held up on
the Pacific west coast to proceed to Vladivostok. Secondly, as-
sistance to China, now an important friend on Japan's flank who
must be given the means to counter-attack in case of Japanese
southward expansion, immediately increased, in fact, the United
States very soon committed itself to assisting China through the
Lend-Lease Act on a scale sufficient to guarantee her continued
resistance. Prevention of a Sino-Japanese peace became of su-
preme importance to Washington.
Thirdly, the United States assisted the Netherlands Indies in
defense preparations and by agreements with Great Britain and
Australia enlarged the facilities for the U. S. fleet in the South
Pacific. In April, 1941, there were Anglo-American-Dutch talks
in Manila which, although secret, strengthened the impression
that the three powers had plans for the joint defense of their
interests in Southeast Asia. Australia and New Zealand were to
contribute to the defense of the South Pacific and Australia in
particular was a potential industrial hinterland for the defense
of Singapore. Fourthly, the United States put pressure on Japan
in such a way as to embarrass her war effort yet not, it was hoped,
to force her into such a desperate situation that she would be com-
pelled to fight. The effect of American economic measures up till
FAR EAST IN WORLD POLITICS
the complete cessation of trade in late July of 1941 was consider-
Fifthly, the United States began to build up around Japan a
ring of air bases with long range bombers which was expected to
discourage any aggressive action against the South China Seas.
These bases extended from Alaska to Pago Pago, from Hawaii to
Guam and Cavite; in particular, the naval base at Pearl Harbor
was greatly strengthened and new naval facilities were built in
Alaska. The importance of small outposts in the Pacific, even if
not fortified as naval bases, becomes apparent now that air power
is of such importance in all military operations.
Most important of all, the United States, by including Great
Britain and her allies, and China, in the scope of the Lend-Lease
Act, showed that she considered the Far Eastern conflict to be
part of the European struggle; there was but one front but many
theaters of action. Nothing contributed so much to the new
orientation of American policy as Japan's adhesion to the mili-
tary alliance with the Axis. If the Japanese really hoped that this
pact would act as a deterrent upon the United States they were
very disappointed; the attempt to force Washington to deter-
mine the extent of its intervention in Europe by threats in the
Pacific was too clumsy to succeed. There was no more effective
way of making the New Order in East Asia unpopular in Amer-
ica than by linking it up with Hitler's New Order in Europe.
If Japanese policy hinged upon the Axis, as Matsuoka told the
American ambassador to Japan, then Japan was bound up with
powers which are out to destroy the British Commonwealth and
Empire, whose survival the United States had decided was neces-
sary for its own safety. Without the consent of the United States
there could not be a Japanese New Order in East Asia. Mr,
FAR EAST IN WORLD POLITICS
Matsuoka, by his alliance with Germany and then with the
U.S.S.R., did more to align the democracies against Japan in
one year than did the continental expansion of a decade; the first
was, indeed, a logical consequence of the second.
The position of the U.S.S.R. during the course of the Euro-
pean war is clearer now than it was before the German invasion.
The U.S.S.R. and Germany concluded an armed truce rather
than a non-aggression pact in 1939 and the U.S.S.R. conducted
its negotiations with each member of the Axis independently.
The military alliance between the Axis powers, in September
1 940, was discounted as the regulation of relations already exist-
ing between them but mention was made, in the Soviet press, of
the spread of the war to include both East and West. Most im-
portant were Russian relations with China. From the very begin-
ning of Chinese resistance to Japan in 1937 t ^ ie U.S.S.R. has sent
military supplies to China to assist in what the Russians look
upon as a war of national revolution against an imperial power.
No strings seem to have been attached to this aid, which went
direct to Chungking and not to the Communist 8th Route Army.
This aid continued even when relations between the Kuomin-
tang and the Communists reached the breaking point and it con-
tinued in spite of the non-aggression pact between the U.S.S.R.
and Japan. A Chinese-Soviet trade agreement was signed in
January 1941 at a time when the New Fourth Army was being
suppressed by Chungking. The Soviets have apparently been
more concerned with Chinese independence and capacity to con-
tinue the struggle against Japan than with assisting the Com-
munist movement in China, although the two are not uncon-
Conflict between the U.S.S.R. and Germany changed once
more the whole balance of forces in the Far East. Japan naturally
FAR EAST IN WORLD POLITICS
For the United States it is historically fitting that she should
have entered the world conflict by way of the Far East. It is in the
Far East that the United States has always been the more deeply
involved. In Asia the United States has had a position of leader-
ship from which she could not abdicate, in Asia she has made
every effort to spread her ideas and institutions. From rivalry
with the British she passed to open ideological conflict with the
U.S.S.R.; now she is locked in struggle with Japan to determine
what political, social and economic concepts shall prevail in
eastern Asia and the Pacific. There can be no compromise the
monopoly imperialism of Japan admits of no rivals and no com-
petition. There is no solution of Pacific problems until Japanese
imperialism is rooted out of Japanese society.
America entered the conflict at the last possible moment and
with the maximum number of allies. She entered it in alliance
with the western empires, with the Republic of China, with the
Philippine people, with the U.S.S.R. fighting the chief ally of
Japan in Europe. She entered the conflict at a time when the sub-
ject peoples of Asia were no longer indifferent to their fate, when
nationalist movements were strong, and when the East had had
ten years to contemplate the meaning of Japan's program of
Asia for the Asiatics. The cooperation of the subject peoples,
especially of India, is indispensable to victory, and they have
already been predisposed in favor of the United Nations by the
Japanese themselves. But the full mobilization of their resources
and man power can come only through a realistic acceptance of
their political aspirations for national independence. Here the
importance of China as an ally is of overwhelming significance
China can furnish the biggest land front against Japan, espe-
cially against Manchuria, a vital industrial base, she can give
FAR EAST IN WORLD POLITICS
enormous man power to the allied forces, and she can also stand
as the greatest political factor in the struggle. So long as China is
kept in the fight the subject peoples of Asia will have hope of
eventual victory and freedom; so long as China fights, the claim
of the Japanese that they are leading Asia will stand out as a hol-
low sham. China is the key to the New Pacific.
N.B. The plain numbers refer to pages, numbers after M to maps
Agriculture, 29-31, 76-7, 99, 103, M 25.
Ainos, 62, 67.
Air bases, 159, 170-1, 195.
Alaska, 159, 195, M 40.
Aleutian Islands, 139, 171, M3i.
Altai, 18, 19, 106.
America, 15, 23; see also United States of
Amur, 31, 45, 46, 78, 80, 83, 86, 94, 98, 99.
Angkor, 21 (note).
Anhwei, M8, 120, M26, M27.
Annam, 34, 36, 37, 46, 146-9.
Anshan, 99, M 18.
Antung, M 16, M 18, Antung-Mukden rail-
Australia, 28, 109, 137-9, 142, 146* *94
M4, Mn, Mi2, M3i, M34, Mft,
M 38, M 39.
Austroasiatic languages, 34.
Austronesian languages, 34.
Baikal, Lake, 33, 45, 78, 80.
Bali, 36, 144.
Balkh, 21, 22.
Bangkok, 21, M 6, M 34, M 37, M 38, M 39.
Banners, Manchu, 54 (note); Mongol, 107,
Batavia, 41, 149, M 6, M 34, M 38, M 39.
Biro-Bijan, 78, M 13, M 14.
Bismarck Archipelago, 138, M 34, M 38.
Blagoveshchensk, 94, M 16.
Bonin Islands, 64, Mg, 138, M34, M38.
Borneo, 26, 146, 152, M 32, M 34.
Britain, 41, 44, 46, 55, 57, 58, 61, 63, 136,
137-9* 142* 149 154* i 6l l6 3 17* !94-
Buddhism, 17, 22, 36, 104.
Burma, 22, 55, 147, 175, 192, M 34, M 35,
M 36, M 37, M 38, M 39; Burmese lan-
Cambodia, 26, 34, 36, 37, 146, 149.
Canton, 42, 57, 61, 114, 122, 135, 174, M i,
M 5, M 6, M 30, M 34, M 36, M 37, M 38,
Canton Island, 139.
Caroline Islands, 45, Mg, 138, 142, 154,
Cavite, 140, MSI, M&, M&, 159, 195-
Celebes, 44, 150 (note), 152, M 32, M 34,
M37, M38, M39.
Ceram, 37, 152, M 32.
Chahar, M8, 60, 86, 100, M 19, no, 120,
126, M 27.
Changchun, 90, 93; see also Hsinking.
Chang Hsueh-liang, 87, 112.
Changkufeng, 96, M 17.
Changsha, 175, Ms6.
Chang Tso-lin, 87, 91.
Charchan, 22; 23.
Chekiang, M8, 116, 120.
Chiang Kai-shek, 74, 122, 128, 132.
Chinese Eastern Railway, 49> 7 8 > 8 S> M X 5>
90* 9i 94-
Chinese Turkestan, see Smkiang.
Ch'ing dynasty, 52, 93.
Chishima, 64, M 9; see also Kurile Islands.
Chita, 78, M 14, M 15.
Chungking, 114, M 23, MSO, M 36, M 37,
M 38, M 39.
Coal, 70, M 10, 76, M 13, 99* M l8 > 12 4-8*
M 26, M 27.
Cochin-China, 46, 146.
Cockchafer, H.M.S., 149.
Communists, 74, 84, 134, 135* *7 6 * 1 7 8
Cotton, 70, 128, M 29.
Customs, Chinese Maritime, no.
Dairen, 46, 90, 92, 94, M 36.
Dalny, 46, 66, 90.
Davao, 151, 185, M 33* M 34* M 38, M 39.
Dutch Harbour, 159, M 40.
East Siberian Region, 78, M 4, M 13.
Eighth Route Army, 135.
Ellice Islands, 139.
Enderbury Island, 139.
Extra-territorial rights, 48, 50.
Far East, extent of, 16, 137; three zones of,
Far Eastern Region- (of the U.S.S.R.), 77*
Fengtien, 99, M 18.
Fiji, i39> M 3 8.
Filipinos, 38, 150.
Fisheries, Siberian, 80.
Formosa, 34, 4*> 64, M 9 68* 70, 151,
France, 46, 48, 55, 146, 154* 167.
Franco, Francisco, 164.
French Concession, Shanghai, 118.
French Indo-China, 46, 137, 146-9* J 75
M 4, M 12.
Fushun, 99, M 18.
Gama, Vasco da, 22.
Gilbert Islands, 139.
Gobi desert, 23, 86, 102-4, 1O 7> M 2Q -
Grand Canal, 116.
Guam, M 31, 142* *95 M 34-
Hainan, 36, 148, 154, M33, 174* M36,
M37, M38, M 3 9.
Kami, 18, 22, 23, M i, 104, 110, M 20, 112,
Han dynasty, 29.
Hankow, 57, 114, 116, 122, 132, M 30, 174,
Harbin, 23, M i, 49* M 15* 90* 94* 98-
Hawaii, 139, 143* *54* ^ _ _ _
Heiho, town, 94, M 16; province, 99, M 18.
Heilungkiang, 87, 93.
Himalayas, 18, 22.
Hokkaido, 62, 67, M 9.
Holland, 41-5, 63, 167; see also Netherlands
Honan, M 8, 120.
Hongkong, 46, 136, M 33, M 36, M 37,
M 38, M 39.
Honshu, 62, 68, Ug.
Hopei, M8, 87, 99, no, 114, 115* 120.
124-8, M 27.
Hsingan, M 18, 109.
Hsinking, 93, 94.
Hsuan Lung iron ore deposits, 120.
Hull, Cordell, 164.
Hunan, M 8, 120, 134.
Hupeh, M 8, 114, 120.
India, 17, 21, 22, 26, 34, 36, 42, M 34.
Indonesia, 26, 36, 37, 41* 44* *45* W
Indonesian languages, 34.
Irkutsk, 23, Mi, M2O.
Iron, Mio, 70, 99, M 18, 110, 126, M27.
152, M 32.
Iron ore, 186.
Italy, 191, 199* * 01 -
Java, 20, 26, 37, 38, 41-4, 144-6.
Javanese language, 27, 145.
Jehol, 60, 86, 87, 93* 94* M 18, 102, 103, 109.
Kaiping coalfield, 126.
Kalgan, no, M so.
Kalmikov, Ataman, 85.
Kalmuks, 52, 54, 56, 104, M 19.
Kamranh Bay, 148, M 33.
Kansu, 29, M 8, 104, 112, 120, 134, 135.
Karafuto, 66, M 9; see also Sakhalin.
Karakorum mountains, 18.
Kashgar, 22, M so.
Kazaks, 106; Kazakstan, 113.
Khabarovsk, 80, M 13, M 14.
Khan Tengri, 18.
Khasi Hills, 19.
Khingan mountains, Great, 88, M 15.
Khirgiz, 106; Khirgizia, 113.
Khmer language, MS, 34.
Khotan, 22, 23.
Khutukhtu, the, 108.
Kiangsi, M 8, 120, M 28, 134.
Kiangsu, M8, 114, 116, 120, 124.
Kiaochow, 46; see also Tsingtao.
Kirin, 87, M 15, 93, M 16, M 18.
Kita Karafuto Petroleum Company, 82.
Kolchak, Admiral, 82.
Korea, 26, 36, 51, 54, 57, Mg, 66, 68.
Kra, Isthmus of, 21, 148, M 33,
Kublai Khan, 63, 118.
Kulja, 22, 56, M 20.
Kum Tagh desert, 17, 103.
Kunlun mountains, 34. .
Kuomintang, 57, 61, 74, 91, 116, 122, 124,
i34 135* 147* 176, 178, i79> 198-
Kuo Sun-ling, rebellion of, 91.
Kurile Islands, 62, 64, M 9.
Kurusu, Nomura, 200.
Kwangchow, 48, MSJ.
Kwangsi, 57, M 8, 120, 134.
Kwangtung, 56, M 8, 114, 116, 120, 122, 134.
Kwantung, 51, 58, Mg, 66, 90, 91; Army,
9 l -3 99 10 9 8-
Kyushu, 62, Mg, 68.
Lamaism, 36, 104.
Lanchow, 18, M i, Mao, us.
Lao territories (of French Indo-China), 46,
146 (note), 149.
Leased territories in China, 46-7.
Lesser Sunda Islands, s8 t 44.
Lhasa, 22, 58, M37.
Liaoning, 54, 87, 93.
Lytton Report, 90-1.
Macao, 41, M8, 137,
Madura, 144-6; Madurese language, 145.
Magellan, 15, 23.
Mako, 140, M 31, M 33, 156.
Malacca, so, 40, 41, 44; Straits, 143.
Malay Peninsula, 16, 19, 20, 44, 170;
language, 34, 145.
Malaya, 26, 34, 36, 137, 149.
Malays, 37, 144, 149.
Manchuria, 23, 26, 30, 49, 51-5, 58, 64-7,
74, 87-100, 109, 112, 163, 190, 191.
Manchus, 52-6, 60, 88.
Manila, M6, 140, 143, 154, M$$, M$4,
M 38, M 39; Manila hemp, 185.
Mao Tse-tung, 135.
Marco Polo, 18, 22, 24.
Marianne Islands, 45, Mg, 138, 142, 143,
Marquesas Islands, 139.
Marshall Islands, M g, 138, 143, 171.
Mataram empire, 38.
Matsuoka, Foreign Minister, 170, 191, 195,
Mng Chiang, no.
Miao, 32, MS.
Midway Island, MSI, 142.
Mindanao, 37, 151, 152.
Ming dynasty, 42, 52, M 7.
Mintaka Pass, 22.
Mitsubishi, house of, 186.
Mitsui, house of, 186.
Moluccas, 20, 41, 42, 44, 152, 154.
Mongolia, 23, 26, 28, 31, 36, 52, 54, 56, 58,
60, 66, los-is, M 36, M 37, M 38, M 40.
Mongols, 31, 32, M 3, 35, 37, 54, 60, 70, 91,
102-12, M 19.
Mukden, 23, 58, 93, 99.
Naga tribes, 20.
Nankai policy, 151-4.
Nanking, 57, 91, 114, 116, 118, 122, 124,
134, 178, M 36, M 38.
Nanling mountains, 28, 122.
Nauru, 138, 143.
Naval bases, 139, 140, M 31, 142, 149, M 33.
Naval forces, ratio of, 163, 170.
Netherlands Indies, 137, 145-6, 152, 170,
185, 189, 194, M34.
Neutrality Act, 164.
New Caledonia, 139, M$8.
New Guinea, 137, 138, 142, 154, M 34,
M 3 8.
New Hebrides, 139, M 38.
New Zealand, M 11, M 12, 139, Mji, 194,
M 3 8.
Nine-Power Treaty, 61.
Ninghsia province, M 8, 60, 102, 103, M 19,
120, 134; town, Mao, 112.
Nomura, house of, 186.
Ogasawarajima, see Bonin Islands.
Oil, 70, 77, M 13, 80, M28, 146, 152, M 32,
Okada, Admiral, 151.
Okhotsk, 45; Sea of, 31.
Okura, house of, 186.
Open Door policy, 162.
Osaka, 86, 132.
Oumansky, Cons tan tine, 194.
Outer Islands (of Netherlands Indies), 145.
Pamirs, 17, 18, 21.
Panama Canal, 171.
Pan-American Airways, 142.
Paotou, 67, no.
Papua, 137, 138, M 34.
Paracel Reefs, 148, M 33, M 34.
Pearl Harbour, 139, MSI, 159, 195.
Peiping, 18, 23, 28, 49, no, 114, 118, 124,
126, 134, M 36, M 37, M 38, M 40; see
Peking, 52, 54, 56, 107, 118, 122, 163, 178.
Peiew Islands, 45, 138 (note).
Philippines, 41, 44, 138, 142, 143, 149-51*
154, 161, 185-6, M 34, M 37, M 38, M 39.
Phoenix Islands, 139.
Polynesians, 15, 34.
Port Arthur, 46, 49, 57, 58, 66, M 15.
Portsmouth, Treaty of, 46, 49, 51, 58, 66,
Portugal, 40-2, 44, 137.
Possiet Bay, 31, M 17.
Poyang lake, 28.
Railways, 23, 31, 78, M 14, M 15, 88-92, 94,
Mi6, 96, Mi7, M2o, Mai, 116, 132,
M 30; zones in Manchuria, 49, 58, 88-90.
Rashin, 94, 96, M 17.
Ratio of naval forces, 163, 170.
Republic, Chinese, 60, 122; Philippine, 150.
Rubber, 152, 168, 170, 185, M 35.
Russia, 19, 23, 32, 40, 45, 46, 49, 57, 58, 64,
66, 88, 107; see also Soviet Union.
Ryojun, 46, M 15.
Ryukyu (Luchu), 54, 62, 64.
Saigon, M 31, 148, 149, M 33, M 34.
Saipan, MSI, 142.
Sakhalin, 62, 64, 66, M 13, 80-3.
Samoa, 139, 143.
Sanchiang, 94, 99, M 18.
San Francisco, 24, 159.
Santa Cruz Islands, 138.
Sarawak, 44, M 32.
Sarikol, 17, 21.
Sasebo, 140, MSI.
Sayan mountains, 104.
Semenov, Ataman, 83.
Shanghai, 24, 28, 48, 56, 83, 114, 116, 122,
Shans, 20, 32, M 3.
Shansi, 28, M 8, 120, 124, M 26, 126, M 27,
Shantung, M8, 99, 120, 124, M26, M*7,
Shensi, M8, no, 120, M 26, 134, 135.
Shihchiachwang, 128, M 30.
Shikoku, 62, Mg.
Shimonoseki, Treaty of, 51, 57.
Showa Steel Works, 99.
Sian, 74, 112, 135.
Siberia, 19, 26, 31, 76-86; see also Russia
and Soviet Union.
Sikang, M8, 60, 120.
Singapore, 16, 44, 140, MSI, 149,
Sinkiang, 18, 22, 28, 52, My, 54, 56, 57,
M 8, 60, 102-13, 134, M 37.
Solomon Islands, 138, M 34.
South Manchuria Railway, 49, 74, 90-4.
Sovietskaya, 80, M 14.
Soviet Union, 40, 76-86, 90, 91, 94-8, M 13,
M 14, M 17, 107-13, 134-5, 162, 163, 167-8,
176, 191, 192, 193, 194, 198-9, 202.
Ssu Ma-ch'ien, 29.
Suiyuan, province, M8, 60, 102, no, 120;
town, 104, no, M 20.
Sumatra, 20, 26, 34, 37, 44, 146, 152, M 32.
Sundanese, 34, 145.
Sunda Straits, 143, M 43.
Szechwan, M8, 114, 120, 132, 134.
Tagalog, 34, 150.
Tai languages, 34, M 3.
T'ai P'ing rebellion, 37.
Taiwan, M 36, M 38, M 39; see also
Taklamakan desert, 22, 103, M 20.
Tannu-ola mountains, 104.
Tannu-Tuva, 103, M 19, 106, 108.
Tartary, Gulf of, 80.
Teh, Prince, no.
Tenasserim, 19, 21.
Thailand, 185, 192, M 34, MSS, M 37,
Tibet, 18, 22, MS, 34, 36, 38, 52, M7,
54, 58, M 8, 60, M 3.
T'ien-shan mountains, 18, 103.
Tientsin, 48, 114, 116, 124, 134.
Timor, 37, 42, 44, 137.
Tin, M 28, 152, M 32, M 35, 168.
Tokyo, 28, 68.
Tongking, 46, 146.
Tojo, General, 200.
Trade restrictions, 171.
Trans-Siberian railway, 161.
Triple Intervention, the, 64.
Tsinghai, M 8, 60, 104, 120.
Tsingtao, MSO, 136; see also Kiaochow.
Tsitsihar, 94, M 16.
Tuamotu Islands, 139.
Tukhachevsky, Marshal, 98.
Tungans, 37, 60, 106, 112.
Tungsten, M 35.
Tungus, 31, 32, M3, 35, 88.
Turkis, 60, 112.
Turkish languages, 32, MS, 35, 37, 104.
Turksib Railway, 18, 112.
Twenty-one Demands, the, 90.
Ulan Bator, M 37, M 40; see also Urga.
Ungern von Sternberg, Baron, 107.
United States of America, 24, 40, 45, 137,
1 39-44* *49> *54> *59 e* && naval forces,
Urga, 23, 104, 107-10, M 20.
Uriankhai, 104, 107.
Urumchi, 22, 56, 104, M 20, 112, 134, M 37.
Usuri river, 46, M 15, 98.
Vladivostok, 46, 77, 80, M 14, 3-6, 96,
M 17, 194, M 37, M 38, M 40.
Wake Island, MSI, 142.
Wang Ching-wei, 178-9.
Washington Conference, 61, 90; Naval
Wa tribes, the, 20.
Welles, Sumner, 194.
Yakuts, 31, 35.
Yakutsk Republic (Yakutia), 77, M 13.
Yangtse, 29, 49, 57, 116, 118, 132, 174.
Yellow River, 29, 36, no, 118, 135.
Yenisei, 31, 76, 77.
Yunnan, 22, 57, M 8, 120, M 28, 135.